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Abstract: The United States Congress is one of the most disparaged institutions in 
contemporary political life. Citizens and pundits decry it. Many experts also concur, calling 
that branch of government “broken,” “dysfunctional,” “decayed,” “disastrous,” and even, “a 
constitutional shrinking violet.” The institution is even attacked from within, by Members of 
Congress (MCs) themselves. Yet, amongst all this reasonable critique, something is missing: 
the standard of health against which one ought to assess the Congress. This work aims to 
remedy this gap in the literature by providing “a well-thought-through ideal which we can use 
to hold up to [the Congress] for comparison” (cf. Waldron 2009), along with evidence of the 
viability of that standard in empirical cases. 
To develop a comprehensive conception of congressional health, I turn to the 
Constitution. I argue that the constitutional design of Congress, including the Preamble, shows 
that the Congress was designed to remediate the flaws of the Confederation Congress and to 
better promote the general welfare of the nation. I thus find that the chief desideratum of 
legislative health is the tendency of Congress’s rules, structures and norms to foster a 
representative lawmaking process responsive a popular majority in a deliberate way.  
The constitutional approach to Congress is then enriched through a treatment of three 
historical cases, namely, the First Congress, the Antebellum Congress, and the New Deal 
Congress. These case studies provide particularly clear examples of institutional structures and 
 vii 
norms that past congresses used successfully (or failed to employ) to meet the extensive 
challenges of a national lawmaking assembly in a large, diverse, federal republic. 
Returning to the present, armed with the appropriate positive standards for evaluating 
that institution, I find that the contemporary Congress’s rules and norms fail to consistently 
generate an effective and representative lawmaking process. The United States Congress 
avoids the sobriquet of “failure,” only through a limited respect for its dwindling norms held 
by a small number of MCs and the open acknowledgement of its difficulties by a wider group 
of legislators. A lack of independent institutional perspective, however, stands between the 
body and any realistic prospects for reform.
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Introduction: “The Most Disparaged Branch” 
Political scientists, public intellectuals, citizens and journalists have all sought to 
evaluate Congress in recent years.  Citizens are predominately negative in their appraisal.  
In 2010, for instance, a Pew poll asked citizens to describe the U.S. Congress in one 
word.  Eighty-eight percent of respondents used the opportunity to criticize their national 
legislature; many used descriptors such as “inept,” “corrupt,” and “incompetent.”1  While 
scholars are less unanimous, many are similarly critical.  These scholars hold that the 
contemporary Congress is “broken,” “dysfunctional,” “decayed,” “disastrous,” or in more 
colorful terms, “a constitutional shrinking violet” (Mann and Ornstein 2006, Mayer and 
Canon 1999, Tulis 2009, Mann and Ornstein 2012, Chafetz 2012).2  Accounts do differ, 
however, as Congress is sometimes presented as a representative body with a difficult 
institutional job (Sinclair 2009) that governs the country relatively well, even during 
times of polarization and divided government (Mayhew 1991/2005, 2017).3   
Considering the importance of this dispute, it is surprising to note that these 
criticisms and measured defenses have generally been undertaken before determining 
what functionality is and how the current institution fails (or succeeds) in meeting that 
standard of functionality. In short, there is no generally operative description of what a 
                                                 
1 March 2010 poll undertaken by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, quoted in Taylor 
(2013, 1). 
2 Journalist Ezra Klein (2012) is more poetic: “This is the worst Congress ever.” 
3 In similarly poetic terms, scholar Andrew Taylor suggests that all in all, “it is a pretty good legislature” 
(Taylor 2013). 
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“well-functioning,” “well-ordered” or “healthy” Congress would consist of. The 
consequences of such a state of affairs are severe, as “We cannot undertake intelligent 
disparagement or criticism of our legislative institutions if we do not have a well-thought-
through ideal which we can use to hold up to them for comparison” (Waldron 2009b, 
354). Simply put, one must know something about what a healthy Congress is before one 
may diagnose its illnesses. Before attacking or defending Congress, a preliminary 
question must then be answered: What is an appropriate standard for congressional 
health? Since Congress is a purposefully created institution, answering this question 
requires more than a metaphorical step on the scale or a check of the pulse. Counting the 
number of bills passed by Congress or the days in session will not be sufficient.4 To 
develop a conception of congressional health one must instead answer a series of related 
questions: 1) What is the purpose or aim of the institution of Congress? 2) How will a 
well-ordered Congress go about achieving this aim? 3) How was a well-functioning 
Congress constituted in the past? Only after fully answering these questions can one 
reasonably identify an instance or instances of congressional failure. 
Fleshing out what I mean by congressional health will help to illustrate which 
aspects of this term have already been explored in contemporary scholarship and which 
remain to be articulated.  By referencing the concept of health – and more specifically 
health with respect to an institution – I mean to say that certain aspects of the structures, 
                                                 
4 The insufficiency of purely counting-based approaches is clear. Even attempts to develop quantitative sets 
of indicators, as seen in the “Healthy Congress Index” produced by the Bipartisan Policy Center, 
supplement such indicators with qualitative consideration of the appropriations and committee processes.  
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rules, and norms of an institution conduce to its well-functioning. An institution is 
healthy to the extent that these well-ordered structures, rules and norms outweigh any 
institutional features hindering its function. Thus, by health I do not intend to make 
claims about an ideal condition whereby an institution functions perfectly, just as a 
patient who has received a clean bill of health from his physician realizes that his doctor 
is not suggesting his physical condition approaches that of Usain Bolt or any other world-
class athlete. On the other hand, when only the minimum requirements to survive are 
being met a patient is not considered healthy; a patient on life-support is not generally 
considered healthy. Analogously, an institution accomplishing only the task of its self-
perpetuation, likewise, cannot be said to be healthy. 
By referring to a conception of congressional health I draw attention to the fact 
that the United States Congress is a particular legislature and that its particularity is 
related to its place within the constitutional edifice of which it is a part. That is to say, the 
attributes of Congress that will characterize it as healthy are related to what it was 
intended to do (its purposes or aims) and how it was designed to function. This 
consideration means that it makes little sense to evaluate Congress as an institution with 
respect to functions that it was not designed to carry out. The attributes that make 
Congress healthy thus may or may not be attributes that conduce to health in the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom or any other legislature.  
While this point is rather straightforward, it is apparent that a good deal of 
popular criticism that Congress receives is inattentive to this point.  The Senate was not 
designed to be representative, if by representative one means respecting the principle of 
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one person, one vote.  If one criticizes the Senate for its lack of representation on these 
grounds, as some do (see Klein 2013), one must criticize the Constitution on this ground 
(as Levinson [2006] does) rather than the Congress. Finally, this conception, as it relates 
to an institution with a long history, should be attentive to this history. A conception of 
congressional health should be informed by instances or cases where particular 
institutional features helped the body achieve the aims and responsibilities entrusted to it 
by the Constitution.  In short, a conception of congressional health should integrate 
insights from how Congress was constituted in eras or epochs where it was generally 
well-functioning. 
 The extant literature does not provide such a comprehensive conception.  
Scholars have investigated congressional functionality, but they generally probe only one 
particular dimension of failure, such as abdication (Fisher 2000, Farrier 2004, Tulis 2009, 
Chafetz 2012), gridlock (Binder and Smith 1997, Binder 2003), the quality of 
deliberation (Bessette 1994, Loomis 2011, Wallner 2012), or polarization (Theriault 
2013, Muirhead 2014).  No matter the quality of these works, they only provide a partial 
understanding of congressional health as a whole.5 Others do examine these questions 
more directly, but they do so only with respect to the Senate (Swift 1996, Wirls and Wirls 
2002). While several works – those of Mayer and Canon (1999), Mann and Ornstein 
(2006, 2012), and Taylor (2013) – tackle the question of evaluating Congress more 
                                                 
5 This is, of course, more of a description than a critique as these authors did not set as their task the 
articulation of an analytically sophisticated conception of congressional health.   
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directly, each suffers from flaws that render their implicit or explicit standards 
problematic. 
If my appraisal is accurate, scholars, politicians and citizens are engaging in a 
debate of great significance for the polity without attending to its proper foundation. Even 
so, this rather serious criticism must be qualified appropriately. Congressional experts 
can shed light on the question of congressional health as they have carefully attended to 
the institutional rules and attributes of the contemporary Congress. My first task is thus to 
take their studies of the current institution and determine what implicit standards of 
congressional health can be developed from their explicit critiques or defenses of the 
modern Congress, and what assumptions are shared by the field.  In Chapter One I find 
that (1) a rather detailed vision of an “ideal Congress” can be derived from these accounts 
and (2) two key implicit assumptions about a functional Congress emerge.  Nevertheless, 
I find that these accounts are not ultimately compelling as a comprehensive conception of 
congressional health.  Extant political scientific accounts fall short largely because they 
are (i) not systemic, (ii) are not informed by the whole sweep of American political 
history and are (iii) not sufficiently aligned with the constitutional design that continues 
to frame our system of governance. 
Since even the most sympathetic account of the current literature does not provide 
consistent and sophisticated accounts of the three domains of congressional aims, 
functions, and healthy instantiation of those designs, it is necessary to undertake a fresh 
look at each of these matters.  To determine the ends which Congress was designed to 
effectuate, I examine the Constitution itself. While that document does not, in so many 
 6 
words, announce the purposes of the Congress, the framework in constitutional theory 
known as positive constitutionalism offers a path forward. Scholars working in this area 
have revealed the degree to which constitutions as such – and the U.S. Constitution in 
particular – ought to be viewed as purposive endeavors for positive ends, rather than as 
merely lists or sets of limitations on government. Besides the examining the Preamble 
itself, which takes on increased importance when viewing the Constitution in this light, 
engaging in an explicit textual analysis comparing the Articles with the Constitution in 
Chapter Two allows one to identify principles of the institutional design of Congress: 
principles that can guide one in developing a comprehensive conception of how that 
institution was designed to function.  This task is aided by the commentary of those who 
saw “further and better” than most (Storing 1981); moreover, borrowing from the 
subtlety of the Federalist as well as contemporary constitutional theorists such as Barber 
(2003), Waldron (2016), and Whittington (2017) allows one to identify not only how the 
Congress was designed to operate but to determine the authoritative ranking of ends 
within the system (i.e. representation was the foremost virtue sought in the legislature). 
By the conclusion of Chapter Two, I thus show that a healthy Congress is one whose 
rules, structures and norms promote a representative lawmaking process, responsive to 
the immediate desires of a majority of the populace, while simultaneously reflecting a 
future deliberative majority. 
Yet, even this conception is limited, if it only focuses on the prospective design of 
the Constitution for creating new legislative institution.  Fully understanding the 
constitutional design of the legislature is critical, but its formation and development 
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during the “extended founding” is just as important.  The First Congress (1789-91) under 
the Constitution did more than just link the plan articulated in the Constitution with one 
particular, concrete instantiation of that plan; the House and Senate were populated in 
many cases by the same men who framed the Constitution itself. In the First Congress 
more than half of the members of the Senate (15 out of 26), and a number of very 
prominent members of the House (9 out of 65 including Madison) participated in the 
Constitutional Convention (Swift 1996, 48-49).6  
In sum, the fundamental institutional features of the First Congress were created, 
in many cases, by the very men who debated and drafted the words that framed that body.  
By examining the ways in which the first Congress handled the emergent crises of 1789 
one can develop a conception of congressional health with greater specificity, clarity, 
concreteness than otherwise would be possible from a mere abstraction alone.  In this 
way an example of congressional health in the Early Republican Period can help to 
inform the more abstract and general institutional attributes that could be expected to 
conduce to congressional health; they can help generate a picture of how the Congress 
was designed to operate in practice. Moreover, examining and evaluating an actual 
Congress can show that the standards of congressional health arising from the 
Constitution and The Federalist are achievable in practice, rather than being unattainably 
utopian. To this end, observing the First Congress at work only on “high politics,” such 
                                                 
6 While the presence of these framers in the First Congress does not suffice resolve questions of “original 
intent” or provide an authoritative example that every subsequent iteration must pattern itself after, the First 
Congress provides a vantage point for seeing at least one example of how Congress can be constituted. 
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as the development of the Bill of Rights, will not do. Beyond these critical matters, it is 
equally important to also look at the difficult work in bargaining, deliberation and 
representation that was undertaken in more mundane matters, such as setting the schedule 
for the first national revenue act. In the First Congress, MCs spent significant time and 
energy trying to reconcile the need for delegate representation of interests and 
deliberative trusteeship over promoting the national interest. Chapter Three focuses on 
details such as these to illustrate one way in which the Congress can self-consciously 
develop norms, rules and structures that would help it promote the general welfare. 
While examining the text of the Constitution, the writings of framers and 
theorists, as well as the inner-workings of the First Congress will all be a good start in 
developing a conception of congressional health, it will not complete the process.  In the 
first place, holding out the Congress of the “extended founding” as a sole exemplar of 
congressional health poses conceptual and analytical difficulties.  It makes little sense to 
consider Congress as healthy only when it literally engages in a process of construction 
of the structures of government, its internal rules and norms, ex nihilo.  The purpose of 
building institutions is to make many of these structures and rules at least semi-
permanent.  The actors within the institution then utilize those rules, structures and norms 
to aid in the function of the institution and to achieve its aims (North 1991).  While the 
capacity for reform seems, prima facie, to be an important attribute of institutional health, 
it need not accomplish reform each time from scratch.  Holding out the first Congress as 
the sole model of institutional health thus poses the problem of choosing a quite 
unreasonable and undesirable standard to apply to the rest of U.S. political history. 
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But more fundamentally, the account would be incomplete primarily because the 
concept of heath itself suggests a possibility of disorder or failure.  In order to have a 
good understanding of congressional health it is necessary to distinguish a healthy 
Congress from a stressed institution or a failed institution. 
To remedy the possible deficiencies in a conception of congressional health 
emerging from the founding alone, I proceed in Chapter Four and Five to investigate one 
case of congressional failure and one case of health in the subsequent development of the 
polity.  It is worth saying something further about this methodology. The process of case 
selection in this project differs from the manner in which cases are generally selected.  In 
ordinary social scientific inquiries cases are selected to help generate hypotheses that will 
be tested rigorously in subsequent work, to show a causal mechanism in action, or even 
as the main form of evidence for a historical or developmental theory of politics (Gerring 
2007).  The inquiry undertaken here demands a somewhat different task: selecting cases 
to gain greater resolution on the conception of congressional failure developed in the first 
stage of my project.  Selecting and describing instances where the Congress was 
constituted in a healthy manner, and those in which it failed institutionally, is 
methodologically in the service of distinguishing between these institutional states.  
Continuing with the medical analogy, until one can perform a successful “differential 
diagnosis” of the institution, the conception of congressional health is incomplete. If a 
Congress lacks the attributes specified (such as self-consciously developed structures to 
aide in responsiveness) and is yet quite successful, or possesses them and appears quite 
unable to promote the general welfare, the conception of congressional health advanced 
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in this work will prove to be inappropriate for evaluating the real-world institution of 
Congress. 
The cases selected for this study, the antebellum Congress and the Congress of 
FDR’s One Hundred Days, so far from operating to reprove the conception of 
congressional health operating in this work, provide substantial evidence of its validity. 
Consider the antebellum Congress: In the mid-nineteenth century the Congress (and the 
Senate in particular) was thought to be in a “Golden Age,” where the legislature had 
comparatively more influence than the President (differentiating them from the present 
status of Congress) and was ostensibly dedicated to a statesmanlike lawmaking process, 
emphasizing public-spiritedness and deliberation. Close investigation of the antebellum 
33rd Congress of 1854 shows that these generalizations were false or misleading so far as 
that institution was concerned. Prioritizing partisan loyalty over responsiveness or 
representativeness, that institution destroyed its own deliberative capacities over the 
course of a relatively small number of weeks. Even as the Senate appeared to spend a 
month seriously deliberating over the Kansas-Nebraska Act, analysis of what occurred on 
the floor shows that deliberation occurred over a fitful two-day span, while “speeches” 
with little to no deliberative content filled the other four weeks of the month. Robbed of 
the capacity to trade arguments regarding the particular merits of the policy under 
investigation, the Congress produced perhaps the most baneful bill in its entire history. 
Chapter Four is thus dedicated to a close analysis of that institution, coupled with a 
careful decomposition of its norms, rules and structures to illustrate the completeness of 
that bodies dereliction of their constitutional place. 
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The New Deal Congress of the First Hundred Days provides another opportunity 
for illustrating the way that responsiveness and deliberative policymaking representative 
of the important interests in the society can promote the general welfare. Commonly 
considered FDR’s personal Congress, fit to be molded to his command (at least in these 
pivotal early days of emergency), investigation of the record show something more 
complex. Responding to exigent circumstances, the Congress did allow the initiative to be 
set by the President, but the Congress retained in deliberative capacities by leveraging the 
power of bicameralism, as intended by the design of the Constitution.7 The House acted 
as a transmission belt, marshalling the bills proposed by the President through the 
legislative process with minimal change at maximum speed. The Senate, however, saw 
amendment activity and deliberation over the bills proposed to the extent that the 
Congress occasionally moved in the opposite direction as the President. Even more than 
that, by attempting to frame a representative policy-making process, the Congress 
provided the maximum chance of success of some of the more experimental and 
sometimes ill-considered presidential initiatives such as NIRA.8 The New Deal Congress, 
besides showing that the standards for congressional health articulated in this project are 
still relevant in the twentieth century, provides an explicit refutation to the idea that the 
national interest can only be promoted by the President, or to the equally fallacious idea 
                                                 
7 The mere fact of the existence of such an institution seems to cast doubt on accounts that the Congress is 
essentially a relic of a bygone era (Howell and Moe 2016), as modernity does not appear to obsolete the 
notion of bicameralism, at least as practiced in this Congress. 
8 I say “attempting” rather than “succeeding,” as the New Deal Congress failed to comprehensive represent 
all important interests. One way it failed to do so was through rules such as the filibuster. This rule operated 
to prevent any action directly referencing civil rights of black Americans from reaching a vote. 
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that any congressional deference to the President is a shirking of its duty. Chapter Five, 
thus concludes by injecting some needed optimism into conversations regarding 
Congress; if at the time of direst need the Congress could play a key role in righting the 
Republic, surely the polity need not resign itself to the permanence or constitutional 
necessity of a dysfunctional Congress. 
In the end, a well-conceived conception of congressional health “speaks its own 
importance” (Hamilton et al 1787/1963, 27). Existing not only in the design of the 
Constitution, it is also alive in the motivations and considerations of reelection-minded 
MCs of the past and present.  Such a conception has the potential to be useful not only 
academically, but also civically, in an effort to help politically engaged citizens and 
politicians to properly diagnose the disorders plaguing our contemporary legislative 
institutions, and to guide them to the kind of reforms which could place Congress on a 
healthy footing one again. By tracing out such an account, one is not led to a simple set of 
proposals for reforms, but rather to a more complete understanding of legislative 
functionality in the past and present. 
The work thus concludes with a relatively brief but targeted investigation of the 
contemporary 115th Congress, in the light of the investigation undertaken in this project. 
While not precisely on the low-level of the antebellum Congress, it is possible to rather 
precisely target the institutional failures of Congress, especially those related to the 
attempt to repeal the ACA. While the contemporary Congress as a body contains a 
substantial repository of information regarding the diverse political and economic 
interests of the nation, its internal processes consistently fail to utilize this resource. Such 
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norms and processes have led the Congress to a harrowingly close approach to 
democratic debacle. In attempting to repeal a divisive, although narrowly popular law, 
that institution was poised on the precipice of replacing that law, the ACA, with a vastly 
more unpopular policy, the AHCA. Besides the fundamental unresponsiveness of this 
maneuver, the replacement was evaluated by the Congress’s own scorekeepers as a 
potential disaster in the making. Only the action of a very small number of Republican 
Senators were able stop the body form inflicting grievous wounds upon itself (and 
perhaps the nation). The silver-lining emerging from that near-miss is fleeting 
institutional self-consciousness: several of the Senators seemed surprisingly self-aware in 
identifying the source of dysfunction. It was not partisanship, or ideology, that those such 
as Senator McCain pointed to as the cause for the Congresses difficulties, but rather an 
intentional turn away from “regular order.” In short, even some in the current stressed 
institution of Congress recognize that norms, rules, and structures are pivotal in getting 
the body back on its right footing. An account of congressional health, of what the 
Congress should look like, is thus both a needful and a timely thing. 
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Chapter One: Scholarly Analysis of “The Broken Branch” 
State of the art work on Congress speaks to the concept of congressional health 
even if it does not do so explicitly. Indeed, the literature is full of sophisticated and 
important investigations of congressional performance and governance. The majority of 
such works focus their criticism on particular aspects or elements of the contemporary 
institution of Congress. Writing about these alleged failures, scholars have articulated 
what I will label throughout this chapter “the dimensions of congressional failure.”  
These include the demise of the regular order, a lack of civil discourse on the floor, 
abdication of constitutional responsibilities, and failures of deliberation.  While scholars 
differ as to how explicitly they articulate the standard that they use to judge Congress, 
one can nonetheless abstract positive attributes of a “Good Congress” from these 
critiques. Indeed, at least implicitly, any critique presupposes a certain ideal against 
which to contrast the current suboptimal institution. 
Critiques and evaluations of congressional performance are not the only place 
where one can find helpful reflection on the institutional health of Congress.  Other 
scholars, while investigating the quality of modern governance and the policy process, 
illustrate key presumptions in the field regarding congressional health.  These 
presumptions emerge even in works that are not straightforwardly normative 
investigations.  The normative implications of ostensibly “value-neutral” work arise on 
account of the need to ground empirical investigations on certain baseline assumptions.  
Setting up such assumptions is necessary to the practice of contemporary empirical 
political science. This practice means that even purely empirical studies call upon certain 
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ends of politics – the aims, goals and normative content of political behavior - even when 
they fail to examine or even state those ends.  
Examination of two such threads of contemporary political scientific research 
reveals that the field trades on key assumptions about congressional functionality.  The 
first debate I examine concerns whether or not gridlock is a major problem in the 
contemporary, polarized Congress.   This debate, carried out at a high level of 
sophistication by Mayhew (1991/2005, 2009, 2011) and Binder (2003, 2015) reveals a 
shared assumption regarding congressional functionality: scholars believe that 
productivity is an essential element of congressional health. In other words, a Congress 
that can and does produce “landmark legislation” is a “good Congress.” The second 
debate I investigate regards the legitimacy, constitutionality and expedience of the 
filibuster.  Schickler and Wawro (2006) have sparred with Binder and Smith (1997) over 
the degree to which the filibuster procedures are protected and entrenched by “path 
dependence” and how much the filibuster has affected the policy process.  It is apparent, 
regardless of their final answer to these questions, that these interlocutors believe that 
Congress must, at minimum, allow a determined and cohesive majority to have its way 
and to manifest its will in the lawmaking to process. Combining the insights emerging 
from the evaluative and descriptive work of scholars yields a set of standards: a healthy 
Congress is a constitutionally-assertive, productive and majoritarian legislature, 
supported by institutional loyalty, and legitimated by transparent, responsible 
deliberation on policy. 
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While there is nothing irrational or inexplicable about the findings and 
assumptions that I outline above, they present an incomplete product when it comes to 
developing a systematic and comprehensive account of congressional health. Certainly, 
the individual findings of many of the scholars surveyed here are unquestionable; for 
example, it is simply true that an institution paralyzed or dominated by a faction 
unresponsive to reasoned debate is unhealthy. Nevertheless, I conclude this chapter 
arguing that the ideal presupposed by contemporary critiques of Congress, together with 
the assumptions of the foremost practitioners in the field, are not sufficient for generating 
a comprehensive and systematic conception of congressional health that is informed by 
the logic of constitutional design. The meaning of this phrase will be unpacked 
“negatively” in this chapter. That is, I will demonstrate that these assumptions and 
presumptions are not tied to a defensible account of constitutional purposes and aims of 
the legislative branch.  Only in the next chapter will this concept see a positive definition 
and explanation: an articulation of how one generates standards of institutional health by 
examining the text of the Constitution and other authoritative texts, such as the governing 
documents of the pre-Constitutional regime, namely the Articles of Confederation. 
THE DIMENSIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL FAILURE 
Most of the works evaluating the contemporary Congress are devoted to 
critiquing specific elements or characteristics of the institution. Surveying this swath of 
the Congress literature reveals myriad “dimensions of failure:” aspects of the institution 
that have fallen under heavy scholarly critique.  Examination of these varied critiques of 
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the present Congress can be divided into three broad categories: procedures, norms, and 
inter-branch relations. 
Congress has been heavily criticized in recent years for its abandonment of certain 
rules and procedures that were previously taken as settled rules of the game.  Mann and 
Ornstein (2006, 2012) argue that the demise of regular order – the rules of the so-called 
“textbook Congress” that call for a bill to be reported to a committee, marked up, etc. – 
has had the effect of allowing the majority to steam-roll the minority party, particularly in 
the House of Representatives.  The end of the regular order, they argue, leads to a lack of 
representation of minority views and concerns in final versions of legislation.  According 
to Mann and Ornstein the procedures previously allowed a bill to be marked up in 
relatively consensual fashion with frequent bargaining between the two parties.  The 
current process does not approximate the previous one at all, as bills are hastily 
assembled into unwieldy omnibus legislation that is placed on the floor under closed 
rules.  
Furthermore, in a manner that greatly complicates the “School-House Rock” 
version of lawmaking, particularly in the House, bills are now subject to ad hoc 
specialized rules (Oleszek 2011, Sinclair 2012).  Bills frequently come onto the House 
floor under a closed rule – i.e. without the possibility of amendment. Open rules, where 
Members have an opportunity to propose amendments to a given bill, have thus become 
rarer, sometimes vanishingly so. From 1989 through 2008, only 32 percent of rules were 
open. “During the 111th Congress [2009-2011], no legislation was brought to the floor 
under a simple open rule” (Sinclair 2012, 28).  The dominance of the Rules Committee 
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by the majority party has led to even more peculiar features, such as the emergence of 
special rules.  One such example is a special rule that, when passed, automatically 
amends the underlying substantive bill under consideration, with no vote on the 
substantive matter required.  
Because a self-executing provision in the rule allows language to be 
incorporated into legislation without a vote, it can be used to pass matters 
that members would be leery of voting for openly. Without a recorded 
vote, the visibility of the issue is decreased and responsibility for it is 
obscured. In 2004, $12.8 billion in new tax breaks for business were 
quietly incorporated into the transportation bill through a self-executing 
rule (Sinclair 2012, 35-6).  
Legislation responsiveness to majority preferences can certainly be imperiled in an 
environment where substantive votes can be transformed into procedural votes – votes 
which MCs seldom need to explain due to their low salience. 
According to critics, Congress’s processes are also imperiled by its “Tuesday-
Thursday Club,” was a term once used derisively to describe a group of MCs who 
skipped out on important Monday and Friday business to attend to matters in their district 
(see Nokken and Sala 2002).  Observers of Congress note that scheduling House business 
around this growing custom unduly shortens the amount of time and attention that it can 
give to serious national concerns and problem solving (Mann and Ornstein 2006, Taylor 
2012). Critics further allege that the Congress, to give extra time to constituency service 
and fundraising, has in fact altered its time in session to make the “Tuesday-Thursday 
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Club” a norm of congressional scheduling rather than a violation.  One piece of solid 
quantitative evidence to back up this allegation is that the present Congress spends 
roughly one hundred days less in session than the Congress of thirty years ago (Taylor 
2012, 184). A Congress with a higher workload, spending fewer days in session is not a 
recipe for success, according to the institution’s detractors. 
Institutional rules and procedures are not the only target of contemporary blame. 
Scholars argue that the Congress’s policy making process must be capable of preference 
aggregation in a civil fashion.  Norms, they argue, are as important as formal rules.  
While partisan rancor certainly cuts against the norm of civil debate, scholars do not see 
partisanship as inherently pernicious. They do, however, argue that it must be a 
partisanship amenable, in the end, to compromise for the sake of partisan principles 
(Muirhead 2014).9 Partisanship which is closed to the possibility of compromise is not 
partisanship, in this account, but rather zealotry (Muirhead 2014, 49-51).   
While not all scholars go so far as Muirhead as labeling extreme partisanship 
zealotry, many scholars contend that the norms of comity and mutual accommodation 
have broken down in the contemporary Congress (Sinclair 2014, Theriault 2013).  Such 
behavior has risen to such heights that it has received a new designation: “partisan 
warfare.” It is not unusual to see senators – who might be supposed to be the nation’s 
                                                 
9 Muirhead suggests that extremists will brook no compromise of their sacred principles.  He suggests that 
partisans will compromise, especially so that their principles will at least partially upheld.  This approach 
could be questioned; if the underlying principles are extreme, such as those of white supremacists, for 
instance, does being willing to compromise to achieve only some preference for whites really consist of 
healthy moderation. 
 20 
elder statesmen – openly questioning each other’s motives, patriotism, and integrity, not 
merely in a political campaign, but right on the Senate floor (Theriault 2013). While 
overheated rhetoric is thought to be almost a natural outgrowth of the House’s size and 
close connection to the moral and political passions roiling the broader society, the 
appearance of such a phenomenon in the Senate is more troubling.  Indeed, this change is 
reputed to be a deep and lasting departure from the norms that characterized that “august” 
body in both the nineteenth century (Tocqueville 1840/2004) and in the mid twentieth 
century (Matthews 1959).10 Since the binding power of norms is certainly enhanced by 
their adherence, the violation of the norm of courtesy is likely to lead to further violations 
of other salutary norms, such as apprenticeship, specialization, and reciprocity (Matthews 
1959).   
Moreover, the growing incidence of partisan warfare is said to threaten the ability 
of the Senate to reach the bargains and compromises necessary to solve the nation’s 
problems.  It may even impair the ability of the government to merely “keep the lights 
on.” In the latter years of the Obama Administration it was frequently necessary for the 
Senate to come to the nation’s “rescue” by preventing conflict between a liberal president 
and a conservative House from spiraling out of control.  The influx of more “partisan 
warriors” to the Senate could endanger the formation of future working groups of 
                                                 
10  “When you enter the chamber of the House of Representatives in Washington, you are struck by the 
vulgar appearance of that august assembly… In a country where education is almost universal, it is said 
that not all of the people’s representatives are capable of writing correctly… A short distance away is the 
chamber of the Senate, whose narrow confines contain a substantial proportion of America’s famous men. 
Scarcely a man is to be seen there who has not distinguished himself by some recent achievement… Every 
word uttered in this assembly would do honor to Europe’s greatest parliamentary debates” (Tocqueville 
1840/2004, 229). 
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senators to achieve compromise in these polarized times. The partisan wrangling and 
harsh invective made common by these “partisan warriors” is unlikely to change in the 
immediate future and is likely to grow worse.  The very competitiveness of recent 
elections exacerbates the fundamental cause of partisan warfare (Lee 2009).  In short, 
critics say, comity is dead in Congress and unlikely to return, at least in the short term. 
The last category of Congressional critique concerns relations between the 
Congress and the other branches of the government.  This literature could be summarized 
under an accusation: the contemporary Congress suffers from a deficit of institutional 
strength.  Criticism in this arena has centered on something scholars call “abdication.”  It 
has been argued that the modern (post-war) Congress has abdicated a number of its 
constitutional responsibilities to the executive (Fisher 2000).  This abdication is said to 
occur in at least two primary areas; foreign policy and appropriations. Constitutionally, 
the war powers of the United States represent shared property of both the Congress and 
the president. For instance, the document confers the right to declare war to Congress but 
locates the powers of commander-in-chief in the presidency. Furthermore, the 
Constitution does not fix absolute barriers or provide commentary on how these powers 
are to be shared, provoking contestation between the branches (Zeisberg 2013).  Yet, in 
recent memory the Congress has seemed very hesitant to even contest for a fraction of its 
theoretical power to mold foreign policy.  Even the War Powers Act, which was designed 
to fortify Congress in this regard, has not led to a more assertive Congress. Instead, 
Congress has allowed the President to sidestep and even violate the terms of this act 
numerous times since it was placed on the statute book in the 1970s (Fisher 2000, Tulis 
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2009).  As of 2018, the conflict against ISIS is still being waged under the authority 
provided by the authorizations for the 2001 and 2003 conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Even though President Obama explicitly asked the Congress to authorize the conflict in a 
prime-time address from the Oval office (Nakamura 2015), the Congress has yet to 
engage in even the most preliminary steps to undertake such an authorization. 
In terms of the spending power matters are somewhat more complex.  The last 
half-century has seen the Congress cede tremendous amounts of budgetary power to the 
president (through powers of impoundment and even the short-lived line-item veto) 
(Fisher 2000). It should be noted that in some cases the Congress may have been 
purposefully and strategically ceding power in order to overcome its own institutional 
weaknesses, a less obviously pernicious act than outright abdication (Farrier 2004).  If 
Congress recognizes a weakness or pathology in its operation and then utilizes a 
delegation of authority to counteract this weakness, in so doing Congress is arguably 
enhancing its institutional health rather than degrading it.  A prominent example of such 
an activity was the formation of base-closing commissions after the end of the Cold War.  
In this case the Congress recognized a pathology in its operation; although a majority 
favored a drawdown in military spending, individual MCs could not afford the political 
costs of voting to close any base in their district. Congress overcame this pathology by 
establishing a commission, whose recommendations could not be amended, only voted 
up or down after debate.   
In any case, Congress has nevertheless seemed all too often turn to the president 
and other extra-legislative bodies such as bipartisan commissions and the like to resolve 
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budget problems (Farrier 2004).  While on their face these expedients seem similar to the 
base-closing commission, they have proved pernicious in practice, likely because they 
have been structured in such a way as to evade votes, rather than to force the Congress to 
take a “tough vote.” For example, President Obama and the Congress were at 
loggerheads over the issue of entitlement reform from the 2010 Midterm elections all the 
way through the end of his presidency. Although numerous commissions and ad hoc 
committees have addressed the issue, very little substantively has occurred to indicate 
that the Congress has taken ownership of the budget. The Congress has, in fact, failed to 
pass all twelve of its regular appropriations bills on time each year since 1997, instead 
turning to the expedient of continuing resolutions and other stopgap measures to handle 
recurring budgetary crises (Tollestrup 2014, 15). Congress cannot effectively protect its 
institutional powers in inter-branch relations if it cannot effectively manage its own 
internal concerns. 
Besides abdication of its own responsibilities, the weakening of the legislative 
branch vis-à-vis the other two “equal and coordinate” branches has been manifest in 
separation of powers disputes. It has been argued that the contemporary Congress is 
floundering about in a weakened institutional state compared to both the executive and 
the court.  Moreover, it refuses to utilize its means of constitutional self-defense.  Calling 
this either a lack of constitutional self-assertion (Chafetz 2012) or institutional decay 
(Tulis 2009), scholars have noted that the Congress has a host of powers that it could use 
to exercise oversight over the executive, but that it chooses not to do so.  Chafetz and 
Tulis both point to the fact that Congress can compel attendance at oversight hearings by 
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finding an absent witness in contempt of Congress. The Congress need not be reliant on 
the ordinary judicial system to achieve its legitimate constitutional ends.  Indeed, the 
Capitol has its own on-site jail that could be used to hold any who chose not to testify to 
Congress; they are not at liberty to leave until they testify. This penalty can either be “for 
a specified period… or an indefinite period (but not, at least by the House, beyond the 
end of a session of the Congress) until [the person] agrees to comply” (Garvey and Dolan 
2014, 11). The Congress, however, admits its own impotence when it tries to have the 
federal court system exercise its contempt findings (Chafetz 2012). For instance, the 
Republican-led Congress resorted to suing President Obama during the latter part of his 
time in office. Rather than focusing on passing bills, conducting hearings, or 
investigating Obama Administration executive officials, it instead chose to sue the 
Obama administration in Federal Court to achieve its policy goals. This admits, indirectly 
but clearly, that the Congress is unable to hold the Presidency to account without the help 
of the judicial branch. 
Norms and procedures can have compounding effects on one another; one 
“compound” dimension of failure is that of deliberation.  Whether deliberation is defined 
as “reasoning together about the nature of a problem and solutions to it,” (Smith 1989, 
238-9) “a process of collective policy making in which legislators work through 
alternatives in a … rational manner,” (Taylor 2012, 30) or “meaningful floor debate… 
[and] committee markup” (Mann and Ornstein 2006, 169-70) nearly all agree that it is an 
essential element of a high-quality policy process. Many argue that the Senate in 
particular, which was to be a mature and deliberative body – the saucer in which to pour 
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the overheated ideas, policies and rhetoric coming out of the People’s House – has seen a 
remarkable change in norms so that its floor now resembles that of the House of 
Representatives (Loomis 2011, Wallner 2012). Indeed, despite the high level of scholarly 
attention placed on deliberation it appears that a similar high regard to the art of 
deliberation is not shared by MCs.  Deliberation in Congress appears to be far less 
important and central to the tasks of legislators than was the case in even the near past 
(Bessette 1994, Mann and Ornstein 2006).  Examining this common impression, Taylor 
(2012) finds that the quality of deliberation has sharply declined over time, where quality 
is operationalized as the extent to which MCs interact and reason with each other 
concerning the common good.11  Rather than engaging in arguments with their 
colleagues, MCs deliver self-contained speeches which do not even feign an interest in 
what was said by the previous speaker. Many of the “speeches” delivered to the 
Congress, are in fact not speeches at all, but instead statements read to C-SPAN cameras, 
while the chamber is entirely empty. 
As aforementioned, the folkways of the Senate (Matthews 1959) were said to 
encourage reciprocity, courtesy, and specialization amongst the members of this august 
body.  While these norms had many purposes, one was to manage deliberation in a body 
                                                 
11 Taylor finds simultaneously that that the modern era has seen “greater aggregate quantity, participation, 
and equality” of deliberation (2012, 178).  He thus argues that this combination of results qualifies as 
mixed and fails to support the thesis that deliberation has worsened over time. I do not find Taylor’s 
conclusion convincing.  A greater quantity of lower quality deliberation is a decisively worse result than a 
lower quantity of high quality deliberation. I would also argue that this state of affairs is likely worse than a 
low quantity of low quality deliberation, as that would at least indicate that MCs have prioritized a different 
aspect of their congressional responsibilities.  To the contrary, the contemporary reality is that MCs are 
giving more time and energy to decidedly poor attempts at deliberation, wasting their time and thereby 
coarsening the political culture in the process. 
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where unlimited debate was allowed.  Anecdotally, it appears that these norms are 
operative no longer.  In the absence of these norms pure partisan politicking takes the 
place of even the pretense of deliberation.  While this may seem extreme, recent years 
have seen partisan teams join together in such embarrassing escapades such as the recent 
“letter to Tehran.”  The Iran episode saw a majority of the majority party of the Senate 
(but still a minority overall) attempt to circumvent executive negotiations with Iran on the 
issue of nuclear proliferation. Combining a decided lack of cool deliberation with a 
profound lack of self-assertion, the forty or so signatories admitted their inability to do 
anything about the proposed agreement with Iran until after the next election (Baker 
2015).  The Senate could have used its leverage as a deliberative constitutionally-
empowered body to insist on its rights; they could have argued that the executive 
agreement being made with Iran was so significant that it ought to be made into a treaty 
and brought before the Senate for ratification.  Of course, the right addressee for these 
arguments resided in the Oval Office, not halfway across the world in Iran.  Instead, the 
Senate apprised a major international rival (and perhaps future enemy) of the United 
Sates of a remarkable fact: they are thoroughly unable to exercise the constitutional 
mandate given to them by the treaty power in the United States Constitution. 
THE CONGRESSIONAL IDEAL 
Taking a bird’s eye view of the foregoing, one can identify the implicit or explicit 
standards that scholars use to evaluate and criticize the contemporary institution of 
Congress.  Given that every critique supposes the existence of some preferable alternative 
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arrangement, this should not be an unreasonable claim.  In addition, the claim that 
Congress has “decayed,” or that norms have “broken down” implies rather clearly 
historical or precedential models of the ideal, making the process of abstraction 
considerably easier.  In sum, I argue that the ideal Congress emerging from these 
critiques is that of a constitutionally-assertive legislature, supported by institutional 
loyalty, and legitimated by transparent, responsible deliberation on policy.12 While the 
idea (or ideal) of deliberation is a constituent part of a wider and elaborated-upon notion 
of deliberative democracy, the other attributes are not as often given as explicit treatment.  
For this reason, I will turn to these features first and illustrate the implicit importance of 
the attributes of institutional loyalty and transparency as standards or ideals of 
Congressional behavior.  Only after illustrating their significance will I turn to what is by 
far the most explicitly remarked upon attribute of an ideally functioning legislature: 
deliberation. 
Constitutional self-assertion, which I define as a norm that encourages MCs to see 
themselves first and foremost as members either of the “the People’s House” or the 
“Most Powerful Senate in the World,” seems to be an implicit attribute of congressional 
health in most criticisms of Congress.  Scholars rightly and importantly acknowledge 
another form of loyalty – partisan loyalty – as incredibly significant in shaping the 
current institution.  Parties in Congress emerged almost immediately after the ratification 
of the Constitution and have persisted throughout subsequent American political 
                                                 
12 The statement here refers only to standards extracted from the normative or evaluative critiques 
examined thus far in the chapter. This ideal thus differs from the statement on page 15; in a subsequent 
section the rationale for adding majoritarianism and productivity will be described. 
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development (Aldrich 2011).  Partisan loyalty (although its existence as separable from 
shared political preferences is subject to some controversy – cf. Krehbiel 1993) shapes 
member behavior and can even cause a member to vote entirely opposite of what his or 
her political self-interest would dictate.  For example, in 1993, President Clinton, who 
was desperate to pass his budget, pressured Rep. Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky (D-PA) 
to change her vote from no to yes.  Even though she represented a Republican leaning 
district and had previously promised to oppose the budget due to its tax increases, 
partisan loyalty (among other factors) led her to change her position.  She supported the 
bill even though the vote virtually ended her legislative career (Hinds 1993).13  
Furthermore, partisan loyalty can even be praised as a norm that ties together MCs and 
unites them in achieving goals with a time horizon longer than just the next election 
(Muirhead 2014). 
Constitutional self-assertion, a “pride of place” possessed by legislators, is less 
often discussed that partisan loyalty, but appear to implicit hold that it is necessary to 
surmount some of the key dilemmas posed by the very institution of Congress and the 
pathologies posed by partisan loyalty.  The types of activities that can maintain the 
institutional health of Congress often cut against personal self-interest and the incentive 
posed by partisan team play.  Canon and Mayer (1999) argue that the Congress is 
characterized by two collective dilemmas, which they term the institutional dilemma and 
the policy dilemma.  Both dilemmas refer to the fact that “rational” (i.e. self-regarding) 
                                                 
13 Margoles-Mezvinsky’s vote was so clearly against her political interests that Republicans derisively 
jeered her as she made her way no to the floor, with chants of “Goodbye, Marjorie!” (Hinds 1993, 30). 
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actors often lack the incentives to carry out the difficult work needed to make Congress 
function well.  In the institutional dilemma Members of Congress are given incentives to 
prioritize their own individual election prospects at the cost of the institution of Congress.  
The primary behavioral manifestation of this dilemma is “running for Congress by 
running against Congress” (Fenno 1978, Mayer and Canon 1999).  Members of Congress 
wage their reelection campaigns on the premise that they are far superior to the other 
legislators of Congress.  They thus present their continued services as necessary to fight 
the corruption and incompetence overwhelming the institution as a whole.  All 
incumbents successfully utilizing such a means secure reelection at the price of 
downgrading their own institution.  The second dilemma, the policy dilemma, concerns 
the incentive that operates, particularly in distributive policy making, to push rationally 
calculating legislators to enrich their constituents at the cost of the national interest.  
While members are responsible for enacting polices to advance the general welfare, their 
reelection incentives encourage them to take a narrow view of such responsibilities and a 
more favorable view to the special interests of their constituents. 
The dilemmas posed by Canon and Mayer and not the only ones caused by 
conflicts of interest within the Congress. With respect to partisan interests it is often said 
(see Mann and Ornstein 2006, 2012) that Congress is much less energetic in its 
constitutional role of oversight and investigation of the Executive Branch when the same 
party holds both Capitol Hill and the White House.  For this to be a valid criticism of 
Congress, scholars such as Mann and Ornstein must suppose that it is possible for norms 
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to restrain such pathologies and to offer countervailing incentives to resist personal or 
partisan reasons for shirking the duties of a Congressperson. 
The most plausible norm one could utilize in theory to combat the growing 
indifference shown by MCs toward their constitutional and institutional responsibilities is 
loyalty to their respective chamber of Congress.  In this way constitutional assertiveness 
and institutional loyalty are alloyed.  The easiest way to construct such a norm is through 
the example of an MC whose notions of institutional loyalty seemed rather eccentric: the 
late Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV).  In many respects Byrd is the caricature or epitome of 
institutional loyalty, both in terms of genuine devotion to the good of his institution and 
in terms of the manner in which self-interest can be allied with the power of norms (Tulis 
2009). He carried a copy of the Constitution in his pocket at all times and was wont to 
quote directly from it if he felt the situation merited it.  Byrd’s knowledge of Senate rules 
was tied intimately with the sense that the Senate needed certain norms to ensure its 
smooth functioning in a body where each of the hundred members could halt the 
proceedings at any time (cf. Mathews 1959). Byrd’s knowledge of the rules undoubtedly 
redounded to his political benefit on many occasions, but one should not shy away from 
noting the importance of the norm of institutional loyalty in shaping and legitimating 
such institutional maintenance work, which otherwise would have little incentive 
operating in its favor.  One need not even inquire into a biographical investigation of 
Byrd’s life to determine if loyalty or personal benefit was the primary motivating factor 
in his personal calculation – the fact is that he was led to take actions that would not be 
expected by calculations of political expedience alone. 
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 The extant literature also suggests that an ideal Congress would be transparent in 
its lawmaking and deliberations (Taylor 2013, Waldron 2009b).  While this is an explicit 
aspect of many conceptions of legislative functionality, what is less often elaborated is 
the manner in which the current Congress, which is televised nearly twenty-four hours a 
day on C-SPAN, could be said to be worthy of critique on this ground.  Surely, the 
contemporary legislative institutions are much more transparent than those of the past, as 
even committee hearings are televised by C-SPAN, and even the contents of closed 
sessions frequently become public knowledge. This degree of public visibility is only 
heightened by its contrast with the past.  When one compares present Senate 
recordkeeping and publicity with the norms and procedures of the Senate in the Early 
Republic, which kept closed sessions between 1789 and 1794 (Swift 1996, 58), it is odd 
that anyone could criticize the present institution on this ground. 
Connecting what is implicit in critiques of current policymaking with this 
frequently articulated standard of transparency allows one to see the rather clear damage 
done by the breakdown of regular order, even in a time of high media access to Congress.  
Scholars (Mann and Ornstein 2006, Sinclair 2014) bemoan the deviation from the regular 
order not only because ad hoc procedures can reduce the quality and efficaciousness of 
policy proposals, but also because they attack what has become a very tenuous electoral 
connection (see Gilens and Page 2014) between the wishes of constituents and their 
representatives.  Special rules, omnibus measures, and governing by crisis may allow 
MCs to evade responsibility for bills and make the process of electoral accountability 
more difficult even for relatively well-informed voters. 
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To explain how this could be the case, consider the example of governing by 
crisis.  Rather than working through the ordinary budget process the contemporary 
Congress has often had recourse to continuing resolutions to fund the government. These 
expedient measures generally pass through both chambers of Congress primarily because 
MCs would rather avoid the prospects of a government shutdown. The Congress has 
utilized the deadline for funding the government (generally the start of new fiscal year on 
September 30th) and the crisis that missing such a deadline would provoke to shepherd 
through continuing resolutions for most of the last ten years (Tollestrup 2014). The use of 
deadlines to motivate MCs to do unpleasant things (like raise the debt-ceiling and 
appropriate money for institutions they would rather not fund like Planned Parenthood) is 
not inherently problematic, but the posturing and politicking that occurs around these 
manufactured crises can potentially complicate accountability and transparently greatly. 
Governing by crisis cuts against the standard of transparency because the 
manufactured crisis offers plenty of opportunities for MCs to equivocate, even more than 
is usual or necessary for politicians who must compromise to govern.  Governing by 
crisis allows MCs an opportunity to “stand on principle,” or in the parlance of political 
science, “advertise and credit claim,” (Mayhew 1987) and take votes against an increase 
in the national debt or for a cut in national spending, all the while knowing that they will 
vote for a continuing resolution in a few weeks which will do the exact opposite. Indeed, 
these later votes will occur under conditions where they can shift blame to other 
individuals for being “forced” to vote yes. Sometimes MCs may go further than this, in a 
strategy known as “vote no, but hope yes.”  This stratagem sees MCs vote against their 
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sincere preferences: when the final compromise comes up for vote the MC votes against 
it, hoping that enough of their more moderate colleagues will vote for the bill and pass it. 
Besides the other problems inherent in brinksmanship,14 this type of behavior 
makes electoral responsibility more difficult.  Strategic MCs can use governing by crisis 
to claim both the bona fides of a prudent politician who knows when to compromise and 
that of a principled leader who refuses to compromise one’s principles.  Since the action 
of voting on principle can be made more salient through media coverage and directed 
messaging to the MC’s constituents and the final vote on passage to avoid a shutdown 
will be much more likely to be covered in the media as a showdown between the 
Presidency and the Congress, the final vote is likely to be much less salient in the mind of 
voters. Such manipulation is certainly a violation of norms of transparency, even if 
everything happens in plain sight and with high levels of press and popular access to the 
voting records to MCs.  
Regardless of the nature of what ideal transparency would consist of, critics 
would argue that manipulations such as these must be ended.  In the service of increasing 
transparency, Mayhew (2006, 233-4) has suggested the creation of a media outlet that 
condenses the week’s C-SPAN activities into a digestible and entertaining 30-minute 
block.  He argues that this would go far in aiding the public’s ability to hold their MCs 
responsible and tightening a fraying electoral connection.  Irrespective of the way 
                                                 
14 One obvious problem that ‘playing chicken’ is a dangerous game; sometimes the other side does not 
blink. Government shutdowns have therefore occurred during three of the last four presidencies; incredibly 
the last one occurred in the Trump administration even though Republicans have unified control of 
Washington. 
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forward, it is relatively clear that Congress scholars and critics see transparency as an 
essential component of an ideally functioning legislature. 
While inference is necessary to establish the importance of institutional loyalty to 
most critics’ concepts of the ideal functioning of Congress, deliberation (or the lack 
thereof in the contemporary Congress) is an explicit feature of most critiques of the 
institution (cf. Mann and Ornstein 2006, 2012, Sinclair 2014).  A positive image or ideal 
of deliberation need not be developed from these critiques, however, as the field already 
contains several examples of efforts to enshrine deliberation as a key element of ideal 
legislative functioning.  Generally, it appears that there are three levels on which an ideal 
Congress would be deliberative.  The three levels can be arranged from highest to lowest 
– both in terms of the normative and political significance of the topic up for debate and 
the danger of conflict.  This yields three visions of deliberation: (1) high deliberation over 
principles (or values);15 (2) political deliberation over interests; and (3) practical 
deliberation over efficaciousness. 
While some theorists of democracy and liberalism see a settled sense of what 
justice entails as a precondition for the establishment of a political regime (cf. Rawls 
1971/1999), such a settled definition or conception of justice does not seem in evidence 
in contemporary debates over issues such as same-sex marriage, abortion and health care.  
Rather than being dismayed at such a consideration, it is possible to argue that such a 
                                                 
15 Values, in this sense, can be taken to mean the fundamental ends of politics, as distinguished from 
technocratic disputes over techniques of governing, or the horse-trading and bargaining of interest-based 
politics. 
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conflict over fundamental values provides an opportunity for the democratic articulation 
of arguments for and against accepting certain values as authoritative for the society 
(Waldron 1999).  In the highest ideal of deliberation, a legislature, as a representative 
body literally embodying the various sides and perspectives on a given controversy, is 
arguably the best venue for the articulation of the “authoritative allocation of values” (cf. 
Easton 1965).  To be more concrete, one could image the debates occasioned by the issue 
of slavery in the mid-nineteenth century as an attempt by the Congress to settle questions 
of principles, in this case questions of justice. That attempt at settlement failed.  Indeed, it 
was perhaps doomed to failure by the lack of representation of the most interested “party” 
to the dispute in the Congress. Nevertheless, the act of deliberation itself, as weighing 
and debating the relative value of union, compromise, and justice for the enslaved, 
remains as the instantiation of the theoretical concept. 
This ideal of deliberation is rather exalted and difficult to reach; moreover, it is 
perhaps good that the Congress need not always be grappling with issues as morally 
fraught as that of slavery.16 Indeed, the issue of majority tyranny can hardly be addressed 
at all by allowing a legislative body to set the authoritative values of society without 
limitation. In the American context this must be the fundamental reason for the existence 
of the written constitution and review of legislation by an independent Judiciary.17   
                                                 
16 After all, it could very well the case that polities are most solid when there is frequent recursion to values 
or principles which are shared, rather than to those which divide us. 
17 But see Waldron (2009a) for the argument that legislators are likely better moral reasoners than judges 
and, notwithstanding the problem of the tyranny of the majority, should be given the power to settle such 
disputes. 
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A more restrained version of the deliberative ideal can be marshaled based on 
alternative institutional grounds.  It can be argued that the attributes of legislatures qua 
institutions make them uniquely qualified to carry out deliberation over interests.  That is, 
an ideal legislature should devote itself to deliberation over interests because this role is 
better suited to being carried out by the legislature than by an executive officer alone or 
by members of the bureaucracy (Waldron 1999, 2009b).  A legislature is, almost by 
definition, made up of a relatively large number of members who represent diverse 
constituencies throughout the nation.  These legislators are moored to the permanent 
interests of their constituents: as such they are uniquely qualified to speak to the way that 
a given law will affect those interests.  One function for Congress to play is thus 
deliberating over interests: to attempt to advance the “permanent and aggregate interests” 
of the nation (Hamilton et al 1787/1960).  Suffice it to say, it is extremely difficult to 
determine what the aggregate interests of a large and diverse nation are on a subject such 
as taxation or trade policy.  Suppose a given trade policy, like the hotly debated Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), would have been likely to benefit the nation as a whole while 
negatively impacting selected geographic or economic sectors. The mid-level deliberative 
ideal suggests that a well-functioning Congress would take these various interests into 
account and develop a comprehensive policy that offsets losses to those interests.  If it 
chooses not to do so a deliberative legislature would have reasons to explain why those 
interests were not sufficiently important to warrant support. 
Finally, a deliberative Congress would address itself, both on the floor and in 
committee, to reasoning together over the merits of public policy (Bessette 1994).  This 
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type of deliberation is not devoted to debating the fundamental values of society and need 
not even seek to arbitrate between different interests, but instead serves a crucial function 
in addressing questions of efficacy and expedience. An ineffective, poorly-drafted, 
duplicative, or poorly-thought-out bill is unlikely to solve the problem it was meant to 
address.  After reaching a settlement on which interests will be affected by a bill, under 
this standard it is not good enough for MCs to simply bargain, horse-trade, and logroll to 
get the votes for final passage.  Bargaining activities could be even part of deliberation, 
especially in the example of a trade deal as discussed above.  The key is that deliberation 
must focus on investigating the likely intended and unintended effects of a given bill, and 
must be carried out by the MCs themselves, not delegated to either the bureaucracy or the 
President.18 MCs also ought to debate the alternative means available to meet a given aim 
or purpose and reason together about which means are both “necessary and proper” to 
achieve that end. 
One final aspect of the deliberative ideal is that there must be reasons provided 
for and against a given bill.  This is true for even horse-trading and bargaining.  If the 
MCs do not specify why a specific state, interest, district ought to be preferred to another, 
or why splitting the difference between two budgetary amounts could lead to good 
                                                 
18 An example where this ideal was not met, was in the passage (and veto-override) of a 2016 enactment 
allowing victims of the September 11th Attacks the right to sue Saudi Arabia.  Regardless of the merits of 
the issue, it falls far below the standard for senators to deliberate over unintended consequences of a law 
after it passed.  The veto-override passed the Senate with only one “nay” vote.  Nevertheless, “Within 
hours of their vote, nearly 30 senators signed a letter expressing some reservations about the potential 
consequence of the law, including the prospect that the United States could face lawsuits in foreign courts 
‘as a result of important military or intelligence activities’” (Steinhauer et al 2016).  Such concerns should 
obviously be expressed as part of the deliberation over a bill, not after passage. 
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outcomes, then the Congress has failed to meet this ideal.  It bears noting that it is an 
open question whether these reasons must be provided in public.  Bessette (1994) holds 
that excessive transparency can get in the way of deliberation and that reforms to increase 
the transparency of Congress have led to greater grandstanding and less deliberation on 
the merits.  On the contrary, Waldron (2009b) holds that it is essential that all these levels 
of deliberation occur in an environment of relative publicity.  From Waldron’s admittedly 
reasonable point of view, resolving questions related to the fundamental values of society 
in a closed-door meeting would be less than ideal.  It remains unclear whether occasional 
executive sessions, or deliberations carried out by Congressional leaders and the 
President, on matters of interest or of mere means would be subject to the same critique. 
THE POLICY PROCESS: ASSUMPTIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL FUNCTIONALITY 
Examining contemporary critiques of Congress is not the only way to determine 
what the field takes to be congressional health or functionality; one can also examine 
empirical studies more generally.  Such an examination reveals that even practitioners 
with different interpretations of the institution of Congress share certain presuppositions 
or assumptions regarding what a functional Congress entails.  While scholars differ 
sharply over the issue of gridlock and its causes, the key figures in the debate regarding 
gridlock nonetheless agree that productivity is an important aspect of a functional modern 
legislature.  In addition, despite significant disagreement over the causes and effects of 
the filibuster, the field seems to possess certain shared assumptions about the nature of 
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majority rule in the Congress; that is, the field seems to share an agreement that a 
determined majority must be able to work its will in the legislative process. 
Turning to the issue of productivity, a major and counterintuitive finding has 
spawned a research agenda exploring the issue of gridlock. Journalistic accounts of 
gridlock starting in the 1990s emphasized the degree to which Congress was paralyzed by 
partisan conflict and was simply unable to address policy areas covering a wide swath of 
its agenda. While “the eye-ball” test seemed to bear out the accuracy of this claim, initial 
quantitative analysis did not. Examining both ordinary enactments and so-called 
landmark legislation, relatively rudimentary statistical work showed that there was no 
statistically significant difference in the rate of legislative productivity between unified 
and divided control of government (Mayhew 1991/2005). While there were some mixed 
and inconclusive findings regarding what might explain such an unexpected result, the 
main finding was relatively clear: the level of productivity in Congress seemed relatively 
constant. 
As such claims clashed with the scholarly and popular perceptions of the 
pervasiveness of gridlock (Krehbiel 1998), it was not long before a debate emerged, 
claiming that the previous research had not fully answered the question.  For the most 
part the empirical debate comes down to a question of numerators and denominators.  
Whereas Mayhew simply counted the number of enactments, scholars critical of this 
methodology suggested that the size of the agenda is an important factor in deciding 
whether the productivity of Congress has declined.  Binder (2003) argues that if the size 
of the agenda (as measured by the total number of issues and highly salient issues 
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mentioned in national papers of record) increases but number of enactments stays the 
same, that the productivity of Congress must be said be decreasing, as the ratio of 
addressed issues to unaddressed ones has declined.  Taking this measure of productivity 
to be the correct one, Binder (2003, 20115) finds that the Congress has become less 
productive in recent years as the size of the agenda has expanded tremendously with very 
little increase in the number of agenda issues addressed per legislative session. 
Arbitrating between these two sides of the debate is not part of the project 
undertaken here; what is important in this context is that the debate itself takes place 
based on a shared assumption about the nature of congressional functionality.  Mayhew, 
who often casts himself as a defender of Congress, and Binder, who is more critical, 
nonetheless agree that a Congress should be productive and that a lack of productivity 
would be a sign of dysfunction.  Binder is relatively straightforward.  She claims that 
despite the multiple veto points constraining legislative action, that productivity is a key 
requirement for a functional cotemporary Congress and is in no way foreclosed by the 
institutional design of Congress (Binder 2003, 32-33).   
Mayhew, while explicitly denying that his account is normative, nevertheless 
makes similar assumptions about Congress and indeed must make them if his argument is 
to remain consistent.  This is so on account of his decision to address, within the body of 
his conclusion, several normative claims.  Even though he found that divided government 
was not responsible for gridlock, he considers several alternative arguments for why 
divided government might matter nonetheless. One such normative argument holds that 
that the non-rich would benefit more from unified Democratic government than from any 
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other alternative. This is because the Democratic platform is addressed, at least in part, to 
ameliorating the condition of previously or currently disadvantaged racial, ethnic and 
SES groups. Mayhew finds that the Great Society-level productivity is not the only way 
to expand the safety net for these groups. Mayhew sees the “constancy” in productivity as 
benefiting these groups, even in times of divided government with philosophically 
opposed presidents.  He cites the expansion of Pell Grants, changes to Social Security, 
and other reforms during the Nixon and Ford Administrations as evidence of this fact. In 
spite of divided government and Republican control of the White House, “the laws just 
kept getting passed” (Mayhew 1991, 197).  Regardless of his earlier claims, one cannot 
refute a normative argument without making at least an implicit normative claim of one’s 
own. While Mayhew makes no explicit normative claims, arguments such as these 
suggest that the status quo (by his lights, relatively constant productivity) is not 
problematic.  One can only conclude from this that the relatively constant productivity 
over time, even in spite of changes in the mood of the electorate, is a necessary 
component of a functional Congress. 
A similar process has played out regarding scholarly investigation of the 
filibuster. The ability of a minority of Senators to frustrate the wishes of a majority of 
their colleagues is a curious power; one immediately wonders whether there is a 
principled reason to allow Senators to do so, or whether narrow partisan aims motivate 
both the existence of the institutional rule and its present prevalence.  This query gains in 
urgency when one considers the fact that the filibuster is used much more frequently in 
the contemporary Congress than in any other epoch. Examining the history of the 
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filibuster, Binder and Smith (1997) find that filibuster is grounded mainly on political 
interest. They make the claim that the invention of the filibuster was in essence an 
accident resulting from changes in the rules of the Senate.19 They further argue that this 
rule has been locked in and preserved against the wishes of the majority, primarily 
because changes to the rule itself are subject to being filibustered by a minority who 
wishes to keep the rule intact. This rule can be described in terms of path dependency, or 
the tendency of rules, once established, to remain in effect, even when more efficient 
ways of carrying on legislative business may be available or even preferred by majorities 
of current members of the institution. 
Binder and Smith, while primarily undertaking a descriptive and empirical 
investigation of the filibuster rule, explicitly end their work by drawing out the normative 
implications of the “stickiness” of the filibuster rule.  Specifically, they normatively 
critique the filibuster because they argue that no reasonable principle defends the ability 
of minority of Senators to control action on the floor and deny the majority the ability to 
pass laws that they favor.  While this seems a rather bold claim, they marshal strong 
evidence that the filibuster was critical in stopping civil rights legislation favored by 
majorities in the House and Senate in both the late nineteenth century and the mid-
twentieth century (Binder and Smith 1997, 136-137).  If the filibuster rule had been 
                                                 
19 In 1806 the Senate was in the process of tidying up its rule book.  During this process the “previous 
question motion” was dropped from the rule book.  This incidental change meant the body had dropped, 
“its only potential means of permitting a majority to cut off debate and vote on pending measures” (Binder 
and Smith 1997, 5).  Despite this change, filibusters were not common in the early Senate, as majorities 
were frequently able to pass legislation, despite the dilatory motions and speeches of their peers. 
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developed primarily as a way for religious, cultural or racial minorities to protect certain 
civil rights against majority tyranny, that would have been one thing.  But the filibuster, 
as practiced in American political history, is the history of racial supremacists using the 
strength of their preferences, and their belief that their opponent’s preferences for racial 
equality were less strong, in a gambit to preserve their supremacy over minorities.  Given 
this fact, Binder and Schickler argue that the filibuster should be radically reformed, to 
give effect to the will of the majority of Senators. 
These empirical claims are not free from controversy in the field; Wawro and 
Schickler (2006) argue that this rendering of the history of the filibuster is descriptively 
and empirically incomplete.  Investigating the fact that the filibuster and associated 
institutional rules and norms have changed over time, they argue that majorities of the 
Senate have generally been able to pass legislation with far less than the number of votes 
to break a filibuster. If the filibuster rule generally required all bills to achieve 
supermajority support to pass, the coalition size enacting laws throughout American 
political development should be large; they find on the contrary that relatively narrow 
majorities have succeeded in the Senate. Moreover, they find that even before the 
existence of the cloture rule that very slim majorities were able to pass key legislation.20  
Finally they note that reformers have been successful in changing the filibuster several 
                                                 
20 In the absence of a cloture rule (created in 1917), technically even one Senator could have held up a bill 
through continuous delaying tactics, holding the floor, and dilatory motions.  If this were truly an 
undemocratic check on the minority, Wawro and Schickler argue, we would expect the coalition size in this 
time period (pre-1917) to approach 100%.  Wawro and Schickler find that it does not (2006, 107).  
Schickler and Wawro compare the period immediately before and after Cloture reform and find that the 
coalition sizes before 1917 were actually larger than those after 1917. 
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times over the course of the history of the Senate. Focusing particularly on the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, they show that sub-filibuster level majorities have 
been successful in imposing changes on the filibuster that were not fully consensual, 
cutting against Binder and Smith’s argument that the filibuster itself has always been 
protected by filibustering minorities. Even in the early nineteenth century, narrow 
majorities were able to curb obstruction through chair rulings and other precedents that 
cut down on the ability of Senators to engage in dilatory motions and other obstructive 
activities (Wawro and Schickler 2006, 87).  Wawro and Schickler (2006, 280) thus 
characterize the Senate as a place of “remote majoritarianism,” an institution where the 
supermajorities are required for immediate action, but where the consent of a mere 
majority of senators can alter these super majoritarian procedures. 
One must note, however, that this argument makes no inroads at all against 
Binder and Smith’s claim or assertion that a healthy or functional Congress would see a 
determined majority able to enact its preferences into law.  In fact, Wawro and Schickler 
(2006, 27-28) completely accept this contention and make it part of their “defense” of the 
filibuster.21  They argue that the filibuster is legitimate because a majority of Senators 
have never been willing to totally abandon it). They re-describe the filibuster’s 
privileging of minority rule as an institutional rule supported by a majority of members of 
the Senate. That is to say, a majority of Senators has never, up to this point, been willing 
                                                 
21 Wawro and Schickler do not position themselves explicitly as such, but they nonetheless argue that very 
little in the way of reforms are necessary in the contemporary Senate; majorities are already empowered to 
do what they will in the Senate. 
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to completely dispense with the filibuster, largely because they rationally conclude that 
they would like the power the filibuster provides to be in their hands were they to be in 
the minority of the Senate.  This argument holds that any institutional rule supported by a 
majority of Senators must be in accord with the notion that determined majorities must be 
able to work their will – it is simply in this case a determined majority committed to the 
individual and collective rights provided by the filibuster.  Wawro and Schickler (2006) 
predict that in the case that a majority of the Senate experience such obstreperous 
obstruction that they no longer support the filibuster that the rule will be changed – just as 
it has been changed in the past.  “The committed support of the majority of the Senate is 
necessary” to reform or alter the filibuster, but under this condition reform is 
institutionally possible (87). Not only is reform possible, but it has actually occurred with 
mere majority support before. Thus, even the argument in favor of the filibuster is to be 
made consistent with the presumption that a majority must be able to prevail in the 
Congress. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC AND THE PREVAILING ACCOUNT OF THE CONGRESS 
Even though contemporary scholarship does not utilize the concept of 
“congressional health,” it has been shown that the leading works in the field have much 
to offer in developing such an account.  By examining the works critical of Congress, one 
can develop a portrait of the essential attributes of congressional health. Such an 
endeavor has been carried out above in great detail.  By similarly examining descriptive 
or explanatory work in the field, it is possible to identify assumptions shared widely by 
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practitioners studying Congress. This is not the end of the matter, however, as evaluation 
is the next step. One must next ask whether the prevailing account of congressional 
health and functionality stands up to critical inquiry. 
 The conclusion of such an evaluation is stark: despite the insights canvassed in 
this chapter, turning to implicit understandings of the field cannot completely answer the 
question: What is congressional health?  This is because the standard fleshed out above – 
of a constitutionally-assertive, productive and majoritarian legislature, supported by 
institutional loyalty, and legitimated by transparent, responsible deliberation on policy – 
is underdeveloped and undertheorized.  An assertion that these attributes are important to 
the Congress is hardly false; in fact, several are critically important for the institutional 
health of the Congress.  Rather, three problems with the current literature evaluating 
Congress render the current account incomplete.  I would summarize these problems or 
flaws as issues of scope, of history, of and constitutional-alignment 
 In terms of scope, no synoptic work has attempted to synthesize or combine the 
various elements of congressional health into one comprehensive account.  This is 
important, because some of the most important attributes of congressional health – such 
as responsiveness to public opinion and deliberativeness – are in tension with one 
another.  By tension I do not mean that they are in logical contradiction.22 Instead we find 
                                                 
22 But for an account that the Congress is fundamentally based on contradictory purposes of articulating a 
national common good and representing individual interests see Canon and Mayer (1999). In the previous 
chapter, it was mentioned that this was a very unsatisfactory picture of Congress. The failure of this 
account is straight-forward; it has no way of explaining the fact that the degree of congressional 
dysfunction varies. 
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a tradeoff: maximizing responsiveness might result in a reduction in the quantity and 
quality of deliberation.  In the case of unified partisan control of all three branches, 
responsiveness can have the effect of eliminating salutary inter-branch relations and 
substituting mere partisan teamplay. The currently existing work, often focusing only on 
one attribute at a time, lacks sufficient attention to this fact.  A synoptic account, on the 
other hand, would allow one to say that one attribute is more pivotal or foundational than 
another. It would likewise be able to evaluate trade-offs between one attribute and 
another and determine if those trade-offs enhance or diminish the institutional capabilities 
and responsibilities of the Congress.  In November 2015, the House of Representatives 
quickly passed a bill designed to make it more difficult for Syrian refuges to be resettled 
in the United States.  Is this an example of a healthy Congress responsive to majority 
sentiment,23 or an example of an unhealthy one ignoring its responsibilities to coolly 
deliberate and determine whether the Syrian refuges pose a threat to national security at 
all?  The current account cannot say. 
The second problem imperiling our current understanding of congressional 
functionality is an insufficient attention to the sheer fact of history.  The United States 
Congress is an institution whose history matters a great deal in constructing or 
articulating standards of health and functionality.  Unfortunately, very little scholarly 
work has been devoted to identifying examples of Congresses in the political history of 
the United States that have been generally successful in meeting the complex 
                                                 
23 A November 2015 Gallup Poll found that 60% of Americans were opposed to resettling refugees from 
Syria (Jones 2015). 
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responsibilities entrusted to the legislative.  This is not to say that there has been no work 
on the history of Congress, and some of this work can be enlisted to identify healthy 
Congresses and how they were constituted.  But in the main the work on the history of 
parties (Aldrich 1995, 2011, and Holt 1999), the institutionalization of Congress (Polsby 
1968, Schickler 2000, 2001), and even the development of the Senate (Swift 1996) has 
occurred outside a research paradigm where broad concepts such as institutional health 
would arise.24 In fact, the subfield most likely to be concerned with development and 
disintegration of institutions, American Political Development, has had very little overlap 
with the study of Congress (Katznelson 2011). 
The lack of historical context creates theoretical problems for otherwise plausible 
accounts of institutional wellbeing.  Consider the current state of the literature. When 
many contemporary political scientists write about Congress they compare it to the 
“textbook Congress” of the 1950s and early 1960s, heralding compromises and bargains 
reached between Republicans and Democrats in this era.25 That time period was so much 
less conflictual than today that the modus vivendi was commonly considered to be most 
reflected in the motto of Speaker Sam Rayburn: “If you want to get along--go along” 
(New York Times 1961). While this seems superficially superior to our exceptionally 
partisan present-day Congress, one should ruminate on the “textbook Congress” in its 
                                                 
24 In areas in which this question would arise, the lack of attention to history has been stark. Taylor (2013), 
in his work evaluating Congress, builds an entire checklist of attributes that the attributes to congressional 
functionality with reference to the present alone. No doubt making the endeavor feel more relevant and 
applicable, this standard is in no way an evaluation of congressional health, but is instead a way for 
cotemporaries to mark characteristics of this institution which they prefer. 
25 This same problem seems to imperil Taylor’s (2013) account as well. 
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totality. In particular, one should consider the unrepresentative nature of the committee 
chairmen who blocked meaningful liberal action favored by the majority of Congress 
throughout this time period (Sinclair 2009).  
The lack of a systemic account of Congress magnifies the contemporary 
literatures general inattention to congressional history. Indeed, one needs to construct a 
conception of congressional heath encompassing both its aims and functions before one 
can determine whether one should positively evaluate the “textbook Congress:” a 
legislative body that achieves civility, compromise, and productivity at the cost of 
representativeness.  In the end, one may hail these Congresses nonetheless for their other 
healthy attributes, but one should do so based on a strong theoretical foundation. We are 
currently stuck evaluating the contemporary Congress by comparing it to the textbook 
Congress: The Congress that existed at the time when the discipline of political science 
rounded into its contemporary shape. This is simply not a theoretically justifiable reason 
for making the textbook Congress our frame of reference. 
The historical specificity of Congress is related to and indeed the source of the 
final and most important flaw in our contemporary view of congressional functionality: 
the current way we criticize Congress does not possess a firm constitutional basis.  This 
issue must be resolved before we can evaluate the Congress by a fair and rational 
standard. The Congress of the United States is a particular legislature: an institution 
derived from a specific constitutional design. Prima facie, it is undeniable that Congress’ 
design must be taken into consideration when one attempts to evaluate it.  While this is a 
seemingly banal consideration, this principle has not been carefully attended to in 
 50 
previous investigations of Congress. Consider two instances where this lack of attention 
to constitutional design is evident: 1) in the controversy surrounding the issue of 
productivity and 2) in the literature regarding the Congress’ constitutional assertiveness 
(or lack thereof). 
The assertion that the Congress must achieve a certain level of productivity to be 
functional sounds very reasonable.  It is, after all, constitutionally mandated that the 
Congress pass appropriations bills at least biennially if it appropriates money for the 
armed forces at all.26  Yet, simply stating that a healthy Congress should be productive 
leads to unexpected results when this assertion is not placed in context. Grading Congress 
on productivity means that the legislature at the beginning of President G.W. Bush’s first 
term (the 107th Congress) would be graded higher than any Congress since the 1980s 
(Binder 2015, 11).  While partisan differences of opinion may yield different perspectives 
of evaluation on that Congress, it does not seem as if indicators of national health such as 
the GDP or Gallup polling on the state of the nation subsequent to that Congress verify 
the claim that it was the best Congress since the Reagan Presidency. Productivity is not 
valuable, in and of itself, without the other attendant characteristics attributes of 
institutional health (Mann and Ornstein 2006). 
Besides the over-simplifying effect of evaluating Congress on just one attribute, 
there is a far more important consideration: it is not clear that productivity is even an 
                                                 
26 Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 stipulates that the Congress has the power “to raise and support Armies, 
but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years.”  The Congress is 
required to pass annual budgets on the basis of a mere statute, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. 
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attribute aligned with the design of the Constitution. If productivity was the paramount 
function sought for Congress, Article I of the Constitution is oddly structured to fit that 
purpose. Instead of a single-house legislature with an empowered central leadership, the 
nation has a bicameral legislature with electoral mechanisms designed to ensure that the 
composition of each body is distinct from one another.  This is not a productivity 
maximizing structure. Additionally, the commentary of prominent framers such as James 
Madison speaks to the fact that excessive productivity was thought to be pernicious: 
many of Madison’s concerns about the nation prior to the Constitutional Convention 
concerned the mutability of state laws – that laws were constantly being made and 
unmade with a frequency that created instability and made healthy economic 
development difficult (Hamilton et al 1788/1963, 378). 
While one would think that the strand of the literature emphasizing the place of 
the Congress within the separation of powers system would avoid the above difficulties, 
this is not always the case.  Many of the investigations of constitutional assertiveness, 
such as that of Fisher (2000), are taken from what one may call an institutional vantage 
point.  Fisher and others – sometimes termed “insularists” - contend that the war power is 
the exclusive province of the legislature.  Further they argue that this is what the original 
design suggests.  While there is reason to suppose good institutional and constitutional 
consequences may follow if an MC takes up this position, it seems odd for scholars to be 
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so tied to one institution that they see the world from its perspective.27  There are many 
reasons for considering the war powers of the United States as shared property of both 
the Congress and the Executive.  The document certainly vests the right to declare war in 
Congress, but the powers of commander-in-chief, when forces are called into the service, 
are given to the presidency. Whether this gives the power to the president to involve the 
nation in a purely defensive war (or a preemptive strike) without consulting Congress at 
all is in no way obvious from the text itself.  And while the text may not be dispositive, 
this lack of permanent settlement does seem to imperil the thesis of the pro-Congress 
insularists.28   
The same confusions regarding power struggles appear in work examining the 
tools that Congress possesses to win separations of powers struggles with the executive. 
While Chafetz (2017) provides a long list of tools and powers the legislature could utilize 
to win disputes with the President, it is not clear this should ever be a goal of Congress as 
such. Both cases of congressional health canvassed in this work (the First Congress and 
the New Deal) consider institutions where the inhabitants of Congress cooperate, largely 
as it was the deliberative sense in Congress that such cooperation would promote the 
                                                 
27 An MC making this argument when joined with others in Congress will then face a President making 
exactly the opposite claims about the proper view of war powers.  The “right answer,” if one exists, would 
thus emerge through contestation, communication, and deliberation, not through the maximalist position of 
either side. 
28 This argument is a simplified version of an argument made by Zeisberg (2013).  Zeisberg means to 
criticize settlement accounts of war powers that conclude that the text and meaning of the Constitution has 
given one correct answer as to the proper vesting of this power.  She holds that a relational understanding 
of war powers is anything but fixed and that constitutional authority to declare war or set foreign policy is 
developed through inter-0branch dialogue, see above note. 
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general welfare. I hold that confusions such as these are unavoidable if an account of how 
Congress ought to function is not tied to a sophisticated understanding of the contours 
and purposes of its design from a constitutional, rather than institutional perspective. 
With these three theoretical flaws in mind, much work remains to develop an 
account of congressional health.  While developing a comprehensive standard to evaluate 
legislative institutions is not original to this work,29 developing a systematic standard 
applicable to Congress is. To develop this well-thought-through ideal, in the American 
constitutional context, will be the task of the remainder of this work. In order to develop a 
thorough-going and systematic account of congressional health we must be attentive to 
the theoretical context of our constitutional design, while articulating institutional 
standards from the constitutional design that frames our federal government (see next 
Chapter) and examine how that constitutional design was instantiated, particularly in the 
pivotal extended founding of the Early Republican Period (see Chapter Three).  Only at 
the conclusion of such an account could we be said to possess an account of 
congressional health sufficient to intelligently criticize our present institutions. 
  
                                                 
29 Among others, see the work produced by Jeremy Waldron (2009b). Waldron has remarked on the need 
for such a comprehensive account at length, see above reference in the Introduction. Whereas Waldron, 
being a philosopher, operates on a high level of generality applicable to liberal democracies at large, the 
standards articulated in this project are designed specifically with the American polity in mind. 
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Chapter Two: A Constitutional Conception of Congressional Health 
While Congress is the first institution structured by the U.S. Constitution, analysis 
of its place in our regime is beset by a paucity of research on the role or purpose of 
Congress. Creating problems in the realm of constitutional theory and in the study of 
institutional politics, a lack of attention to this question imperils our attempts to fairly 
evaluate Congress. Theoretically, “the problem … is that we have not developed a 
normative theory of legislation that could serve as a basis for critiquing or disciplining … 
the antics of the past or present membership … of the US Congress” (Waldron 1999, 1).30 
Especially in a time of academic and popular depreciation of Congress, it is all the more 
important to develop such an account. Yet, it is apparent that, “no scholarly consensus 
exists on Congress’s role, how it should protect its constitutional prerogatives, and why” 
(Farrier 2010, 21). Beyond lacking such consensus, scholars have yet to articulate a 
systematic, historically, and constitutionally sensitive account of Congress’s role. In sum, 
we do not possess the appropriate tools for diagnosing the ails of the contemporary 
constitutional system. 
In fairness to contemporary scholars, however, this lacuna is not wholly 
unexpected or unreasonable. While a series of essays in The Federalist (Nos. 67 – 77) 
present a comprehensive theory of the Presidency, and Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion 
                                                 
30 Waldron further notes that, “No one seems to have seen the need for a theory or ideal-type that would do 
for legislation what Ronald Dworkin’s model judge, ‘Hercules,’ purports to do for adjudicative reasoning” 
(Waldron 1999, 1). While not an ideal-type to the same extent as that presented by Dworkin, the standard 
of congressional health articulated in this chapter is intended as a response to this invitation. 
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in Marbury v. Madison articulates the Judiciary’s account of its own role, the sections of 
the Federalist devoted to Congress are comparatively less explicit on this matter. 
Although Publius treats the Congress in fifteen consecutive essays (Nos. 52 – 66),31 the 
question of congressional purpose or health is not specifically centered. Indeed, most 
essays in this section treat or anticipate counterarguments to the Constitution, and are 
devoted to the “negative” task of rebutting these potentially damaging allegations.32 Even 
essays No. 62 and 63 of The Federalist, which are ostensibly devoted to the Senate are, in 
fact, a list of the “inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an 
institution” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 376). Implicit statements about the purpose of the 
Senate can be extracted from such a negative list,33 but even this kind of extrapolation 
fails to articulate the central purposes of Congress as an institution.  In sum, The 
Federalist does not explicitly detail the appropriate standards a voter (or expert) should 
use to evaluate that body or its members. Absent a clear annunciation of Congress’s 
purpose(s) either in the text of the Constitution or in Founding Era authoritative 
                                                 
31 Throughout this (and later chapters) I refer to Publius rather than Hamilton, Madison or Jay. I take the 
stance that the collective author Publius presents one comprehensive argument regarding the Constitution. 
While the citations in this chapter are to essays written by both Madison and Hamilton there is no 
inconsistency between the arguments each deploy (despite their later political disagreements) regarding the 
failures of the Articles or the prospects for the Congress under the Constitution. For a systematic analysis 
of The Federalist arguing that Publius presents a “consensual” document focused on shared principles see 
Carey (1984), but cf. Adair (1974) or Mason (1952) for an alternative that emphasizes the alleged “split 
personality” of Publius. 
32 Essay No. 53, for instance, rebuts the idea that tyranny will automatically result from the Constitution’s 
abandonment of annual terms for representatives, while No. 56 confronts the idea that there are too few 
members in Congress to adequately represent the nation. 
33 Indeed, later in this chapter I extract inferences regarding the purpose and healthy ordering of Congress 
from essays such as these. The point is that nowhere is the purpose or role of Congress baldly stated in this 
authoritative text. 
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commentary, one might be tempted to throw up one’s arms and abandon the quest for a 
comprehensive standard for evaluating its function. 
Fortuitously for those interested in either the Congress or the Constitution, this is 
not the end of the matter; a political and constitutional theory called “the positive 
constitution” stands ready to assist scholars in evaluating Congress. Positive 
constitutionalism holds that constitutions qua constitution are more than contracts that 
limit the powers of government over individuals. While they may indeed still “limit” 
government, this conception holds that the primary purpose of a constitution must be to 
structure certain goals for government to achieve and provide the power and authority to 
the individuals or institutions nominated in that document to carry out those functions.34 
The articulation of the purpose of Congress, and a concomitant development of standards 
designed to evaluate whether a particular Congress has succeeded in fulfilling its role, is 
greatly aided by a conception of constitutionalism that is likewise “purposive.” Indeed, 
by determining the role of Congress from a “purposive reading” of the text of the 
Constitution, one can develop standards regarding its well-functioning, as the tendency of 
its norms, rules and structures to facilitate (or inhibit) its purpose will be the key to 
evaluating its success (or failure) as an institution. 
Demonstrating that the purpose of Congress is to minister to the general welfare, 
and that a relatively concrete set of criteria for evaluating the Congress, as an institution, 
can be derived from such a comparatively general purpose, requires three distinct moves. 
                                                 
34 “Constitutions empower [by establishing] institutions that allow people … to pursue projects that they 
cannot achieve on their own” (Waldron 2016, 34).  
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First, it is necessary to show that the positive constitution approach is appropriate in 
analyzing the text of the Constitution, as that document is often interpreted as a frame of 
negative liberties (i.e. claims protected against government interference).35 This part of 
the project is conducted through an explicit contrast of the Constitution with the 
document that preceded it: The Articles of Confederation. Such a contrast reveals the 
degree to which the negative foundation of its predecessor was rejected in the text of the 
U.S. Constitution of 1787.36 Second, I derive the attributes of a healthy Congress from a 
close reading of the text of the Constitution, in the same spirit as that conducted by 
contemporary positive constitutionalists (see Barber 2003, Waldron 2016) and past 
statesmen such as Frederick Douglass (see Douglass 1860/1950; Ives 2018). Doing so 
reveals nontrivial insights into the nature of a healthy, functional legislature, providing an 
important corrective to prevailing perspectives on Congress in the academy. Third, I 
present strong evidence that these standards for evaluating Congress are rigorous and 
theoretically sound, all the while being realistic enough for practical politicians to (at 
least occasionally) meet. Through an analysis of a selected set of House debates in the 
First Federal Congress, I show that representatives discussed the Constitution and the role 
                                                 
35 Minimally, I seek to show that the positive constitution is a reasonable way to interpret the text. 
Throughout, I also intend the argument to stand for the maximalist argument that such a view is the best 
way to understand the U.S. Constitution. 
36 Analyzing the original Constitution of 1787 is appropriate for setting a standard for today’s Congress 
because that document, although amended, remains largely intact, especially with respect to Article I. 
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of Congress in strikingly similar terms to those laid out in this ostensibly theoretical 
chapter.37 
THE REJECTION OF THE NEGATIVE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION  
Studying the Articles of Confederation holds the prospect for greatly aiding in the 
understanding of constitutions as such, as well as the current U.S. Constitution. Yet, a 
difficulty emerges immediately upon setting about demonstrating this notion: “The 
Articles of Confederation have been assigned one of the most inglorious roles in 
American history. They have been treated as the product of ignorance and inexperience 
and the parent of chaos (Jensen 1948, 3). If one supposed the Articles to be solely a 
product of the chaotic wartime years of the Revolution, one would doubt that they could 
shed light on any matter of interest to a constitutional theorist. I follow an earlier 
interpreter of the Articles, however, in seeing the Articles, and the disputes regarding 
their drafting in the Continental Congress (lasting well over a year) as evidence of an 
intentional and thorough design.38 Simply put, “The Articles of Confederation were 
designed to prevent the central government from infringing upon the rights of the states” 
(Jensen 1948, 243).39 The constitutional theory undergirding the Articles of 
                                                 
37 While not intended to lend credibility to an originalist impulse that what occurred in the First Congress 
ought to be binding over future Congresses, this evidence should nonetheless assure a dedicated originalist 
that the majority of the first occupants of the nation’s legislative bodies conceived of the role of Congress 
in terms conformable with the theoretical claims of this chapter. 
38 “An analysis of the disputes over the Articles of Confederation makes it plain that they were not the 
result of either ignorance or inexperience” (Jensen 1948, 239). 
39 But cf. Hoffert (1992) for an account that the Articles is just as purposive as the Constitution of 1787. He 
argues that it was designed “to form a perpetual union of sovereign states whereby those states may protect 
and defend their mutual friendship, liberties and general welfare” (34). Further, Hoffert holds that 
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Confederation was then “negative constitutionalism,” the idea that constitutions are 
primarily (or maybe even solely) charters that limit and restrict the scope of government. 
This “negative” purpose—restricting the power of the central government—characterizes 
the Articles of Confederation to such an extent that it was generally unable to function.40  
While the relevance of this finding to the task of developing a relevant standard of 
congressional health seems remote at first, it is helpful to recall a key point within The 
Federalist. Publius argued that, “the principal defects of the Confederation … do not 
proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the 
structure of the building, which cannot be amended otherwise than by an alteration in the 
first principles and main pillars of the fabric” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 103). Given this 
contention, it stands to reason that the Constitution intended to replace the most pivotal 
“first principles” of the Articles. Altering the “negative” principle purpose of the Articles 
requires recourse to a variant of constitutionalism which is not so limited. The U.S. 
Constitution, as defended by those such as Publius, must then be based on a conception 
                                                 
“differentiation and integration of state and national communities suggest that the Articles sought more 
complex and positive political objectives than those based solely on suspicion of power and fear of its 
abuse … as [states] must be transcended to secure and protect the general welfare of the enlarged … 
community in a just society” (36). While there is some merit to this view, the balance of evidence presented 
in this chapter will show that the predominant purpose of the Articles was negative. Moreover, the claims 
of Hoffert founder on inconsistency, as the general welfare referred to even in his own words is that of the 
states, not of the “perpetual union” framed by these states. 
40 The Treaty of Paris (of 1783) and the Northwest Ordinance (of 1787) were formulated under the 
Articles, somewhat qualifying the claim that they lead to total inaction. One must wonder, however, 
whether the terms of the Ordinance would have been enforced by a government as ineffectual as that under 
the Articles; in fact, the weakness of the central government had severely hampered enforcement of the 
terms of the Treaty of Paris, especially due to unimpeded state efforts to expropriate property from 
loyalists, leading the British to ignore the some of the terms which they had agreed to as well (see Hamilton 
et al 1787/1961, 38 and 101). 
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of positive constitutionalism, otherwise it would remain fundamentally flawed. The 
remainder of this section carefully tests the validity of this chain of reasoning through a 
close textual analysis of both the first and second constitutions of the United States of 
America. 
The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union represent an apotheosis of the 
idea of constitutions as mere limitation on the powers of government. In fact, the Articles 
specified that the “government” framed by its strictures would not even be fully 
sovereign over the territory that would make up the new nation.41 The very first 
substantive article, Article II, provides that, “Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, 
and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this 
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”42 Even 
in the midst of such radical qualification of power, the text makes clear that not only will 
states remain sovereign, but that these states contract (in advance) to refuse to the 
national government any power (no matter how needful to the preservation of the union) 
not expressly delegated to the central government. The cascading set of restrictions on the 
national government announced in the Articles is further enhanced by a structural power 
given to the states – the state legislatures retain the right to recall their delegates from the 
                                                 
41 Publius suggested that the Articles did not properly frame a government at all. He argued that “The great 
and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for 
STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from 
the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist” (Hamilton et al 1787/1963, 103, capitalization original). This vice, 
Publius says, “is in itself evidently incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMENT” (104). 
42 Article I literally provided the name “The United States of America” to the new nation. 
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Confederation Congress at will.43 Legislators under the Articles will not then be “agents” 
in the sense of being free to choose and deliberate, but instead will be agents in the sense 
of the modern “principal-agent relationship,” and fully replaceable by the principal, their 
respective state. Cementing the preeminence of the states over the Union, each state was 
represented equally, no matter the size of the state or the size of the delegation sent to 
Congress.44 And as a final measure of emphasis that the government would simply 
minister over “the mutual and general welfare” of the states, the document was framed 
with no conception of popular sovereignty of any kind, whether at the ratification stage, 
or ongoing, as no elections were mandated for representatives to the legislature of the 
Union.45 
Even the powers granted to the new national government were hemmed in and 
restricted to the point that no important action could be taken by a majority of the states, 
but rather only when a supermajority of nine state delegations concurred. The number of 
                                                 
43 Article V provided that, “For the most convenient management of the general interests of the United 
States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislatures of each State shall direct, to 
meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each State to 
recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the 
remainder of the year.” 
44 Article V further provides that “No State shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor more 
than seven members,” meaning that there is no equality between members of Congress, some of whom 
would have diluted voting strength, not only in reference to the population of their state, as in the current 
Senate, but even in the body itself. 
45 Article II stated that “The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each 
other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, 
binding themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of 
them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.” Note the use of the 
general welfare refers to the states which make up the union rather than the general welfare of the United 
States or its people. 
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restrictions, and the manner with which the document carried out such restriction is worth 
quoting at length: 
The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor 
grant letters of marque or reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any 
treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor 
ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense and welfare of 
the United States, or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the 
credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the 
number of vessels of war, to be built or purchased, or the number of land 
or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander in chief of the army or 
navy, unless nine States assent to the same: nor shall a question on any 
other point, except for adjourning from day to day be determined, unless 
by the votes of the majority of the United States in Congress assembled 
(Article IX, cl. 6, emphasis added). 
Not content to restrict the power of government by limiting the central government to 
expressly delegated powers, this supermajority requirement provides that nine states must 
agree before anything of consequence can be done in the Confederation Congress. Even 
the style of the restriction is heavy-handed in its use of the word “never,” followed by 
eleven instances of the word “nor,” reemphasizing at every turn the restricted and 
cramped nature of the power to be exercised under the Articles. With such a stark 
requirement for action, it must be said that the overwhelming structural tendency of such 
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a government would have to be toward inaction.46 The Articles of Confederation were 
indeed designed with limitation chiefly in mind, as the “government” framed by that 
document would (and did) have a very difficult time doing much of anything. 
The degree to which the Articles of Confederation shackled the central 
government is radical, but certainly is explained by the circumstances prevailing at the 
time of its drafting. The Articles were drafted and debated over the course of more than a 
year of on and off deliberations, from 7 June 1776 to 17 November 1777 (Jensen 1948). 
As the drafting of the Articles were underway in the Second Continental Congress, the 
States were in bloody conflict with Great Britain, and it is clear that the delegates had “no 
intention of re-creating in America a form of government similar to that which they were 
fighting to overthrow” (Jensen 1948, 163). Simply put, the Articles of Confederation 
were framed in the light of a simple hostility to central government as such; the 
conception guiding the Articles of Confederation was proto-libertarian, holding that all 
central government is a pernicious threat to liberty and ought to be restricted from 
exercising any power which could violate the rights of individuals or the states.47 
                                                 
46 The Articles of Confederation especially prejudiced the government toward inaction when the Congress 
was not in formal session. Article X stipulated that a “Committee of the States” could act as a caretaker 
when the Congress was not assembled, but it specifically forbade any power “be delegated to the said 
Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice of nine States in the 
Congress of the United States assembled be requisite.” Since engaging in war was on that list described on 
the previous page, the United States could technically not engage in war, as a formal matter, under the 
Articles of Confederation when Congress was not in session. Thankfully this weakness in the government 
was not actively preyed upon by any foreign state during the decade in which the Articles operated as the 
first national constitution. 
47 This final statement will have to part company therefore, with Jensen (1948) who argued that the 
Articles represented a “democratic” form of government most consistent with the philosophy of the 
Declaration of Independence. Jensen suggests that prevailing doctrine of democracy was that majorities in 
the states should have the unconstrained right to do what they wish within their states, and that this doctrine 
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Separately, and importantly, it must be admitted that a level of distrust of governmental 
power (and a fear of its abuse) is natural and reasonable, even outside the immediate 
context of 1776. 
Even so, the Constitution of the United States of America, written in 1787 after 
some experience with “government” under the Articles, was not framed on the principle 
of simple hostility to government as such (see Edling 2003). Instead, the Constitution was 
framed in context of a general agreement, even among both Antifederalists and 
Federalists, “that there [were] material imperfections in [The Articles of Confederation]” 
(Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 101). The Constitution aims to remediate those “material 
imperfections” by founding a truly national government, dedicated to a comprehensive 
(although limited) set of ends, and structured by grants of authority and power designed 
to effectuate those ends. The U.S. Constitution still places “limits” government (both at 
the state and national levels),48 but it does so for the sake of achieving the ends stated in 
the Preamble of the Constitution under the framework of republican government.  
                                                 
was identical with the Declaration. Further he suggests that the Constitution was a kind of 
counterrevolution against the Declaration by the conservative Federalists who wished to maintain 
oligarchic privilege through the creation of a federal government that would restrict the democracy of the 
common man at the state level. A full refutation of this view would take the reader far afield, but for one 
sharp rejoinder, consider Article IV of the Articles of Confederation which stated that to, “better … secure 
and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the 
free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States.” While some historians since 
Charles Beard have argued that the Constitution was framed as instrument of class domination, it is not the 
U.S. Constitution which contains this statement that the poor are not entitled to the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship. 
48 Such as the restriction in the original Constitution that Congress shall pass no Bill of Attainder, as well 
as the Bill of Rights and 14th Amendment of the current Constitution. 
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As Publius articulates, the Constitution replaces a document framed with an 
excessive suspicion of power that disabled it from even functioning, with an alternative 
theory of constitutionalism. Whereas it might have been sufficient to simply contend for a 
technically functional government, Publius contends that the delegates of the 
Constitutional Convention faced a complex task. Rather than simply representing a direct 
tradeoff, where government is restricted to protect individual autonomy from arbitrary 
coercion, Publius presents the chief undertaking of the Convention (and thus 
constitutionalism) was “in combining the requisite stability and energy in government 
with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican form” (Hamilton et al 
1787/1961, 222). Presented as a triad, energy, stability, and republican liberty represent 
the important positive attributes of any normatively-attractive constitutional order. 
The Constitution thus replaces a theoretically impoverished and unworkable 
understanding of constitutionalism with one that recognizes that constitutions are framed 
to generate certain types of good government, not just to restrict them.49 A complication 
immediately emerges, however, when viewing constitutionalism in this light: providing 
such a government is rather difficult.50 “On comparing [energy and stability] with the 
vital principle of liberty, we must perceive at once the difficulty of mingling them 
                                                 
49 An important consideration is that a more powerful government empowered by a positive constitution 
will in fact be rights-enhancing when compared with the alternative. Indeed, “Individual liberty mattered 
[to the framers,] but the overriding goal of their efforts was to improve representation, not lessen it, and to 
ensure that the general welfare was the government's paramount concern. The Founding-Era idea of 
‘natural rights’ thus … favored broader governmental power just as much as limits to that power. In short, 
natural rights called for good government, not necessarily less government” (Campbell 2017, 87).  
50 “That [such a task] could not be easily accomplished will be denied by no one who is unwilling to betray 
his ignorance of the subject” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 223). 
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together in their due proportions” (Hamilton el al 1787/1961, 223). Whereas stable 
government suggests a very constant administration and minimal turnover of personnel, 
republican liberty presupposes that citizens “will rule and be ruled in turn” (see Book 6 of 
Aristotle’s Politics) with frequent rotation; while energetic government seems to demand 
one individual invested with the power to get things done, especially in emergencies (see 
Schmitt 1922/2005) votaries of republican liberty are (rightly) suspicious of just such 
super-empowered individuals (see Schlesinger 1973, Fisher 2013). It is easy to see in 
today’s world examples of regimes where these trade-offs are neglected to maximize the 
sought-after end, whether energy in Putin’s Russia, or stability in single-party dominated 
Communist China. In the regime framed by the Constitution of the United States such a 
“mingling” of these goals is accomplished through the tripartite structuring of the 
government as well as the internal design of each branch. 
Showing that this new theory of constitutionalism does not exist solely in the 
mind of Publius,51 or is advanced merely to provide a rationalization for the messy 
compromises of the Constitutional Convention, is the Preamble of the Constitution. 
While often considered overly general or vague, when viewed in the light of Publius’s 
theory of a good constitutional order, the Preamble provides a clear indication of the 
purpose of the Constitution. It states: “We, the people of the United States, in order to 
form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the 
                                                 
51  The new theory of constitutionalism adopted by Publius (and ostensibly operating in the background of 
the Constitution) is likely related to, or even constitutive of, the “great improvement” to the “science of 
politics” described by Publius in “Federalist No. 9” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 67). 
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common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to 
ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States 
of America.” It is immediately worth noting that the six ends of government outlined in 
the Preamble constitute a comprehensive set of aims to be pursued, but do not exhaust 
every possible purpose for which a government could (or has been) founded. Missing 
from the list are ends such as promoting the piety, salvation, or moral virtue of the 
community or the individuals which make it up. Such a list, while clearly positive, thus 
acts as a “limit” on government by defining the legitimate spheres of the national 
government’s reach.52 Likewise absent from the list are lower ends such as mere order. 
The Constitution, when viewed in the light of the Preamble, appears as a 
purposive endeavor to accomplish objects that are considered insecure or impossible 
without the foundation of government. “The objects… set forth are six in number: union, 
defence, welfare, tranquility, justice, and liberty” (Douglass 1860/1950, 477). Not only 
the six aims, but the predicates used in conjunction with these aims suggest an active and 
energetic pursuit of those objects, rather than just their protection against government 
interference. The Constitution requires that justice be “established,” that the common 
defense be “provided for,” and that the general welfare of the nation be “promoted.” Each 
of these ends requires that action be taken, not merely abstained from. The ends of union 
                                                 
52  This fact must surely be relevant to Publius’s contention that the Preamble “is a better recognition of 
popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our State 
bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of 
government” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 512). Publius claims, contrary to the common saw that the ends 
described in the Preamble are primarily aspirational or idealistic, that the Preamble is in some way distinct 
from the “treatise[s] of ethics” that make up the states’ bills of rights. 
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and tranquility specify that stability is to be sought, but not a negative order to be 
accomplished through a destruction of liberty, as that would be a “remedy … worse than 
the disease” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 73). The promotion of stability is also not a 
negative aim to be achieved through a stifling embrace of the status quo, as tranquility is 
to be sought in the context of “perfecting” the “Union.” Indeed, the twin goals of 
promoting the general welfare and superintending over a more perfect union strongly 
imply that the government should be dedicated to an ongoing process of growth (or 
development), as mere stasis would be unlikely to achieve these objects.  
Ultimately, a reasonable understanding of the constitutionalism at back of the 
document itself must account for its explicitly purposive nature, especially when 
contrasted with the Articles. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will more forward 
based on the principle that the Constitution is framed for certain defined and known 
purposes, and that the institutions framed by this document must likewise be interpreted 
and founded in line with those purposes.53 
A GENERAL WELFARE ORIENTATION: THE ATTRIBUTES OF A HEALTHY CONGRESS 
The United States Congress is vested with all the legislative authority granted by 
the Constitution; its role is thus to minister over all the aims articulated in the Preamble. 
Even if “establishing justice” will be carried out by a Justice Department in the 
Executive, or a (District Appellate or Supreme) Court in the Judiciary, the funds to pay 
                                                 
53 For the government would not function if its constituent parts where not operating in accord with the 
purposes outlined for the government as a whole or unity. 
 
 69 
for such an institution will be appropriated by Congress.54 Moreover, the structure of 
such institutions will also be duly settled in positive law, passed by Congress, and 
presented to the President for his signature.55 The senior Justice Department official or 
Judge operating in those institutions will only be authorized to carry out these functions 
because they will have been so confirmed by the Senate.56 Certainly, the Congress 
depends on the other branches to execute its policy choices and to impartially pronounce 
judgments under law; but, as these examples show, Congress is the government’s will 
when it sets out to pursue the ends defined in the Preamble. Without the action of 
Congress, the critical purposes for which the government were founded are 
fundamentally insecure. 
Nevertheless, among the ends to be attained by the government under the U.S. 
Constitution, promoting the general welfare stands out as the preeminent purpose 
entrusted to the United States Congress. Reasoning from general principles, only the 
national legislature stands for the ongoing bi-yearly consent of the entire nation, through 
the elections for the House of Representatives. Only the legislature represents the United 
States in its plurality, as a democratically-elected source of the people’s law. Only 
through passage of generally applicable law can the entire nation’s well-being be 
                                                 
54 Article I, Section 9: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law.” 
55 Article III, Section 1: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” 
56 Article II, Section 2: “[The president] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and 
all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and 
which shall be established by Law.” 
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ministered to with a substantial degree of representation for the nation’s various and 
conflicting interests, values, and principles. The alternatives are radically suspect as the 
Judiciary is designed to be insulated (at least to some extent) from the popular will, and 
the singular Presidency (although plural in the Executive Branch) is elected through a 
mechanism that can distort the majority will, to say nothing of the general will. 
Beyond these reasoned suppositions, there is textual support for the contention 
that the legislature should concern itself foremost with promoting the general welfare of 
the people of the United States. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution features the 
second use of the term “general welfare,” through its authorization that, “The Congress 
shall have the power…To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the 
debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.” 
Rather than articulate every cause for which Congress may have to authorize and 
appropriate funds from the national treasury, the emphasis placed on the term “general 
welfare,” through its repetition in the Preamble and Article I, implies that Congress’s role 
is to provide for people’s welfare (including a provision of funds and personnel for the 
armed services). When combined with the necessary and proper clause,57 this provision 
seems to flatly disprove the contention that the Congress operates only within the bounds 
of expressly delegated powers, as did the Articles of Confederation. Yet, this does not 
prove that Congress must center the national government in its deliberations over the 
                                                 
57 Article I, Section 8 also allows Congress “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 
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general welfare—Congress might investigate a pressing national issue and find that it 
might be solved or remediated through well-ordered free markets, or state-level 
decentralized problem-solving.58 
A healthy or functional Congress will thus be one that provides the institutional 
support for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the United States.59 
Given the aspirational quality of this goal, it is important to note that congressional health 
takes for granted the existence of low politics (bargaining-based compromise, ambition, 
partisanship, faction, or the like); indeed, our constitutional order presupposes that 
“enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 75).60 
These caveats aside, a constitutionally derived conception of congressional health is as 
follows: a healthy Congress is one whose rules, structures and norms promote a 
representative lawmaking process, responsive to the immediate desires of the people, 
while simultaneously reflecting a future deliberative majority. To justify this assertion, I 
will sketch each attribute of congressional health one at a time, and then turn in 
conclusion to the importance of the institutional building housing these attributes. 
                                                 
58 Even so, Congress is not relieved of the burden of promoting the generate welfare simply due to a 
prospective agenda item’s absence from an enumerated list in Section 8—as doing so would lead to the 
absurd result that Congress should disregard natural disasters, due to the absence of the words “disaster 
relief” in the Constitution. 
59 While disagreement over the definition or even existence of a common good complicates matters, the 
task of this work is especially eased due to historical context: The Congress under the Constitution was 
framed to ameliorate the defects that plagued the Congress under the Articles. Some of the remediation will 
be found, of course, through recourse to the resources provided by other branches, but much will need to be 
present in the Congress itself for the nation’s laws to be framed in a way that efficaciously addresses the 
“permanent and aggregate interests” of the Union and its people (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 72). 
60 Furthermore, and even at the level of ideal, this institutional support is probabilistic, and not guaranteed 
to be efficacious. A Congress exhibiting the traits of institutional health will occasionally fail to promote 
the common good, and a defective Congress will occasionally give rise to greater prosperity or wellbeing. 
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Table 2-1: Schematic Presentation of the Standards of Congressional Health 
Attribute Analytic Summary 
Constitutional 
Affinity 
Textual / Constitutional 
Alignment 
Representative 
To bring the most important 
interests and viewpoints in the 
country into the lawmaking 
process, in rough proportion to 
their presence in the country. 
Republican 
Liberty 
Preamble, Art. I, Sec 2 
and 3; Absence of 
provision for descriptive 
representation; “Federalist 
Nos. 10, 35, and 56” 
Responsive 
To pass law that promotes the 
general welfare, acceptable, in 
principle, to a popular majority 




Preamble; Absence of 
general supermajority 
requirements; Art. I, Sec. 
1 and 8; “Federalist Nos. 
22 and 57” 
Deliberative 
To formulate an effective public 
policy that could be seconded by 
a majority in the future, 
justifying, with reasons given for 
any interests sacrificed 
Stability 
Art. I, Sec. 3 and Sec. 7; 
Absence of recall and 
instructions provisions; 




To create a lawmaking process 
that will ameliorate the vices 
endemic to legislatures 
Energy and 
Stability 
Art. I, Sec. 5; Absence of 
hard-wired requirements 
for rules; “Federalist Nos. 
34 and 51” 
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The first and most crucial attribute of congressional health is that the Congress 
promote a representative lawmaking process. In short, “Congress is the primary vehicle 
by which the citizenry is represented in government” (Whittington 2017, 574). An 
important indication of the truth of this statement is the name of the most numerous 
branch of Congress. Unlike the unicameral Confederation Congress, which possessed 
“delegates” from states, the Congress’s largest chamber, and that responsible for 
originating all money bills, is literally called “The House of Representatives.” Whereas 
other branches represent the United States as a unity,61 the Congress represents the 
natural, permanent and valuable diversity of a liberal polity.62 
But in what way ought Congress represent this diversity? Representation is, after 
all, a famously multifarious concept, “a rather complicated, convoluted, three-
dimensional structure in the middle of a dark exposure” (Pitkin 1967, 10). Examining the 
text of the Constitution, that which is absent from that text, and the commentary of The 
Federalist reveals the representative frame privileged in this regime: Congress is 
designed to represent the diversity of the United States in terms of its interests, rather 
than replicating or reduplicating a United States, in miniature, in the body. By 
                                                 
61 The executive, despite its thousands of officials, normatively acts as a single actor, to provide a unified 
command and control in war, and to act as a singular symbolic figurehead of the nation. The Supreme 
Court, while itself a multi-member body, seeks through its pronouncements to provide a single, fixed 
meaning to the law for the purpose of providing a uniform and impartial administration of justice. 
62 As for permanence and naturalness, Publius states that “The latent causes of faction are … sown in the 
nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into … activity” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 73). 
While Federalist No. 10 famously focuses on the dangers of faction – defined as interests working against 
an aggregate or common good – elsewhere Publius identifies the value of diversity for republican liberty, 
“In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in 
the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects” (321). 
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constructing two legislative bodies, composed of members from fixed geographic 
constituencies, the Constitution’s design promotes the representation of interests and 
viewpoints at different levels of generality, but does not aspire nor succeed in bringing 
members into the body in the same proportion as they exist in the wider society, either by 
class, race, gender, or even partisan affiliation.63 Congress’s design is thus based on 
substantive rather than descriptive representation. 
Saying that the Congress is designed to represent “interests” rather than be a 
perfect mirror of the nation’s racial, gender, class or partisan diversity, requires that 
something be said about interests. In a liberal society, based at least in part on property 
ownership, individual rights, and freedom of thought, it is inevitable that people will have 
concerns which are differentiated from the good of all. Calling such concerns “interests,” 
it is also evident that groups of individuals will come to see that some of these interests 
are shared among groups smaller than that of the entire polity.64 While interests mean 
more than just pecuniary or material interests, as people can have an interest in a political 
or religious doctrine, generally self-interested economic interests are presumed to 
predominate in a “commercial republic” (see Diamond 1986).65 Publius is explicit in 
                                                 
63 Consider the 2016 election, which is certainly not among most striking in its divergence from descriptive 
representation on the basis on partisanship, Republicans make up 55.4% the House of Representatives, 
despite receiving only 49.1% of the popular votes (“Election Statistics, 1920 to Present”).  
64 This is reflected in the Oxford English Dictionary definition of interest relevant to politics, “A business, 
cause, or principle, in which a number of persons are interested; the party interested in such a business or 
principle; a party having a common interest; a religious or political party, business connection, etc.” 
65 As Publius puts it, “the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal 
distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct 
interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A 
landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser 
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announcing lawmaking in this modern liberal order must attend to “interests” when he 
announces that, “The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the 
principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the 
necessary and ordinary operations of the government” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 74, 
emphasis added). Since the very existence of interests, as distinct from the common good 
of all citizens, raises important normative problems, including the prospect of tyranny by 
a majority of the interests acting in concert, it is important to see how the attribute of 
representativeness is designed to “regulate” these “interfering” interests. 
Publius famously contends that the value of republican representatives comes 
from the way in which they can craft competing citizen interests into something 
resembling the permanent and aggregate good of the whole community. Coming to the 
conclusion that it would not be possible to rely exclusively on the moral or civic virtue of 
leaders, Publius argues that elections will produce a due respect for the interests of their 
constituents in representatives, without leading to representatives who simply mirror their 
voters. “Is it not natural” Publius asks, “that a man who is a candidate for the favor of the 
people, and who is dependent on the suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the continuance 
of his public honors, should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and 
inclinations and should be willing to allow them their proper degree of influence upon his 
conduct?” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 212). While the original design substituted an 
indirect election for the Senate, the current operations of the Constitution make this even 
                                                 
interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by 
different sentiments and views” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 74). 
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more true of the entire Congress, now that every member of that body is “dependent on 
the suffrages of his [or her] fellow-citizens” (212). 
Refining and enlarging the views of contending interests (within their own 
congressional district or state) provides sympathy and knowledge of the interests 
operating in each electoral district; the Congress as a whole is designed to bring this 
knowledge together in a rough sort of harmony.66 Indeed, “Only a national council 
representing the diverse interests of the country could be properly situated to make policy 
on the problems that spilled across state boundaries and implicated the collective interest 
of the nation as a whole” (Whittington 2017, 578).  It should be emphasized that the 
contrary understanding of representation as a mirror for the masses is rejected by Publius 
and by the design of the Constitution. Decisively, the Constitution lacks any prominent 
mechanism to guarantee descriptive representation of the American people in Congress, 
whether race, gender, class or party. Publius is rather explicit here, announcing that, “The 
idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people by persons of each class is 
altogether visionary. Unless it were expressly provided in the Constitution that each 
different occupation should send one or more members, the thing would never happen in 
practice” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 210). While Antifederalists such as Federal Farmer 
contended that, “a full and equal representation, is that which possesses the same 
                                                 
66 “It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and 
circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and 
interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute 
and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute 
necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 344). 
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interests, feelings, opinions, and views the people themselves would were they all 
assembled” (Storing 1985, 39), the Constitution fails to provide for this understanding of 
representation. The Congress has thus never been a descriptive representation of the 
American people.67 
Yet, a healthy Congress, one that is seeking to minister to a common good, must 
do something beyond merely representing interests as ambassadors from their states or 
districts. “The process of legislation – at its best – [is] something like the following: the 
representatives of the community come together to settle solemnly and explicitly on 
common schemes and measure that can stand in the name of them all, and they do so in a 
way that openly acknowledges and respects (rather than conceals) the inevitable 
differences of opinion and principle between them” (Waldron 1999, 2). Such a 
description of a legislative process emphasizes that a healthy legislature will not always 
be able to lead to all (or even a supermajority) to agree “solemnly and explicitly on 
common schemes.” A representative lawmaking process obtains when the most important 
interests and viewpoints in the country are presented on the floor (or in the committees) 
of Congress, in rough proportion to their presence in the country. 
                                                 
67 This is not to reject or deny the fact that a degree of descriptive representation is needed for reasons of 
regime legitimacy. No version of the Constitution has ever textually sanctioned a test of sex, race, gender 
identity, religion, or class to be a representative, unlike numerous state constitutions that contained property 
restrictions. But this de jure openness for all to participate is certainly imperiled if, as in many cases in the 
history of the polity, there were de facto requirements that the representative be upper-class, Christian, 
straight, white and male. Publius speaks of the de jure openness of the Congress when he states that, “There 
are strong minds in every walk of life that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will 
command the tribute due to their merit, not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but 
from the society in general. The door ought to be equally open to all” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 213). If it 
turns out that only particular “situations” yield MCs, this claim is put in doubt, and problems of legitimacy 
for the regime certainly do arise in full force. 
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Invoking the necessity of a well-structured legislative process presents an easy 
segue to the second attribute of a healthy Congress: to promote the general welfare the 
Congress must move decisively in responding to popular majoritarian preferences. As 
stated by constitutional theorist Keith Whittington, “Structuring a legislature to be 
representative is futile if legislators are not responsive to the constituents that they 
represent” (2017, 580, emphasis added). Further, one can say that the purpose of having 
responsive legislators is to more efficaciously minister to the general welfare of the 
nation. Indeed, while the general welfare is something akin to a common good, a good 
shared by all, there will naturally be disagreements concerning what this entails given the 
diversity characteristic of the United States both in theory and practice. While this lack of 
agreement over a common good led some mid-twentieth century political scientists to 
skepticism regarding the existence of a genuine public interest (see Truman 1971), the 
Constitution does not require this radical version of “pluralism.” Specially, the U.S. 
Constitution’s structural provisions privilege the majority’s conception of the common 
good and provide the means for that view to prevail, except in limited defined conditions: 
when the Senate is acting on treaties or impeachment, and when either House votes on 
expelling a member or veto-overrides. 
While considerable ink in constitutional theory is focused on the “counter-
majoritarian” features of the Supreme Court (see Bickel 1962), or the filibuster (see 
Chafetz 2011), the text of the Constitution, in Article I, focuses primarily on majoritarian 
institutions. While infrequently remarked upon due to the number of “veto points” 
alleged to operate in the lawmaking process, the Constitution is remarkably majoritarian, 
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especially when compared with its immediate predecessor, the Articles of Confederation. 
Article I, Section 5 specifies that “a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum 
to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be 
authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such 
Penalties as each House may provide.” As a result of continuous tardiness and absence in 
the Confederation Congress, the Constitution provides that only a majority of each 
Chamber even need meet to do legislative business, making a 26-25 vote in the 
contemporary Senate a constitutionally approved margin for the enactment of any 
ordinary statute. While majority rule is surely not guaranteed to yield an aggregate or 
general good, it is the best available procedure for seeking the common good, in an 
environment of conflict or contestation over just what exactly will promote welfare, 
establish justice, or render the union less imperfect. 
Given the dangers posed by majority tyranny, it is a natural reaction to wonder if 
requiring a greater consensus for action would result in greater security against this 
baleful possibility. Yet, Publius, praising the Constitution and criticizing the Articles, 
makes it clear that this a remedy worse than the potential disease: “To give a minority a 
negative upon the majority … is one of those refinements which, in practice, has an effect 
the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. The necessity of unanimity in public 
bodies, or of something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposition that 
it would contribute to security. But its real operation is to embarrass the administration 
[and] to destroy the energy of the government” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 143). In short, 
requiring any more than a majority to concur in the ordinary operations of the 
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government has the perverse effect of letting the smaller number govern the greater. The 
problem posed by excessive supermajority requirements is exacerbated by the crises 
which any nation must face in the fullness of time. In Publius’s words: 
In those emergencies of a nation … there is commonly a necessity for 
action. The public business must, in some way or other, go forward. If a 
pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority, respecting the 
best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order that something may be 
done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the 
smaller number will overrule that of the greater… Hence, tedious delays; 
continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the 
public good. And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when such 
compromises can take place: for upon some occasions things will not 
admit of accommodation; and then the measures of government must be 
injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. [The government is thus] kept 
in a state of inaction. (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 143-4). 
While checking the majority by requiring it to meet additional hurdles of persuasion 
appears at first to offer security against majority tyranny, instead it offers the prospect of 
grinding the gears of government to a halt, even in crisis, and substituting minority rule 
for majority republicanism. 
In terms of responsiveness, Congress ought to aim for gaining the lively and 
interested consent of the general populace to the laws deliberated upon, as the purpose of 
republican government is to achieve the blessing of self-government without the vices of 
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direct democracy. It will say little in favor of self-government if the privilege of being a 
republican lawmaker consists of the ability to make the laws irrespective of the 
preferences of their constituents. To provide incentives for such an end, “the members of 
Congress must stand for frequent election. The design of an electoral mechanism is 
always a delicate balance. Officials must be independent enough to make policy 
judgments but responsive enough to react to the felt interests of the people” (Whittington 
2017, 582). Publius seems to say much the same when surveying the “electoral 
connection” that will yoke representatives (and now senators) with their voters. “Such 
will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their constituents,” Publius 
says, “Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which they will be 
bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people. It is possible that these 
may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not all 
that government will admit, and that human prudence can devise? Are they not the 
genuine and the characteristic means by which republican government provides for the 
liberty and happiness of the people?” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 350-1).68  
Nevertheless, and as Publius famously reflected, auxiliary precautions must be 
resorted to ensure that the Congress actually aligns its deliberations with that which has a 
                                                 
68 Publius further states that “The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for 
rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the 
society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they 
continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of 
republican government. The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy 
are numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a limitation of the term of appointments as will 
maintain a proper responsibility to the people” (Hamilton 1787/1961, 348). The Constitution, which sets a 
six-year term for senators and a two-year term for representatives, attempted to provide for this 
responsibility. 
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potential basis for majority approval, not merely in the Congress, but in the society at 
large. Among the most important vices of representatives are to forget that they are not 
the people themselves, but rather, are their deputies. To be responsive to the majority in 
society is thus not the exact same as producing a proposed course of action which will be 
approved by 50 percent plus one of the voting senators or representatives. Given the fact 
that the popular will is fleeting and sometimes difficult to discern, Congress might thus 
find proxies for the popular will when there is uncertainty or an immediate crisis. One 
important expedient might consist in relying on executive leadership. Contrary to some 
congressional insularists, there is nothing inherently dysfunctional about accepting a 
reasoned argument that the popular will is behind a course of action proposed by an 
executive. Even so, those promoting the presidency as the seat of popular will also need 
to be reminded that the executive’s claims to be such a mouth-piece for the majority are 
not self-evident truths. A healthy Congress will in fact attempt to use signs and signals, 
(polling, election results, correspondence from constituents, petitions, popular protests or 
assemblies of support) to determine what agenda items the public would like the 
Congress to focus on, and whether the policies proposed in Congress could conceivably 
be approved by a majority of the nation’s citizens. One sign of a healthy Congress is an 
active attempt to listen to what occurs outside of the deliberations of Congress. 
Structuring legislative institutions in this fashion should lead to the passage of legislation 
that is closely enough tied to citizens’ wishes that most citizens, most of the time, feel 
that the government is working for them. 
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The necessity of a healthy legislative process aimed at promoting the general 
welfare likewise is suggestive of the last attribute of congressional health; legislative 
institutions, such as those structured by Article I of the Constitution, ought to be 
deliberative to be effective. Simple responsiveness will not be enough; the Constitution is 
definitively not based on “a simplistic normative model of democracy whereby 
democratic majorities are to get whatever they want, on every issue, and in short order” 
(Sabl 2015, 346). While it is common to reflect on the slow and deliberate pace to the 
legislative process created by bicameralism and the requirement for the President to 
consent to the passage of law (see Farrier 2010, Chafetz 2017),69 it makes more sense, 
especially from the standpoint of positive constitutionalism, to emphasize the fact that 
deliberation (reasoning together over the merits of public policy [Bessette 1994]), is 
necessary to the successful promotion of the general welfare. It will not do to simply have 
Congress put a rubber stamp on popular preferences if the goal being sought is the greater 
prosperity, security, liberty, or justice of the American polity. A number of possibilities 
                                                 
69 Farrier (2010), for instance, focuses on the checking impulses of bicameralism, stating that “The sewn-in 
differences between the House and Senate were designed originally to prevent a unified institutional mind-
set even under conditions of small government and shared party power” (25). While certainly true to 
Publius’s treatment of this topic, (see following) this is not the primary (or even secondary) role which 
bicameralism, and the deliberation it promotes, is meant to play in achieving the general welfare. Chafetz 
(2017) is somewhat blither when stating that “Ours is an intentionally inefficient system” (313). To state 
that sheer lawmaking efficiency, as might be measured in the number of bills passed by the legislature in a 
given increment of time, is not quantity to be maximized by a healthy Congress, seems fair enough. But in 
no way could the design of Congress be to create an intentionally inefficient system. That would be 
irrational. Instead, the Congress is designed to efficaciously and effectively promote the general welfare, 
and the Congress is handed a set of structural channels designed to meet that goal.  Bicameralism in 
Congress is a structural solution to the deficiencies of radical responsiveness and/or rapid lawmaking 
present at the state level in the 1780s. The Constitution was designed to replace a system of complete 




require this rejection of simple responsiveness: popular (i.e. majoritarian) preferences 
regarding constitutional ends might be in error; popular preferences may not contain a 
sufficient specification of the means for achieving the goal sought; popular preferences 
may contain a collective short-sightedness that will be self-defeating over the 
intermediate or long-run; popular preferences might be inconclusive, contradictory or 
unclear, even while urgent action is needed; popular preferences might contradict 
normatively important constitutional or moral principles.70 A healthy Congress ought to 
be deliberative, not because it is essential to offer numerous veto points to stop a 
majority, but because the ends the government is structured to achieve are insecure 
without deliberation. A sufficient degree of reasoned discussion of the agenda items 
placed on Congress’s plate (by exigent events, campaign promises or a popular 
outpouring of passion or preference) is necessary to ensure that proposals to be as 
efficacious as they are popular. 
In order to minister to the general welfare, a persistent or permanent aggregate 
good of the nation, each House of Congress must construct a deliberative process – a 
lawmaking process responsive to a reasoned conception of the general welfare.  While 
neither the word “reason” nor “deliberation” appears in the text of the original 
Constitution, there are several aspects of the Constitution which structure or allow for this 
                                                 
70 Publius, for instance, states that a second, more deliberative body “may be sometimes necessary as a 
defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of 
the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over 
the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by 
some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested 
men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and 
condemn” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 382-3). 
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needed deliberation. The presentment clause itself, in Article 1, Section 7, 
constitutionally requires reasons to be given and exchanged between the branches when 
consent is not given to a proposed law. In order to veto a bill passed by Congress, the 
president must “return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have 
originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to 
reconsider it.” Such a procedure envisions, and indeed requires, that the Congress pass a 
law with a set of arguments for its passage, such that it could be defended against 
objections from the President. Upon hearing the President’s objections, it likewise 
appears that the process of reconsideration ought to concern a debate occasioned by the 
reasons advanced by the President against a bill’s passage into law, and an attempt to 
determine if those are conclusive or erroneous. Further, by changing the voting 
mechanism in Congress to voting as individuals, away from the provision as voting as a 
bloc as in the Confederation Congress, the suggestion seems to be that each MC should 
vote in favor or against each proposed bill based on the basis of their own deliberate 
choice rather than the fixed perspective of the majority of their state legislature (or more 
controversially, of a simple poll of their constituents). 
Moving away from a clause-bound approach to interpreting the Constitution, the 
addition of bicameralism to the Federal Congress cannot, therefore, be thought of as 
unalloyed desire to add veto points to the mechanism of government. Instead the purpose 
of bicameralism, viewed in the context of congressional health, is to promote a second 
form of majority support: the conceivable future support of a majority for the course of 
action proposed by Congress. A healthy Congress ministers to the permanent and 
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aggregate welfare of the nation, not a temporary, fleeting well-being or a passionate 
desire whose actualization will prove more hurtful than helpful. Support for this thesis 
can be derived not only from the structural provisions of the Constitution, but from the 
most important treatments of bicameralism in The Federalist. As is common in that set of 
essays, Publius reflects on seemingly paradoxical insight when he states that immediate 
responsiveness to the people can lead to a surprising defect, “the want, in some important 
cases, of a due responsibility in the government to the people, arising from that frequency 
of elections which in other cases produces this responsibility” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 
381). Publius means that the electoral connection which encourages representativeness, 
by learning and listening to the interests of their constituents, and responsiveness, by 
wanting to be reelected on the basis of favoring those interests, can lead to those very 
interests being neglected. This problem emerges because:  
The objects of government may be divided into two general classes: the 
one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and sensible 
operation; the other depending on a succession of well-chosen and well-
connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved 
operation. The importance of the latter description to the collective and 
permanent welfare of every country, needs no explanation. And yet it is 
evident that an assembly elected for [too short a term will be] unable to 
provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the 
general welfare may essentially depend (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 381-2, 
emphasis added). 
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The Constitution was designed, however, with this defect in mind. While the electoral 
connection between representatives and their constituents may encourage this vice, the 
electoral connection between senators and their constituents means that they need to 
think ahead to consider their prospects for reelection, not this or next year, but more than 
half a decade down the line. While Publius means this to explain the presence of a small 
Senate with terms much longer than many expected in a republic, the effects of this 
incentive structure should prove to be felt throughout a healthy, well-ordered Congress. 
The design of Congress ensures that the House of Representatives needs the concurrence 
of the Senate for its proposals to become law. Just as the existence of the President’s veto 
affects the deliberations of Congress, the prospect of seeing one’s bill become dead on 
arrival in the Senate ought to force a degree of deliberation and care into the lawmaking 
process that might otherwise not exist in “the people’s House.” Critically, the same 
incentives ought to convince the Senate to be more attuned to immediate popular 
preferences than otherwise may be the case, since radically unpopular Senate bills will go 
down in defeat in the House due to the same differential. 
A similar set of compensating bicameral advantages apply when comparing 
deliberations concerning interests in Congress. Wise deliberation regarding interests 
obtains when interests can find a fair advocacy on the floor of Congress, and when 
interests must be sacrificed, reasons are given for why this should be the case. Bargaining 
and compromise are thus acceptable but not as a decision of interests x and y to exclude 
interest z from the benefits of the policy. Side payments (for losing interests) are thus 
clearly legitimate and likely even necessary for an argument that the common good, or 
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general welfare, is being ministered to in its deliberations. While the House deliberations 
may focus on short-run welfare of only their narrow geographic constituency, the 
Senate’s deliberations can offer reasons to occasionally sacrifice certain short-term 
goods, for broader, long term aggregate welfare. Bargaining and compromise imply that 
there is no ex ante ideal balance to strike between these twin goods; by providing 
constitutional support for the views of each, bicameralism enhances the effectiveness of 
Congress in navigating the tension between responsiveness and deliberativeness. 
The idea that constitutional design acts to remediate vices incident to 
representative bodies is connected to the final attribute of a healthy Congress, and one 
perhaps less remarked upon that it ought to be: The Congress must be a self-consciously 
organized institution. A healthy Congress must be cognizant of the fact that collective 
bodies are susceptible to certain problems (vices in the language of the Framers; 
collective action [or coordination] problems in the language of contemporary political 
science) and ought to provide for rules and procedures, as well as enforcing norms, that 
militate against the weaknesses of such bodies, while fortifying its strengths. The criteria 
by which we evaluate Congress must therefore necessarily be different than the criteria a 
voter will use to evaluate her MC; it will clearly be different than that which an MC 
would use to evaluate a bill. Attempting to directly evaluating a Congress’s 
representativeness or responsiveness without reference to its norms, rules, and 
procedures, would be to confound accidental attributes, from essential ones. In sum, one 
must evaluate Congress for its institutional ability to refine or redirect the tendency for 
MCs to fail to use the appropriate criteria to judge prospective law (due to reasons such 
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as excessive responsiveness to party or to narrow parochialism) or for Congress to fail 
prey to its vices (such as indecision or delay).71 
The Constitution reinforces this natural supposition when it omits the codification 
of rules, procedures, or norms that the Congress must use in furtherance of their 
legislative tasks. Only the most fundamental requirements, such as requiring publicity 
and transparency through the publication of a journal, as well as recorded roll call votes, 
if requested by one-fifth of each House, are set down in advance; otherwise, the 
Constitution gives total discretion to Congress.72 The Constitution states clearly that, 
“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for 
disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”73 The 
reason the Constitution does not “hard-wire” the rules or procedures of the legislative 
process in advance is quite clearly presented by Publius: “we must bear in mind that we 
are not to confine our view to the present period, but to look forward to remote futurity. 
Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing 
exigencies, but upon a combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages, 
according to the natural and tried course of human affairs” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 
203, emphasis added). The appropriate body for determining which rules, procedures and 
norms best conduce to founding a legislative process with the general welfare in mind is 
                                                 
71 See Whittington (2017), for an extensive, detailed and learned account of the potential vices which may 
befall Congress. 
72 Art. 1, Sec. 5. 
73 Art. 1, Sec. 5. 
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the current Congress, and specifically each Chamber thereof, as different ‘ages” will 
require different innovations and developments in institutional maintenance.74 Such 
consideration also makes it clear that each House is responsible for its own rules, and that 
precedent only hems them in so far as they freely choose to retain past practices. 
One final point confirms the importance of rules, norms and structures for 
achieving the aims set out in the Preamble: Congress’s virtues are not so automatic as 
those of the other branches, so these internal regulatory structures are much more 
important in the legislature. Plain historical fact and the present situation show that the 
Congress can relatively easily (without obviously violating any explicit textual provision) 
become overly (or even solely) responsive to parochial or special interests. It can likewise 
become representative (or even creative) of factional conflict in the wider society. It has 
certainly been stagnant, rather than deliberative, or behaviorally become motivated only 
by short term political gain in its decision-making.75 The basic structures of Congress 
were surely founded in order to remediate similar flaws in the Confederation Congress, 
such as its lack of energy, its domination by parochial interests, and the inability for the 
Congress to make the short-term sacrifices necessary for long-term gain. Indeed, as this 
chapter has shown, the Congress was granted substantially more power, its workings 
                                                 
74 Such a maxim means that a rule, norm or procedure which may be needful in one age is positively 
pernicious in another one. In a latter chapter it will de amply demonstrated that special rules and 
unorthodox lawmaking played a critical role in helping the Congress to be responsive. On the other hand, in 
the epilogue, I agree with contemporary scholars who think those processes destroy the possibility of 
deliberation.  
75 For a comprehensive treatment of alleged contemporary vices, see the previous chapter. 
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were directed toward majority rule, and each MC was granted some autonomy and 
license to align personal and political self-interest with the good of their constituents to 
promote these changes. Yet, some of these vices are more “natural” than the qualities that 
Congress ought to maximize.76  
A substantial degree of institutional self-consciousness is needed, therefore, for 
Congress to instantiate the attributes of representativeness, responsiveness, and 
deliberation – and yield the constitutional affinities of energy, stability and republican 
liberty. While The Federalist famously explains the checks and balances needed between 
the three primary branches of government, Publius clearly says that such rules and 
procedures are needed in the subordinate organizations as well. “This policy of 
supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced 
through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it 
particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant 
aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a 
check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the 
public rights” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 319, emphasis added). A member of Congress, 
whose constitutionally allowable internal motivation may be the single-minded pursuit of 
reelection (Mayhew 1987), must nonetheless be directed, through appropriate norms, 
rules and procedures, to do so in such a way that the general welfare may be promoted; 
                                                 
76 Lee (2007), succinctly traces out the vices that naturally emerge from the geographical scheme of 
representation utilized to populate the Congress. The main flaw addressed therein, parochialism, is clearly 
but one of a number of ways that the Congress can fail to promote the general welfare. 
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otherwise, the central aim of the Constitution, and of its most sovereign part, has been 
subverted from the start. “If all members did nothing but pursue their electoral goals, 
Congress would decay or collapse” (Mayhew 1974, 141). The rational self-interest of 
MCs must be contended with at the stage of institutional design or risk the collapse of the 
institution. 
By way of conclusion we can compare the explicit attributes developed in this 
chapter to the implicit standards operative in the field of congressional studies. In this 
chapter, it is shown that a healthy Congress is one whose rules, structures and norms 
promote a representative lawmaking process, responsive to the immediate desires of the 
people, while simultaneously reflecting a future deliberative majority. Recall that the 
implicit conception examined in the previous chapter suggested that legislative health 
consists of a constitutionally-assertive, productive and majoritarian legislature, 
supported by institutional loyalty, and legitimated by transparent, responsible 
deliberation on policy.  
Such a juxtaposition reveals that several implicit standards have been rejected 
altogether as primary desiderata of institutional functionality: namely, productivity, 
transparency and constitutional self-assertion. The Constitution, failing to be a 
productivity enhancing device, instead suggests that popular responsiveness should be a 
mark of congressional health; after all a popular majority might well be more interested 
in the repeal of one law than in a programmatic positive platform of a dozen of laws. 
Productivity, especially when defined as the number of bills passed in a given Congress, 
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is simply not an indicator for congressional health.77 Transparency, on the other hand, is 
not so much rejected as it is downgraded; certainly, much of Congress’s work must be 
carried out in public, so that constituents may judge if their views and interests are being 
represented. But if Congress engages in some bargaining or deliberation out of the public 
eye that is hardly an indicium of dysfunction. Constitutional self-assertion is not 
presented as a primary attribute of health for rather different reason. The issue is that 
focusing on assertiveness as a primary attribute of a “good Congress” leads to the 
misimpression that Congress must be butting heads with the president to be successful. 
Maybe most perniciously, making such an attribute central to evaluating this institution 
suggests that Congress’s status ought to be evaluated in reference to its relative status in a 
zero-sum power conflict with the presidency. This is not the case, as is demonstrated in 
the case studies. To sum up, the purpose of Congress is to promote the general welfare 
while taking advantage of its independent institutional vantage point and the special 
resources provided by the fact that Congress is a multi-member, democratically-elected, 
and constitutionally empowered body. In some cases, the Congress may very well find, 
after careful analysis, that full-cooperation with the president carries out this role better 
than contestation. Of course, on some occasions the Congress must assert itself, but 
conflict, for its own sake, ought not be presented as an attribute of congressional health. 
                                                 
77 Even one of the progenitors of the contemporary scholarly debate over productivity has admitted that 
counting the number of bills passed in a given congress is not terribly significant. David Mayhew (2018), 
considering the contemporary critique of Congress, suggests that “it would be good to abandon the ‘number 
of bills passed’ yardstick.” 
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A WELFARE ORIENTED HOUSE DEBATES THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 
Developing an ideal account of congressional health poses important difficulties; 
one of the most important issues is ensuring that the standard is practicable and not 
unrealistically utopian. Indeed, readers of this chapter would not be initially faulted for 
being concerned that the account of Congress developed here represents “a Congress for 
boy scouts:” an institution composed entirely of selfless and purely public-interested 
individuals, wisely deliberating over institutional mechanisms and the policies proposed 
under those procedures, disagreeing without every becoming disagreeable, and fairly 
representing the voice of their constituents, even those not likely to vote for them at 
reelection time. In fact, one can easily adduce evidence to show that well-structured 
federal legislative institutions will operate much as described here; and that legislative 
institutions known for their great failures have frequently lacked these clear attributes of 
institutional health. While a demonstration of this evidence will occupy the next several 
substantive chapters, an even more heady task can be addressed immediately. While it 
will not strain credulity to posit the existence of Congresses which were responsive, 
deliberative, representative, or contained helpful internal regulating features, it will 
surprise many readers that the key attribute identified in this chapter, the promotion of the 
general welfare, was explicitly centered in the public debate of the very much self-
interested, reelection seeking members of the United States Congress. 
In the First Federal Congress MCs operated in an undiscovered country. Their 
attempt to grapple with the full scope of their power under the new forms inaugurated by 
the Constitution of 1787 was prompted not by matters of abstract principle, but the 
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concrete needs of resolving practical debates. Near the conclusion of the First Congress 
in 1791 one such question concerned whether or not the Congress had the power to 
charter and incorporate a national bank. Since the word “bank” does not appear in the 
Constitution, some worried that Congress was already beginning to exceed its delegated 
powers, in seeking to do just that. One MC, Representative Elbridge Gerry (MA), an 
arch-critic of the Constitution in the campaign for its ratification, yet a defender of the 
Hamiltonian Federalist vision for the government in 1789 – 91, presented a way forward. 
He suggested that one turn the tools of textual (legal) interpretation developed by the 
eminent English jurist Blackstone for assistance in penetrating this difficult issue: 
[Blackstone] is of the opinion ‘that the most universal and effectual way of 
discovering the true meaning of a law when the words are dubious, is by 
considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which moved the 
legislature to enact it.’ The causes which produced the constitution were 
imperfect union, want of public and private justice, internal commotions, a 
defenceless community, neglect of the public welfare and danger to our 
liberties. These are known to be causes not only by the preamble of the 
constitution, but also from our own knowledge of the history of the times 
that preceded the establishment of it (diGiacomantonio et al 1995, 457). 
Rep. Gerry has here made several very important claims: (1) that the appropriate way to 
understand the Constitution is with respect to its “spirit;” (2) that one can find this 
“spirit” in the Preamble of the Constitution; (3) that one can locate in this Preamble a 
notable contrast between the conditions prevailing under the Articles of Confederation 
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and the intended rectification of those issues by the Constitution. If Elbridge Gerry did 
not use the word “positive constitution” in describing these views, he did the next best 
thing: his vision of constitutional interpretation started, just as this chapter did, with an 
explicit contrast between the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation. It is surely 
evident in his elaboration of this statement, where he proceeded to pose rhetorical 
questions: 
If these weighty causes produced the constitution, and it not only gives 
power for removing them, but also authorizes Congress to make all laws 
necessary and proper for carrying these powers into effect: shall we listen 
to assertions that these words have no meaning and the new constitution 
has not more energy than the old? … Or shall we, by a candid and liberal 
construction of the powers expressed in the constitution, promote the great 
and important objects thereof? (457). 
Representative Elbridge Gerry, speaking on the floor of the House to his peers, posited 
that the Constitution should be understood primarily as a document that would “promote 
the great and important” objects stated in the Preamble. If it was necessary and proper to 
charter a national bank to promote the general welfare, then it was constitutional to do so. 
 Rep. Gerry was not alone in taking such a stand; numerous members of the House 
spoke to the central concerns of this chapter when they stated that the Constitution is best 
understood through its Preamble, that the Preamble is intimately connected to the 
Congress through the words used in Article I, and that the general welfare was to be the 
“north star” for that body. With respect to the Preamble, Rep. Laurence (NY) notably 
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remarked that “The principles of the government and the ends of the constitution … were 
expressed in the preamble, [where] it is established for the common defence and general 
welfare; the body of that instrument contained provisions the best adapted to the intention 
of those principles and attainment of those ends. To these ends, principles, and provisions 
Congress was to have, he conceived, a constant eye, and then by the sweeping clause, 
they were vested with the powers to carry the ends into execution” (413, emphasis 
added). Speaking likewise in favor of the constitutionality of the national bank bill, Rep. 
Boudinot (NJ), “took up the constitution, to see if this simple power was not fairly to be 
drawn by necessary implication from those vested by this instrument in the legislative 
authority of the United States. It sets out in the preamble with declaring the general 
purposes for which it was formed —‘The insurance of domestic tranquility—provision 
for common defence and promotion of the general welfare.’ These are the prominent 
features of this instrument, and are confirmed and enlarged by the specific grants in the 
body of it” (434, emphasis added). Rep. Sedgwick (MA) was blunter in stating that “The 
preamble of the constitution warrants this remark, that a Bank is not repugnant to the 
spirit and essential objects of that instrument” (397). Representatives were at pains to 
explain that the purpose of government was to promote the ends stated in the Preamble, 
and that they would not tolerate attempts to fit the Constitution with a straightjacket 
which would inhibit the Congress from framing laws to promote the general welfare.78 
                                                 
78 Rep. Sedgwick (MA) was even more direct when he averred that if he “concur[ed] with [the opponents 
of the bank bill], I should think it my duty to go home to my constituents, and honestly declare to them, that 
by their jealousy of power, they had so restrained the operations of government, that we have not the means 
of effecting any of the great purposes for which the constitution was designed…” (399, said by Sedgwick). 
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The intimate connection between the Preamble and the most fundamental aim of 
Congress was likewise indicated in another statement of Rep. Gerry worthy of being 
quoted at length: 
It is remarkable, that altho’ ‘common defence and general welfare’ are 
held up in the preamble amongst the primary objects of attention, they are 
again mentioned in the 8th section of the first article, whereby we are 
enjoined in levying taxes, duties, &c. particularly to regard ‘the common 
defence and general welfare;’ indeed common sense dictates the measure; 
for the security of our property, families, and liberty—of every thing dear 
to us, depends on our ability to defend them. The means, therefore, for 
attaining this object, we ought not to omit a year, month, or even a day, if 
we could avoid it, and we are never provided for defence unless prepared 
for sudden emergencies (454-5).  
Gerry stated that special solicitude ought to be paid to the fact that the Constitution uses 
the phrase “general welfare” very precisely in two places, to connect the deliberations of 
Congress with its promotion and to ensure that necessary means of promoting it are 
efficaciously provided by the laws framed by that legislative body. 
According to the reasoning of the members of the House speaking in favor of the 
bank bill, one must understand that the “general welfare” is to be constantly in the 
contemplation of the body, otherwise the Constitution’s remediation of the flaws of the 
Articles have been for naught. “From the restrictions to the government contended for by 
the opposers of the bill, [Rep. Vining (DE)] similized the constitution to a horse finely 
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proportioned in every respect to the eye, and elegantly caparisoned, but deficient in one, 
and the most essential requisite, that of the ability to carry the owner to his journey’s end; 
he had rather, he said, mount the old confederation, and rag on in the old way, than be 
amused with the appearance of a government so essentially defective” (472). Rep. 
Vining’s statement reveals itself as another important declaration that the Congress is to 
comport itself very differently than the Confederation Congress, and that to do so, the 
Congress must keep the ends laid out in the Constitution in mind during deliberations 
even regarding the constitutionality of legislation, not just regarding its expedience.79 
Otherwise, the essential energy necessary to the promotion of the general welfare will be 
sacrificed. 
Finally, members of the House contended that this “liberal construction” of the 
Constitution was not the same as a simple contention that the Congress could do anything 
it wanted so long as it used the magic incantation of “general welfare.” They insisted, 
therefore that energy in government was not inconsistent with the demands of republican 
liberty. Rep. Ames (MA) stated that no one aimed to “contend for an arbitrary unlimited 
discretion in the government to do everything.”  Ames specifically, “took occasion to 
                                                 
79 Rep. Sedgwick likewise stated that “The conduct of Congress had a construction on those words more 
rational, and consistent with common sense, and the purposes for which the government was instituted; 
which [Sedgwick] conceived to be, that the laws should be established on such principles and such an 
agency, in the known and usual means, employed in the execution of them, as to effect the ends expressed 
in the constitution, with the greatest possible degree of public utility.” Sedgwick was not shy in stating 
what those ends were: “The great ends to be obtained, as means to effectuate the ultimate end—the public 
good, and general welfare, are capable, under general terms, of constitutional specification; but the 
subordinate means are so numerous, and capable of such infinite variation, as to render an enumeration 
impracticable, and therefore must be left to construction, and necessary implication” (400-1, emphasis 
original said by Sedgwick). 
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protest against such a misconception … He noticed great marks by which the 
construction of the Constitution, he conceived, must be guided and limited—and these, if 
not absolutely certain, were very far from being arbitrary or unsafe: It is for the house to 
judge whether the construction which denies the power of Congress, is more definite and 
safe” (395-6). In other words, there were clearly stated lines which the Congress should 
not cross, but MCs sought to prevent their colleagues from assuming that limitation of 
governmental power was desirable for its own sake; the plain experience of the Articles 
of Confederation had shown that this maxim was not reasonable. In fact, energy in 
government was proved to be necessary, not only for the security of liberty, but for the 
continued existence, vitality and stability of the regime itself. 
Members of a Congress, motivated by powerful norms regarding the importance 
of the newly written Constitution, expressed the insights of positive constitutionalism 
with such force that some construed the Congress as duty bound on this issue. Rep. Smith 
(SC) said that “If… on solemn deliberation … [it appeared] that the measure was not 
prohibited by any part of the constitution, was not a violation of the rights of any state or 
individual, and was peculiarly necessary and proper to carry into operation certain 
essential powers of the government—it was then not only justifiable on the part of 
Congress, but it was even their duty to adopt such a measure” (430-1, emphasis added). It 
is taking little liberty with this language to say that members of the House of 
Representatives were advocating that Congress had positive duties to promote the general 
welfare, even in ways not expressly mandated in the text of the Constitution. They 
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located such claims in the “spirit” of the Constitution, collected from its Preamble and 
from its structural provisions in Article I. 
Members of a healthy Congress, which the First Congress was, as will be shown 
in the next chapter, are capable of being redirected in such public-spirited and even 
frankly theoretical territory, by a combination of norms, structures and rules and their 
own political self-interest. It is no surprise that many of the representatives quoted above 
were from the financially burgeoning Northeast. Their political self-interest motivated 
them to advocate for the passage of a bill incorporation a national bank. In a well-
functioning Congress, language of partial good is displaced by arguments for the 
common good of all. Searching for arguments to overcome objections, MCs came upon 
reasoned arguments to defend to passage of bills on subjects not expressly defined in the 
Constitution.80 Able opponents of the bank bill, such as James Madison, sought to reject 
these arguments, but they could make no headway against the stubborn logic that the 
Constitution was different in kind than the old Articles. For well-more than a year 
previous to the bank debate the Congress has legislated on many topics not “expressly” 
enumerated in the Constitution, appropriating money for lighthouses, despite not a word 
in the Constitution describing such “internal improvements” (Bordewich 2016). Even 
                                                 
80 “In the understanding of The Federalist ... the Constitution will be effective to the extent that it is able to 
institutionalize hypocrisy. Political self-interest is translated into action for the common good by the 
creation of incentives for ambitious politicians to defend their actions with publicly justifiable reasons. In 
this view, the injustice or prejudice of individual motives becomes politically irrelevant to the extent that 
politicians feel constrained to justify their actions with good reasons—through reasons that may not 
actually been their motivation. As long as politics trades on the plane of these public-regarding 
rationalizations, liberal constitutionalism would have worked” (Tulis and Mellow 2018, 139). In the First 
Congress, liberal constitutionalism worked quite well. 
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though interests may have been thought to be incommensurable on this topic, as many 
feared that the agricultural interior of the nation was not to equally benefit by such a 
bank, the arguments advanced by the proponents of the bank bill proved unanswerable; 
the bank bill passed by a tremendous margin in both the House and Senate (Bickford and 
Veit 1986). It is not for nothing that the politically-motivated reasoning of the First 
Congress was largely confirmed by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in 1819 
(see McCulloch v. Maryland). In short, an ideally healthy Congress features MCs capable 
not just of promoting the general welfare, but of doing the constitutional interpretation 
necessary to conclude that this is their chief task. 
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Chapter Three: The First Federal Congress 
The First Federal Congress convened in March of 1789 with a full agenda and 
high expectations.81 It was the responsibility of the Congress, as outlined in Article I of 
the Constitution, to establish the executive and judicial departments of the Federal 
Government, to raise revenue, and to establish a national capitol.82 Likewise, the 
Congress was the primary actor needed to pass the ordinary laws needed by an 
acquisitive, commercial republic (see Diamond 1986).83 The legislative agenda, being 
bottled up by so many years of inaction in the Confederation Congress (Jillson and 
Wilson 1994), was long and complex.  At minimum, the Congress needed to devise a 
national impost system, then develop a collections system to receive the revenue that 
resulted from this import tax.  Besides these necessities, the Congress was also urged to 
                                                 
81 Calling this body, the “First Federal Congress,” helps to avoid a possible misunderstanding, as there was 
more than one First Congress.  There at least two other bodies that this term might apply to, including the 
first Continental Congress, as well as the first Congress convened under the authority of the Articles of 
Confederation, which one might call the first Confederation Congress.  But, for the sake of brevity, I will 
use the term First Congress throughout the rest of this chapter to refer only to the First Federal Congress. 
82 In Section 8 of Article I, the Constitution stipulates that “The Congress shall have power to lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general 
welfare of the United States…[and] To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such 
District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of 
Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States.”  The existence of federal executive 
departments is confirmed by Section 2 of Article II, as the President is granted the power to request, “the 
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments.” Intriguingly, the power 
of the Congress to create Executive Departments is not directly stated, but rather appears to be implied by 
that same section (Section 2 of Article II), which states that the President may appoint with the advice and 
consent of the Senate “all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of 
such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of 
departments.”  Since Congress is the national lawmaking body, it is evidently necessary to pass a law 
creating such departments. 
83 See also Tulis and Mellow (2018): “The Constitution was a political design for a large commercial 
republic where national power would increase dramatically over time. [Tulis and Mellow stress] that this ... 
understanding of the projected working of the polity designed by the Constitution—what [they] called its 
political logic—is the core meaning of the Constitution” (145). 
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establish a national bank and the post office, pass a code of national criminal law, and 
provide encouragement for the arts and sciences. 
Given its heady mandate, forming a healthy, well-functioning Congress was 
critical. Fortuitously, the body was given nearly unlimited power in the Constitution to 
set its own rules and develop its own internal structures.  The rules, procedures and 
norms developed by the First Congress, however, may surprise contemporary political 
scientists. MCs did not settle on strong central leadership, standing (permanent) 
committees with clear jurisdiction, conduct investigative or informational hearings, or 
construct any of the other contemporary expedients thought to solve “collective action 
problems” in lawmaking assemblies (Jillson and Wilson 1994, 5).  The First Congress, 
did however, manage to achieve virtually everything on its lengthy agenda, passing 102 
bills, out of 167 introduced (De Pauw 1972, 719-740), and the few items that it left 
behind were immediately turned to in the Second Congress (Bordewich 2016, 301-304).  
In this chapter I thus present one iteration or instance of a functional Congress, 
along with the norms, rules, and structures that it developed to fulfil its difficult 
constitutional mandate.  The method chosen is, loosely speaking, that of “analytic 
narrative” (cf. Bates et al. 1998, 3-10).84 The analytic narrative carried out here is helpful 
in three distinct ways: (1) it provides a useful and well-fleshed out “ideal-type” for the 
                                                 
84 Why loosely? This chapter does not use the models of game theory, and neither does it make casual 
claims.  These attributes are usually associated with the “new institutionalism,” but are not present in this 
account. Why is it still, nonetheless, an analytic narrative?  Because it marries data (from the historical 
record) with theory (the claims made in Chapter Two) about Congress and the Constitution, in the 
framework of analytic political science. 
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conception of congressional health articulated in this study;85 (2) it provides an empirical 
example of a Congress presenting coherent, reasonable and effective policymaking 
process, even in the absence of explicit Presidential or party leadership and (3) 
theoretically aids in developing and fleshing out the concrete ways in which a Congress 
can be representative, deliberative, and responsive to popular impulses, all the while 
remaining faithful to the purposes for the government articulated in the Preamble of the 
United States Constitution.86 
The chapter begins with a treatment of case selection, seeking to quell any 
skepticism that may result from my focus on such an unrepresentative example to aide in 
developing an account of institutional health.  After considering methodological 
concerns, I turn to an analytic investigation of the Congress as an institution. Simply put, 
the First Congress was an adeptly designed system. The First Congress (1) developed 
structures to channel interests in the lawmaking process, by creating a floor-centric 
legislative system; (2) adopted a procedure of reading and officially acting on citizen 
petitions to gain information about popular preferences; (3) created and then relied on a 
set of rules designed to encourage deliberative exchanges between equals; and (4) created 
                                                 
85 To present the First Congress as an instantiated ideal-type of a healthy, functional Congress is not to say 
that the First Congress is the image of legislative perfection. It was undoubtedly imperfect; although I have 
mentioned the convening of Congress in March of 1789, it must be said that accurately the Congress, with 
its incredibly full agenda, did not have a permanent presence until a quorum was assembled in the House 
on April 1 (De Pauw 1977, 7).  In the Senate a quorum materialized on April 6 (De Pauw 1972, 7), nearly a 
full month late, with only the presence of only 12 Senators. How, one might ask, did 12 members constitute 
a quorum?  North Carolina and Rhode Island had not yet adopted the Constitution, thus the 12 Senators did 
in fact constitute a quorum out of a total possible membership of 22. 
86 Namely, “To Establish Justice and Insure Domestic Tranquility,” but preeminently to “Promote the 
General Welfare. 
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a system of interbranch cooperation which enhanced the legislative process by delegating 
certain responsibilities to the executive. Importantly, none of these innovations were 
foisted on Congress, but rather created through the action and inaction of MCs. We can 
thus fairly attribute the success of Congress, generally to MC behavior and the incentives 
provided by the constitutional logic of the new regime. To provide for a legislative 
process where interests had their due say, MCs utilized a structure called the Committee 
of the Whole House, where the general outlines of policy were proposed. After a 
relatively wide-ranging consensus was reached, drafting policy would then be entrusted 
to select (ad-hoc) committees of limited duration and small membership. This process led 
to the creation over 400 committees over the three sessions of the First Congress. 
Bringing interests into the fold, while not allowing logrolling or parochialism to flourish, 
MCs developed strong behavioral norms regarding the manner and quantity of 
deliberation necessary to create effective and representative legislation. And to ensure 
that these deliberations had some relation to popular impulses and views, the First 
Congress developed an elaborate system for receiving and presenting petitions on the 
floor of both the House and Senate.  
To help contextualize these institutional devices and norms, one prosaic, yet 
representative law is investigated throughout this chapter: the enactment which 
established the first schedule of tariffs (imposts) that would fund the federal government. 
While the temptation exists to focus on the acts of constitutional statesmanship exercised 
by MCs in the drafting of the Bill of Rights, or the creation of the executive departments 
of State, War, and Treasury, centering analysis on a mundane matter helps to make the 
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investigation undertaken here speak to a broader array of circumstances. Even within the 
deliberations over the impost, attention is primarily directed to the setting of one tariff on 
imported molasses. Representing a contentious issue, setting the proper rate on molasses 
represents the kind of political issue arising in every Congress, where claims are made of 
a zero-sum competition between interests. Closely following the legislative history 
behind this conflict provides an account of the First Congress in microcosm, as an issue 
that would have certainly deadlocked the old Congress of the Articles was resolved 
successfully. The impost thus passed into law, setting the nation on the course to fiscal 
solvency. 
Yet, the First Congress certainly did more than simply set one impost rate; 
therefore, one final section of the chapter is devoted to examining interbranch relations in 
the First Congress. Congress proved surprisingly eager to delegate the initial stage of 
policy formation to the executive branch, all the while remaining steadfastly jealous of its 
power to amend, revise and even reject proposals emanating from the Washington 
Administration. While it is essential that Congress guard its constitutional prerogatives, 
the First Congress contained statesmen who nevertheless engaged in strategic 
delegation.87 Such a legislative process shows that congressional health need not be 
determined by a maximization of its power vis-à-vis the presidency. Following the 
                                                 
87 Chamberlain (1946) goes so far as to describe Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton as the “prime 
minister” of the First Congress. While I would not go quite so far, this appellation certainly shows the 
extent and importance of the legislative leadership provided by executive departments in 1789 – 91. 
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investigation of these constitutional and interbranch questions, a final conclusion is then 
offered on the Congress of 1789-91. 
CASE STUDY A – AN IDEAL TYPE 
Prima facie, the First Congress does not appear very representative of the 
institution of Congress more broadly speaking.  The differences, after all, are clear and 
striking between the First Congress and the 115th (contemporary) Congress. The First 
Congress did not have partisan leaders, or formal parties at all.  It only had two standing 
committees, a House committee on elections, and a three-member joint committee to 
examine bills to ensure that they were typographically ready to be enrolled and sent to the 
President (De Pauw 1977, xxii). The 425 other committees were chosen for one subject at 
a time and then disbanded after reporting. It only consisted of 26 Senators and 65 
Representatives, which is less than a fifth of the current size of Congress.  The Senate 
galleries were closed to outside observers, or more accurately speaking the Senate had no 
galleries for spectators at all (Swift 1996, 58).  The First Congress even convened at two 
different capitals, neither of which were Washington, D.C.88  
As a further limitation, Congress met with an unusual occupant of the Presidency 
– the father of the nation, George Washington, who was elected unanimously to the 
position. With a singular statesman of unquestioned respect ensconced in the White 
House, the constitutional contestation which frequently characterizes the separation of 
                                                 
88 The First Congress convened in New York City, NY for the First and Second Sessions, only to relocate 
to the city of Philadelphia, PA for the Third Session, because of a bargain struck in the Second Session.  
More on this matter will be discussed below. 
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powers system was very much inhibited. Thus, The First Congress did not interact with 
the Executive in the same way they would have had literally any other individual been 
President. Since the incentives offered to MC to take an independent institutional 
vantagepoint (and potentially clashing with other branches who do not share this 
constitutional place) is an important attribute of the constitutional system, this is an 
important limitation of examining the First Congress. Overall, given these limitations, 
one might pose a question: what is the purpose of examining such an unusual congress 
when one is attempting to develop a standard appropriate for evaluating the institution of 
Congress more broadly? 
I would submit at least three strong rationales for closely examining the 
proceedings of the First Federal Congress.  The first is that my general scheme of case-
selection aims to select a “diverse” (see Gerring 2007, 97-8) set of cases that illustrate 
attributes of congressional health.  The fact that many of the Senators and 
Representatives who attended the First Congress were framers at the Constitutional 
Convention (Swift 1996, 49) would be vice for a case-selection strategy that aimed to 
find typical or representative Congresses;89 it is instead a virtue for a project that attempts 
to articulation the dimensions of congressional health.  Indeed, as legislators and 
statesmen on par with the framers, the MCs of the First Congress were unusually self-
                                                 
89 One further reason the First Congress is not representative is that no other Congress has felt the need to 
create the institutions its rules from scratch again.  This problem would be still greater if approximating the 
First Congress were the sole source of a standard for congressional health, as defined institutionally, as it 
defeats the purpose of developing an institution, if it must be created de novo, at the beginning of each 
Congress. 
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conscious about the institution they served in, by necessity.  The members of the First 
Congress were literally creating the institution of Congress.  They created its rules, and 
its norms, and they did so in the context of both the earlier failure of the Confederation 
Congress and the knowledge of the critical importance of their actions. In observing this 
process of institution creation, one can gain considerable insight what the institution 
looks like when framed by especially thoughtful and purposive effort. The First 
Congress’s outlier status as a part of the Extended Founding, is thus helpful, rather than 
damaging. 
 Second, examining the First Congress allows the reader to follow a logical 
process that connects the theoretical material developed in Chapter Two with the concrete 
reality and functioning of our governing institutions.  In the previous chapter I developed 
an account of Congress that depicted that body as an instrument of a purposive or 
positive model of constitutionalism (see also Ives 2018). The First Congress presents an 
occasion or a venue for observing a process that would otherwise be inscrutable: the 
process of turning legal provisions, broad language and delineations of power into a real, 
functional institutional government.  Congress, convening in New York, was 
immediately faced with the real questions that a straightforward analysis of the text did 
not immediately resolve.  Some, like the contested removal power (Alvin et al. 2013), 
considered the relationship of the Congress with other branches.  Other issues, such as the 
status of bills not yet passed by both Chambers before the end of a session, concerned the 
inner workings of the legislature.  Yet others, such as framing the Bill of Rights, and 
debating the power of the federal government to charter a Bank of the United States, 
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required reasoning and deliberations regarding both the scope and the appropriate reading 
of the grants of power made in the Constitution.  In other words, for the words of the 
Constitution to be more than mere parchment, they must be discussed and examined by a 
deliberative Congress; in examining the First Congress we see an especially good 
example of this principle. 
 Third, the First Congress, while different from the rest of the other 114 
Congresses in key ways, was nonetheless still a legislative body subject to the travails 
that have characterized the institution for its entire history.  Setting tax and trade policy 
through the imposition of an impost on imported goods revealed the quality of 
congressional deliberation.  These men, while unusually unified in achieving certain 
goals, were not “demigods” and their debates about the tax on molasses readily attest to 
this fact. Facing numerous vested interests on issues such as the impost, the bank, the 
assumption of state debts and the location of the nation’s capital, bargaining was in 
strong evidence.90 MCs faced the perceived needs and wants of their constituents, while 
trying to balance those desires against the need for coherent and reasonable law. The First 
Congress made its share of mistakes, passing no fewer than 9 laws that amending its own 
acts (De Pauw 1972, 719-740).91  While our current legislators do not impress us, the 
                                                 
90 For reasons of economy, this chapter omits direct consideration of many of these disputes, such as 
locating the capital or assuming state debts, instead presenting attributes of the First Congress which 
especially illustrate well-functioning institutional mechanisms. 
91 The First Congress met in three sessions, which long adjournments between each one. In many cases, the 
revisionary laws represented the amendment of a bill passed in an earlier session by another enactment 
passed in the second or third session. One such bill, HR-50, was given a particularly awkward designation: 
“An Act, further to suspend part of an Act, entitled, ‘An Act to regulate the collection of the duties imposed 
by law on the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares, and merchandizes, imported into the United 
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legislators of the First Congress were, by and large, very unimpressive to each other 
(Bordewich 2016, 37).92  Indeed, investigating the First Congress, one sees that in spite of 
some of its unrepresentative features, that it certainly could serve as a very reasonable 
“ideal-type:” an appropriate point of orientation for Congress more broadly. 
 In further developing the concept of an “ideal-type,” a kind of explication by 
similarity might be helpful.  One could parallel the investigation being conducted here to 
the common comparisons made academically, journalistically and popularly between a 
given occupant of the White House (whomever he or she may be) and President George 
Washington.  When one compares a president to Washington, one does so with the 
knowledge that Washington is a singular feature in the history of the United States.  
While predictions are dangerous, it strains credulity to imagine another unanimous 
Electoral College victor. Other differences between George Washington and say Donald 
Trump could be discoursed on, perhaps interminably.  Thus, when one compares a 
president to President Washington, one is not suggesting that that individual could 
somehow become the Father of the Nation. Instead one is attempting to abstract out 
attributes of his character, public behavior, prudent decision-making or leadership that 
                                                 
States,’ and to amend the said Act” (729).  In another case, HR-23, the Congress altered a law they had 
passed, during the same session in which the earlier had passed (726). 
92 Bordewich reports of a letter in which Representative Fisher Ames of Massachusetts wrote the following 
of fellow Representative James Madison: “I see in Madison, with his great knowledge and merit, so much 
error, and some of it very unaccountable, and to tending to so much mischief.”  Overall the entire group of 




present a standard toward which occupants of the office ought to aspire.93 One difference 
exists, however, between those types of comparisons and the method of this chapter: that 
is the advantage of proceeding, systematically and analytically through these 
comparisons.  Examining the attributes of congressional health, allows one to evaluate 
real Congresses based on those standards, without expecting or hoping for the First 
Congress to materialize again.94 
REPRESENTATION IN THE LAWMAKING PROCESS 
Congress is both an assemblage of persons, 95 individuals in the First Congress, 
to be exact,95 and an institution: a complex of rules, norms, and constraints that make the 
action of that group both legible and possible. To speak of the Congress as an institution, 
takes the Congress, as a whole, to be the “unit of analysis.” Therefore, the focus is not on 
biographies of individual MCs, nor presenting a chronological narrative of the legislative, 
constituent service, or advertising activities of Members in the First Congress. Instead, 
one studies the body, generically speaking, its hierarchies (or general lack thereof), its 
internal subdivisions, and its self-consciously developed rules to facilitate its business 
and to corral wayward members back into the fold. 
                                                 
93 Also, contemporary commentaries often note, justly, that Washington was not perfect, especially in his 
personal and political relationship with the institution of slavery. This same caution applies to comparing 
the contemporary Congress with Madison’s Congress. 
94 Indeed, given demographic, political and moral changes that occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, it would be quite unjust and unreasonable for a Congress composed entirely of white men, who 
do not formally identify with any party, to be the lawmakers of the nation in the twenty-first century. 
95 Those of quick arithmetic wit will notice that this number is not equal to the number of seats in the First 
Federal Congress, which was 91 (26+65), once Rhode Island and North Carolina ratified the Constitution.  
This is due to the fact of several resignations and deaths of MCs occurred during the years of 1789-91. 
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Starting the analysis at fundamentals, the chief attribute of congressional health is 
the institution’s ability to provide a place for important views and interests, and to 
represent those in some rough proportion to their presence in the overall society. Meeting 
such a standard requires that MCs present a diversity of views and then develop 
structures to facilitate the conveyance of these views and interests into the legislative 
process. Since this standard pertains to both views and interests, one must survey the 
status of ideological and economically-interested divides in the First Congress; here 
ideology is examined first. 
Although the First Congress did not have parties, in the formal sense as elaborated 
by Aldrich (1995), it certainly contained ideological factions. Three factions of unequal 
size existed amongst the members: the largest and predominate faction made up of 
nationalists, who would have been described as Federalists during the ratification 
campaign of 1787 and 1788; a smaller faction of opponents of a stronger central 
government, very nearly holdovers from among the Antifederalists; and an even smaller 
faction of MCs who were characterized by a favorability to mercantile interests and 
protectionism.  The first group might be called the Pro-Administration faction; the second 
the Anti-Administration; and the third the Hamiltonians. Due to the lack of formal 
parties, determining the exact nature, extent, and membership of these factions is not 
easy.  The most authoritative source identifies 67 (21 senators and 46 representatives) as 
members of the Pro-Administration faction, 17 (4 senators and 13 representatives) in the 
Anti-Administration category, and the remaining 11 (2 senators and 9 representatives) in 
the Hamiltonian (Bickford and Veit 1986, vii). Yet even this accounting is open to 
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question, as some MCs’ views shifted over the course of the three sessions.96 These 
complexities aside, the relative size and strength of the three groups does not seem up for 
question, as there is no doubt that the Pro-Administration, proto-Federalist group was 
paramount in the body. 
These factions, due to the lack of formal leadership, defined platform and the like, 
certainly were not as disciplined as modern political parties.  While the numbers recited 
above would lead one to believe that roll call votes inevitably featured a roll of the two 
smaller groups by the larger, this in fact did not occur.  On many occasions, (establishing 
a national bank, assuming the debt of the states) the commercial, Hamiltonian faction got 
its way, and the voting was typically much closer than the 2/3 majority of the largest 
faction would suggest. The Anti-Administration group saw the Constitution amended 
with a Bill of Rights, but lost many votes in shaping the Bill of Rights in a manner more 
to their liking. Overall, “Partisanship… waxed and waned over the early period. 
Ordinarily it was the array of issues that defined coalition composition and members 
were not compelled to toe a particular, consistent party line” (Wilson 2002, 311). The 
numerical predominance of the Pro-Administration group and its diffuseness should be 
kept in mind, however, when considering the types of structures, rules, and norms chosen 
by the Congress as a whole, as very different ones may have been chosen in the presence 
of two closely-divided and homogeneous formal parties. 
                                                 
96 As an example, one Senator from Pennsylvania, William Maclay, was not previously an Antifederalist 
and is thus not included in the authoritative listing in the Anti-Administration bloc. Nonetheless, his voting 
record in the First Congress revealed him to be the staunchest opponent of the Administration. 
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The existence of a mercantile interest, operating as an ideological faction, presages the 
existence of material or economic interests in the body. Largely geographic in nature, one 
might reasonably divide the nation across two important interest-based cleavages relevant 
in 1790. The first, comprised of a financial, mercantile interest, (contemporaries 
regionally identified this interest with “the carrying states”) was centered around MCs 
from New England and New York; more agrarian interests predominated outside of this 
region. Another overlapping, but not identical split, divided areas heavily and directly 
dependent on plantation agriculture (Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Georgia) from those which did not. The existence to these two different cleavages 
gave rise to roughly three sets of interests, which operated only occasionally coincident 
with the factional interests described above (see Table 3-1). In early-republican America, 
no single economic interest was predominant, although the mid-Atlantic areas without 
large populations of enslaved individuals claimed the smallest contingent of MCs. 
Examining how interest-based conflict played out in a concrete political dispute 
can help flesh out these abstract analytic categories. Consider one conflict that will be 
examined throughout the remainder of the chapter: the setting of an impost (tariff) rate on 
molasses. In 1789, molasses was used as a sweetener for a wide variety of meals prepared 
in the Northeastern United States (especially as a cheaper substitute for sugar), as well as 
an important raw material for the creation of “country rum,” an evidently inferior 
substitute to rum of Caribbean extraction. This led to a predictable line-up of several 
representatives who were resolutely opposed to molasses imposts of any kind, as they 
hoped that a protectionist benefit for the distillers of the Northeast would be reaped by 
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placing an impost on Caribbean rums. Such MCs hoped such low tariffs on Molasses 
would lead to a competitive advantage for the industrial exertions of their constituents. 
Table 3-1: MC Count by Geographically-Concentrated Interest in the First Congress 
REGION SENATE HOUSE 
 No. of Seats % of Chamber No. of Seats % of Chamber 
MERCANTILE, NON-
PLANTATION 
10 38% 23 35% 
NON-MERCANTILE, 
NON-PLANTATION 




10 38% 29 45% 
TOTAL 26  65  
 
Source: The U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section II, Clause 3, for numbers of MCs 
Note: The other potential overlap (mercantile and planation dependent) was a null set. 
Compounding the interest in a low (or zero) tariff for MCs from the mercantile 
region was the fact that imported molasses made up an important article of the trade with 
the Caribbean. Plantations in that basin were reliant on salted fish, caught in the waters 
off Canada by American fishermen. It was feared that a high tariff on molasses would 
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disrupt this trade. Outside the mercantile states, where drinking country grain alcohol was 
more common than rum, and where sugar was used more predominately, there was no 
such compunction about setting a high tariff on rum. Further, where there was no reliance 
on fishing as a mercantile industry there was little direct concern for the alleged 
interconnection between the molasses import and American national exports (Bordewich 
2016, 73-5). 
Given the existence of different blocs of partisan and economic interests in the 
society and represented by legislators in Congress, it was very important that the 
lawmaking process be constructed in a way that allowed the airing of diverse views 
without devolving into an excessive degree of parochialism. In the case of molasses, the 
very real possibility existed for one interest to capture deliberations to the economic 
advantage of their constituents over those in the minority. Due to the sectional dynamics 
of regional-based economic interests, setting the tariff rates appeared to be a zero-sum 
operation, and, prima facie, not one lending itself to equitable deliberation. Speaking of 
such disputes, Publius had very presciently stated that, “The apportionment of taxes on 
the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact 
impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and 
temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every 
shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own 
pockets” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 74-5). Since sectional economic interests were not 
able to be eliminated, their presence must be accepted as permanent and hence controlled. 
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To control the possibility of majority faction and ensure appropriate 
representation of the various economic and political views prevailing in the polity at 
large, the First Congress opted to deliberate over bills on the floor. Not willing to entrust 
the development of a tariff schedule to a committee, where one interest may predominate, 
each Chamber created a process that produced policy proposals from the floor, acting as 
one body. While contemporary political scientists would anticipate that this would lead to 
centralized or cartelized control of the floor, the MCs were also unwilling to trust an 
agent for this task either. Any one empowered agent would be a member of one of blocs 
of interests after all, and hardly above taking advantage of their station to advance its 
economic welfare. Of course, these moves simply traded one set of problems for another. 
One reason for the creation of committees or centralized leadership, in both legislatures 
and in any organization, is that it is simply very unwieldly to attempt to deliberate or 
proceed as a large group.97 Moreover, it wastes the potential for parallel-processing – the 
ability to proceed on more than one area of the agenda at one time – if the body is to 
work through agenda items one at a time, without centralized control. To ensure that 
essential representation could be had, without sacrificing the ability to effectively move 
through the lawmaking process, the Congress turned to two structural devices: the first, 
the so-called “Committee of the Whole House,” was a hold-over from extant 
parliamentary practices; the second, what I call, “the select committee system” appears to 
be an innovation, as I have not seen it described in any other work or body. Examining 
                                                 
97 The Congress, although small by contemporary standards, still consisted of more than two dozen 
Senators, and more than five dozen Representatives. 
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these twin-structural features of the lawmaking process in the First Congress reveals not 
only the way that these expedients operated, but also reveals the surprising advantages to 
operating in such a seemingly “ad-hoc” fashion. 
The Committee of the Whole House, (or the COWH) in particular begs further 
analysis as it is an institutional structure self-consciously chosen by the Members to 
produce the leadership and agenda control lacking in the office of the Speaker.  The 
COWH will be familiar to anyone who has read Madison’s notes on the Constitutional 
Convention, and it operated in much the same way in the First Congress. Rather than 
conclusively settling matters the first time, the entire House itself would resolve itself 
into the COWH, to proceed more informally through marking up a bill, considering 
petitions, or debating what even ought to be on the agenda in the first place. Thus, when 
working through a bill, each Chamber would consider itself as working in committee, 
giving members license to consider the work done in this initial stage as tentative. For a 
group of politicians concerned about whether the interests of their states would be 
properly represented, such a step in the process was imperative. 
The COWH, in fact, came in two varieties. The COWH for the State of the Union, 
was the agenda setting body that could consider all the issues facing the nation, and 
therefore the Congress, and would choose which of those issues to address, by in turn 
electing out committees to report back bills or reports on those topics.  The COWH, when 
not meeting in this form, operated per the rules of the day to mark up or debate one bill, 
previously designated for deliberation on that calendar day.  In either version, the COWH 
needed a chairman, who would never be the Speaker.  The Speaker would actually 
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descend from the dais, and the chairman of the “committee” would ascend in his stead, to 
mark the change between the House operating formally, and as the COWH (De Pauw 
1977, 15).  After finishing its deliberations, the chairman needed to formally report the 
work of the COWH to the House for approval, before that work could be accepted as 
final. Allowing for chairmanship in the COWH provided for expanded leadership 
opportunities in the First Congress, as seven MCs served as chairman of the COWH (De 
Pauw 1977, xxix). Chairmanship in the COWH, thus overcame issues of collective 
choice and action that would usually be associated with a group with weak central 
leadership, without turning to the expedient of entrusting matters to one absolute 
legislative leader. 
The First Congress’s committee system, if one is to call it that, defies easy 
categorization.  The committee system of the First Congress was certainly not 
institutionalized in the sense which it is spoken by Polsby (1968) and others.  The two 
standing committees that existed (Elections and Bill Enrolling) were odd; the Congress, 
despite recognizing them as standing, reformed them at the beginning of each new 
session.  The remaining 425 select and joint committees were ad-hoc, elected from the 
members of each chamber, and expected to disband once they had reported on the matter 
entrusted to them.  But the word “ad-hoc” implies a certain random, or indefinite quality.  
This is especially evident in ad-hoc committees formed outside of legislatures, whether 
on the job or in a civic organization.  In many cases, such committees will not even have 
formal recognition from the larger body of which they are a part. Such informality, 
however, is not in evidence in the First Congress. Indeed, the method of selecting 
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committees, their membership, their purpose, and even their duration was subject to 
certain structural regularities, both across chambers and across the three sessions. Thus, it 
is better to denominate the committee structure of the First Congress as “the select 
committee system.”98 
Since the First Congress formed 427 committees there is some natural diversity in 
the committees, but one can still speak about the committee system, especially with 
careful quantitative work.  While their method of selection was covered above, the nature 
of the median or representative select committee remains to be developed.  Here I 
examine select committees, which make up 392 out of the 427 committees.99  Each select 
committee was committed to accomplish one task, whether to examine a report from the 
Executive Branch, to determine if action could be taken on a petition, or to draft a bill.100  
Committees were also formed for ceremonial tasks, such as waiting on the President to 
inform him of a quorum, or to present him with an official reply to the State of the Union 
or the Inaugural.  The median select committee (of all types [legislative, oversight, 
constituent service, and ceremonial]) in both chambers was made up of three members.101  
                                                 
98 Swift (1996) also refers to these committees as “select committees” rather than ad hoc (73). 
99 Joint and conference committees make up the remainder. Very few bills went to conference in the First 
Congress and most joint committees were ceremonial. 
100 Very rarely, a single committee’s discrete task, such examining a report from the Secretary of the 
Treasury on difficulties encountered in implementing the first session’s Impost Act, would lead to multiple 
reports. That select committee, for instance, reported a Tonnage Bill, a Collection Bill, and a Coasting Bill 
to amend the previous session’s enactments (De Pauw 1977, 266), all in response to that report from 
Secretary Hamilton.  But this was very much the exception. 
101 To generate the quantitative data in this section, I examined the House and Senate Legislative Journals, 
as printed in De Pauw (1972,1977).  I created a data set of all committees formed during the First Congress, 
categorized by type of committee, the subject of the committee, the number of members of the committee, 
the day it was formed and the day it reported.  As indicated above the total n is equal to 427. 
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This median is unusually representative, as around two-thirds the total (261 of 392 select 
committees) contained exactly three members.  Even so, larger committees of 5, 7 or 
even 9 or more, were sometimes utilized.  These larger committees occurred more often 
in the Senate (44% of the time) than the House (27%).  Although there is an exception to 
this general trend; in the House of Representatives there was surprisingly frequent (18 
separate committees or 7% of the total) recourse to grand committees consisting of one 
member from each state.  Overall (see Figure 3-1), a clear preference was shown for very 
small committees consisting of a committee chairman and two other members.  These 
small committees were entrusted with matters of all types, from considering one citizen’s 
petition, to drafting the Copyright Law of the United States. 
There were also considerable regularities in terms of duration. Committees in the 
House also were of a slightly longer median duration than those of the Senate, but both 
were within one week: the median committee served for only 4 days in the Senate (from 
selection to the day of final report); the median House committee lasted around one 
week.  The distributional pattern of committee duration partakes of a normal distribution, 
with the plurality of committees convening for about a week, with a nonetheless 
substantial number taking shorter or longer (see Figure 3-2).  Some committees lasted 
only a day or two, while others lasted a month –  or even months.  This makes intuitive 
sense, as some committees, such as ceremonial ones, or committees to write a single 
amendment might only exist for a day, whereas committees empowered to draft a 
detailed policy-oriented bill, such as a bill regulating the Militia, might take two months 
or more before reporting back to the House.   
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Figure 3-1: Number of Members on Each Committee in the First Congress 
  
Figure 3-2: Duration of Select Committees in the First Congress 
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The committee instructed to draft Articles of Amendment (the Bill of Rights) in the 
House of Representatives was no exception.  A grand committee was appointed on July 
21, 1789, to draft the Bill of Rights, and reported its draft to the House on July 28, one 
week later. 
In sum, the Select Committee System allowed the First Congress to achieve the 
parallel processing that so often is said to reside that body, without leading an 
unnecessarily large number of proposals to wither on the vine.  Whereas committees are 
considered a potential place for bills to go to die today, the select committees convened 
by the First Congress were not designed with this checking purpose in mind. 
Instead, committees were only created with the prior approval of the chamber. A broad 
consensus on the need for a particular bill or report was already widely shared and 
expressed through the creation of a select committee in the First Congress.  Since the 
committees were only created in response to debate on the floor, action in the COWH, or 
as a response to a bill passed in the other house, the committees were oriented toward 
proposing, rather than disposing, of legislative action.  Moreover, the First Congress 
implemented a practice patterned off a parliamentary precedent: only advocates for the 
measure could be members of a select committee formed to consider it. In the First 
Congress, “members [were] … by and large … sympathetic to their committee’s task, 
although they might differ how to accomplish it” (Swift 1996, 74). 
Thus, the First Congress was not dominated by strong legislative leaders in the 
modern or formal sense, but there were numerous opportunities for leadership short of 
this standard.  The First Congress had its constitutionally sanctioned officers – the Vice 
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President presiding over the Senate, and the Speaker presiding over the House –  but 
these leaders did not have agenda setting power, the prerogative to determine committee 
chairs at will, nor substantial political powers (carrots or sticks to persuade members to 
vote one way or another).  Leadership in Congress was rather exercised through 
committee leadership, on the floor in debate, or through informal leadership in a 
bargaining block. 
While member behavior on the floor will be addressed directly in subsequent 
sections, some additional commentary on leadership in a Congress without standing 
committees is necessary due to the consequences for representation in healthy legislative 
institutions.  Since these were not institutionalized committees, being a committee 
chairman in the First Congress was not tied to formal perquisites of agenda power, nor 
invested with property right status.  It was, nonetheless, an important and widely 
accessible source of leadership in that institution.  Over the course of its three sessions, 
there were more than 400 select and joint committees established, each one of which 
needed a chairman.  This fact made committee chairmanships abundant, rather than a 
scarce resource. The chairman was, moreover, not a leader in the sense of being a free 
agent but was rather a leader as informed by the contemporarily defined “principal-agent” 
relationship (Sinclair 1999). To be a chairman for a given committee required one to win 
the votes of one’s peers; in fact, to be on a committee at all required the votes of other 
MCs. The chair went to the MC, “who received the greatest number of votes, and thus 
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enjoyed the most support for colleagues” (Swift 1996, 75).102 Thus, the committee chairs 
owed their place to their fellows, and were generally empowered to carry out a specific 
charge as defined by a formal resolution in either chamber. 
Being a committee chairman required one to be the manager for the subject 
entrusted to the committee, whether that was the development of a report, responding to 
interbranch communications (or to petitions from the general citizenry), or the drafting of 
a bill. Drafting a bill was one of the primary roles of the select committee in the First 
Congress, as bills were not generally written by individual MCs. The role of manager 
also meant taking responsibility for corralling the other members of the committee, who, 
like members of every group have the tendency to attempt to “free ride” off the work of 
the others. It also entailed advocating for and presenting one’s report or bill to the 
respective chamber from which it originated.  Since there were so many committees, 
leadership, in terms of the act of shepherding a bill to passage, frequently included many 
more members than what is commonly seen in more contemporary Congresses. Instead 
of the Speaker, the Majority Leader and the Whip being the primary leaders, as would be 
the case in present Congress, this alternative system made nearly every member a leader 
                                                 
102 The House differed somewhat from the Senate in this regard. The Speaker of the House, per the House 
Rules (De Pauw 1977, 12), had the power to appoint all committees with only 3 members.  Indeed, after a 
change in the House Rules during the second session the Speaker was given the power to appoint all 
committees at will, unless otherwise directed by the House.  The Speaker, did not, however, turn this 
perquisite into a source of institutional power, favoring political allies and advantaging his chosen agenda.  
The Speaker of the House in the First Congress, Frederick Muhlenberg, was likely constrained by norms 
that saw presiding officers as little more powerful than George Washington in the Constitutional 
Convention; which is to say, not very powerful at all, since Washington only spoke once in his own name 
during the entire convention.  Muhlenberg did not even vote except in the case of ties, and this only 
happened 5 times in the entire First Congress.  Speaker Muhlenberg had so little power that this cruel 
couplet made the rounds in New York City: “Fred Augustus, God bless his red nose and fat head / Has little 
more power than a Speaker of Lead” (Bordewich 2016, 31). 
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at some point. While the effort level of these committee chairs varied, Senator Maclay of 
Pennsylvania noted that fellow Senator Ellsworth of Connecticut, “defended one bill 
written by his committee, ‘with the Care of a parent [including] wrath and anger … when 
it was meddled with’” (Swift 1996, 75).  The select committee system may not have 
operated per property right, but it did produce in a chair the kind of identification and 
ownership with the bill drafted necessary to drive the bill through the chamber. This more 
diffuse style of leadership interested many more members in personally overseeing 
legislation than would have occurred with centralized leadership in the hands of factional 
or party leaders. The ultimate consequence of such a system is the existence of a group of 
leaders as diverse as the Congress as a whole. 
The select committee system in the First Congress allowed the institution to 
handle multiple responsibilities at once, without strong or formal central leadership.  By 
dividing labor and providing multiple venues for leadership, the First Congress achieved 
many of the goals sought for when current Congresses empower strong leaders, without 
the problems of hierarchical command and control. Select committees were always the 
product of the floor and responsible to the “house median,” as they depended on the 
election of the whole house, and had no powers to prevent their reports or bills from 
being amended once the returned to the floor.103  Committees were thus an important 
institutional feature of the First Congress, but they had little independent power of their 
                                                 
103 The MCs of the First Congress did not conceive of, nor felt a strong need for, closed rules. 
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own, making them quite unfamiliar compared to the committee system of the twentieth 
(or twenty-first) century. 
Yet, all these structures were just scaffolding for the single most important 
process in the First Congress, the lawmaking process.  While the procedures, rules, norms 
and committee system of the First Congress dictated that the lawmaking process be 
decentralized and floor-centric, it was neither disorganized nor chaotic.  Evidence of the 
lawmaking prowess of the First Congress comes in both quantitative and qualitative 
varieties. In the first place, the Congress succeeded in debating and enacting a remarkable 
number of public laws during its two-year duration. The First Congress, passed 102 bills, 
and none of these were private or ceremonial legislation. As a comparison, the 113th 
Congress, covering the first two years of President Obama’s last term, passed 296 bills, 
of which at least 58 were merely ceremonial.104 Even more significant was a comparison 
of the total number of bills enacted and signed by the President compared with those 
debated; in the First Congress there were 167 bills introduced. Congress thus passed just 
over 60% of the bills that it considered over its three sessions.105 It appears that the First 
Congress’s decentralized norms and procedures did not have the effect of inhibiting it 
                                                 
104 I determine this by a search of all public bill titles for the word “designate,” which is used to signify 
congressional acts that official name facilities or other landmarks after significant personages.  The 
unfavorable comparison to the 113th Congress continues when one considers that it contained 535 MCs, 
compared to the 91 MCs of the First Congress, and that there were well over 10,000 bills introduced in the 
113th Congress.  For more information on the productivity of recent Congresses, see GovTrack.us, 
(http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics). 
105 The best measure of productivity would consist of a proportion or ratio of the total agenda space 
(defined through study of period media) to the number of items on the agenda that were addressed through 
legislative action (cf. Binder 2003).  This is not available for the First Congress, but we can infer from 
other evidence adduced above (the high percentage of topics from formal presidential speeches that were 
addressed) that Congress handled the clear majority of its lengthy and complex agenda. 
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from passing legislation, and in fact passing a much greater percentage of introduced 
legislation than do modern Congresses. 
Just as importantly, the Congress developed normal operating procedures that 
enhanced the workflow of the lawmaking process and added regularity to what otherwise 
could have been a messy and uncoordinated jumble.  The first regularity was that the 
House of Representatives served as the initiator for the vast majority of legislation 
considered in the First Congress. Out of 167 bills considered, only 24 (about 1 out of 7) 
were introduced in the Senate. The Senate was thus generally reactive to the agenda 
adopted in the House, preventing competing agendas from hamstringing the legislature.  
Secondly, the two bodies divided the overall agenda space, so that each “specialized” in 
issues areas (See Figure 3-3).  Several of these specializations were reasonably linked to 
the constitutional attributes of the body, such as the Senate’s disproportionate attention to 
federalism (whether through admitting new states, or adapting existing laws to the 
admittance of North Carolina and Rhode Island during the Second and Third Sessions) 
and its focus on judicial and crime policy (through the development of the Federal 
District, Appellate Courts, and the first National Criminal Code). Others appeared to 
concern a mere division of labor of convenience, such as the evident decision to let the 
House take the lead on matters pertaining to executive organization. The third regularity 
of the lawmaking process concerned the ordinary workflow of Congress in introducing, 
debating, and passing legislation. 
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Figure 3-3: Bills Initiated by Chamber and Issue Area in the First Congress 
 
Following an example bill will help illustrate his process.106  The sample (see 
Figure 3-4) concerns the Patents Act. The first step in the legislative process was the 
action of the whole House forming and instructing a committee to report a bill.  The 
House then instructed the relevant select committee to consider the many petitions they 
were receiving on this topic. After considering the petitions, and the progress made 
considering this topic in the First Session, the committee was prepared to report a bill on 
February of 1790.   
 
                                                 
106 In the flow-chart, the blue arrows represent action within one House, the orange arrows represent a 
transmission of a message from one House or the other, while the single red arrow represents presentment. 


























































Figure 3-4: Sample Lawmaking Process for HR-41 (Patents Act) 
Second Reading: COWH Considers Amendments 
Petitions Related to Patents Referred to Select 
Committee
Select Committee Chair Reports a Bill (HR-41) 
House Instructs Select Committee to Report a Bill 
on Patents
Bill Receives First Reading; Committed to the 
COWH
Whole House Approves COWH Report, Fills in 
Blanks, Passes Bill




Senate Recedes from Remaining Disagreement 
Senate Orders House Bill Committed to a Select 
Committee
Select Committee Reports Amended Bill; Senate 
Passes Amended Bill 
House Agrees with Some Amendments, Disagrees 
with Others
Bill Is Presented to, and Signed by the President
Bill Is Inspected by Joint Standing Committee on 
Enrolled Bills




The House immediately turned to reading this bill and then committed it to mark-up by 
the COWH. Subsequently, the COWH recommended certain amendments to the Patents 
Act that were ratified by the action of the House, reconstituted in its formal capacity.  At 
this point the bill was passed by the House, engrossed and sent to the Senate. 
The Senate process for handling bills initiated by the House was rather consistent.  
The Senate would first read the bill for informational purposes, before moving to a 
Second Reading of the bill.  During this Second Reading, the Senate would, 
characteristically, form a select committee to consider the bill and formally commit the 
bill to that committee, dropping the bill from floor action for the time being. It took the 
committee considering the Patents Act two weeks in March of 1790 to report some 
amendments to the House bill.  The bill then returned to the floor and the Senate 
considered the report of the committee, approved it without change, and then sent the bill 
back to the House.  
Unlike twentieth-century practice, the bill did not then travel to a conference 
committee to hash out the differences between the House and Senate Bills, but instead 
traveled to the House as a message containing the Senate Amendments. The House, 
operating formally (not in COWH) received this message and voted to accept some of the 
amendments while rejecting others.  When this message was sent back to the Senate, the 
Senate approved a resolution, as it frequently did, to “recede” from the remaining 
disagreements between the two Houses (this meant that the Senate dropped the 
amendments that were not accepted by the House), and the bill was considered passed in 
the same form by both Houses. The remaining steps were pro forma, but important for 
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presentment purposes: the bill passed to the standing joint committee on enrollment 
procedures, and the Bill was formally enrolled into the form that would need to be signed 
by both the Speaker and the President of the Senate (the VP). Only then in mid-April, 
after two months of work, was the bill sent to President Washington for signature. The 
lawmaking process, although somewhat idiosyncratic, generally followed this format.107 
The only true exceptions covered Senate-initiated legislation, and these generally resulted 
only in an inversion of the process. The lawmaking process was thus maximally 
representative of the median representative and to the results of floor action, while being 
simultaneously efficacious enough to deliver passage of the majority of all bills 
considered in the First Congress. 
PETITIONS AS GUIDES TO POPULAR PREFERENCES 
The representativeness of the lawmaking process is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the health of Congress: a representative Congress which is not responsive 
will fail to earn the trust of constituents and give lie to the theory of self-government. 
Whatever the Congress was designed to be in theory, the First Congress was doubtlessly 
responsive to at least three outside forces.  In the first place, Congress responded, through 
the consideration and enactment of a legislative agenda, to items placed in important 
interbranch communications, such as the Inaugural Address, the Annual Message (now 
called the State of the Union) and other messages delivered to the Congress by President 
                                                 
107 Some bills, passed both houses with voice votes in the same form, and thus skipped steps in the process.  
But this was exceptional rather than the rule.  Other bills were initiated in the Senate, requiring steps in the 
middle of this process to be reversed.  This was also rather rare, compared to the process outlined here. 
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Washington.  As interbranch relations will be returned to in the conclusion, treatment of 
this type of responsiveness will be deferred. The Congress was also very responsive to 
the felt exigent needs of the nation: what might be called the national interest. The First 
Congress, without any prompting at all, responded to the issues that were not dealt with 
in the 1780s by the Confederation Congress. Pressing national issues such as the debt, the 
lack of revenue for the central government, and the lack of a judicial adjudication system 
for disputes were addressed through the passage of legislation. Responsiveness to felt 
national needs is an important aspect of congressional responsibilities, but in some sense 
these needs were obvious, pressing, and concerned necessities. Consequently, devoting a 
great deal of analysis to the perception of MCs of these issues does not add much to the 
generally known political history of the US in the 1780s; the nation was in crisis, and the 
Congress at least tried to respond to each respective dimension of the alleged impending 
catastrophe. 
More interesting and illuminating, in the case of the First Congress at least, is an 
investigation of responsiveness to public opinion or wider citizen preferences.  After all, 
the responsiveness of a national legislature in a liberal democracy might reasonably be 
thought to be more generally aligned with its relationship to the opinions or preferences 
of the wider citizenry, than to what other elites or the President of the United States 
indicate are important. The First Congress’s attempts to respond to the public needs, as 
articulated in publicly expressed desires and preferences, present an institutional solution 
to a quite clear problem. The problem is obvious to contemporary political scientists but 
was not less obvious to the MCs of the First Congress: There were no opinion polls or 
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other measure of aggregate opinion for Congress to concern themselves when the body 
convened in 1789. To “measure” and determine the opinion, interests or preferences of 
the broader society, Congress turned to an expedient with a long transatlantic pedigree: 
the petition. 
Indeed, Congress primarily relied on the artifice of the petition (or memorial) to 
inform them about the needs and preferences of citizens.108 The first outstanding feature 
of the First Congress’s attention to citizen petitions was the great quantity and diversity 
of the petitions it received. In fact, there were “more than six hundred petitions presented 
to the First Congress” (Bowling et al 1998, xi). Also, while it is true that petition writers 
were not strictly representative of the population of the nation at large, they covered a far 
greater degree of socioeconomic and gender diversity than the membership of the body 
itself.  The Congress was certainly not descriptively representative in any way.   
[Petitioners, on the other hand,] cover[ed] the [socioeconomic] spectrum 
from apparently illiterate war veterans to members of French-Canadian 
landed nobility, from the frontiersmen on the fringes of settlement to an 
associate justice of the Supreme Court and a member of the Senate itself. 
The First Congress heard from aggrieved petitioners [such as] Native 
American … Jehoiakim McToksin, Jews such as Jacob Isaacs, women 
such as Mary Katherine Goddard, and even British subjects (xxv). 
                                                 
108 A memorial, was “a document in the form of a petition, but differing from a petition insofar as it 
opposes a contemplated or proposed action and contains no prayer (plea)” (De Pauw 1977, xxiv). 
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The petition process was thus surprisingly open to many from different socioeconomic 
statuses and was even used by or on behalf of members of subaltern groups, such as 
women, Native Americans, and members of religious minorities.  While aiming for 
responsiveness through the expedient of petitioning could give rise to a bias toward well-
known or connected individuals,109 the petition process allowed ordinary individuals (and 
even noncitizens or those not eligible to vote) to get a formal response, not only from 
their own representative, but often from the entire Congress. 
The reception of a petition in the First Congress was a formal process.  Once 
petition was received, norms and standing rules required the constituent’s own 
representative to present the substance of the petition to the whole body.  Petitions first 
needed to lie on the table, and were not to be immediately acted on.  Once laying on the 
table for a time, petitions then were frequently referred either to an executive branch 
official or to a select committee in Congress to determine if more action was necessary. 
Even petitions offering inflammatory and unpopular views (such as Quaker advocates for 
abolition) were heard and often received formal response from Congress, even if the 
response was not always favorable. Attempts to shut down unpopular petitions, were 
ruled out of order, and such petitions were always heard. This behavior contrasts 
favorably with later Congresses that established “gag rules” on topics, such as slavery, 
that majorities did not wish to discuss. In fact, the sanctity of the right to petition was so 
                                                 
109 The petition of Catherine Greene, revolutionary war general Nathaniel Greene’s widow, received very 
prompt treatment, including the presence of James Madison on the committee considering he request 
(Bowling et al. 1998, xxi).  It seems that this level of attention to prominent individuals was the norm. 
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complete that MCs defended these norms as constitutionally required, even before 
constitutional text existed that explicitly justified such claims.  Indeed, “[New Jersey 
Representative] Elias Boudinot regarded a refusal to receive the Quakers’ antislavery 
petitions as a violation of their constitutional rights–two years before ratification of the 
First Amendment” (Bowling et al. 1998, xv). Finally, citizens could travel to NYC to sit 
in the gallery of the House of Representatives and watch their petition be considered. 
Indeed, “constituents’ access to the House gallery was considered at the time a milestone 
in the democratization of the political process” (xxiii). 
In sum, the petition process allowed ordinary people (and even noncitizens) to 
have an opportunity for redress of their grievances.  Furthermore, the reception of such a 
large number of petitions influenced the response of Congress. As the body received 
dozens of petitions or memorials in each issue area it was evident that the public felt that 
these were important topics that must be addressed. Responding to these citizen claims 
was necessary to maintain an appropriate level of responsiveness to the developing 
national opinion of Early Republican America. The Congress was bombarded with 
petitions for monopolies and other protections for inventions and writings; their 
frequency forced this item onto the agenda long before there was even a system of 
national revenue or a system of federal courts. The Congress wisely deprioritized this 
agenda item until the resolution of these other tasks, but then turned to the topic of 
patents and copyrights again in its Second Session passing a law protecting intellectual 
property and inventions.  Bowling, a chief editor of the primary sources utilized to write 
this chapter, may overstate their importance, but only slightly: 
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The accomplishments of the petitions submitted to the First Congress were 
considerable. Their impact on the legislative agenda transcended private 
claims, in several instances influencing legislative business of far-reaching 
significance; for example, the acts relating to copyrights and patents, 
federal revenues and their collection, the federal debt, the location of the 
capital, the mitigation of revenue penalties, and the land office (xxv). 
The First Congress was nearly buried by the number of petitions it received, particularly 
for compensation or other claims arising from the Revolutionary War, but the Congress 
defeated numerous attempts to set up procedures to defer these claims to other bodies 
(either standing committees or the executive departments). Considering the time 
constraints facing legislators of a new government “in a wilderness without a single 
footstep to guide them” (Bordewich 2016, 5), why would Congress agree to hear more 
than 600 petitions?110  An editorial writer of a period newspaper, The Gazette of the 
United States, has an easy reply: “Much depends on public opinion in matters relating to 
government. Some deference therefore should be paid to it” (Bowling et al 1998, xii).  
Indeed, “Americans considered [the petition and the memorial] to be among their most 
essential prerogatives as citizens;” (xi) Congress would ignore such an opinion only at 
their peril. 
                                                 
110 The words are those of James Madison, expressed in a private letter to a constituent. 
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RULES AND NORMS TO ENCOURAGE DELIBERATION 
Social scientists investigate the rules of a given organization as constraints on 
individuals operating within that organization.  Frequently, these rules are treated as 
constants, operating in the background, allowing causal inference about a hypothesis in 
question.  Additionally, social scientists consider these constraints part of the defining 
character of the institution in question (cf. North 1991). In this section, some of these 
assumptions must be revised, as the First Congress self-consciously operated to create 
these constraints, and decided to modify several of them over the course of their work.  
Standing rules, in the First Congress, were thus variable, and did not exist in any sense 
before being adopted – the First Congress had the constitutional prerogative to set its own 
rules.111 The standing rules of each house (for each chamber had their own rules) have a 
different role in this study, as they are not only (or exclusively) limitations on the 
individuals making up the institution, but also were the creations of their combined effort.  
Instead of being a helpful constant to aide in causal inference, the rules are themselves 
one of the main arenas to be investigated to determine just what characterized the 
institution of the First Congress. 
Taking a bird’s eye view of the rules adopted by the First Congress, one thing 
quickly appears: these rules were designed to facilitate legislative and deliberative 
activity on the floor, in a decentralized manner, befitting a body of equals. Proceeding 
through the standing rules of Congress, this investigation will start by looking at the rules 
                                                 
111 Article I, Section 5 states that, “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its 
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.” 
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of the House, and then canvas the rules of the Senate for any outstanding differences 
between the two bodies.   
The standing rules of the House made the Speaker of the House the presiding 
officer, empowering him to uphold high standards of decorum, and rule members out of 
order.  These standards are somewhat higher or stricter than most rules of these kind.  
The House insisted on having a floor that was at rapt attention to the matter under 
consideration by that body. To do so it prohibited the reading and shuffling of papers 
during bill readings, speeches, and debates. Further, the standing rules prohibited 
Representatives from absenting themselves from (perhaps tedious) floor work, and then 
arriving to take the votes. It was prohibited to vote on matters when that MC was not 
present to hear the motion being discussed on the floor. The rules, standing as a set, 
clearly emphasize decorum, and empowered the speaker to enforce a set of rules stressing 
this norm (De Pauw 1977, 11-13). While the House of Representatives has the reputation 
of being rather rowdy and passionate, especially when compared with the Senate, the 
First Congress’s smaller numbers and strict rules strongly militated against this otherwise 
constant feature. 
The standing rules of the House did much to structure deliberation over 
legislation. In the first place, it imposed a rough equality on members, in the form of 
rules disallowing a speaker from speaking more than twice to each bill, amendment, 
motion or the like under consideration (De Pauw 1977, 13).112 This rule sought to ensure 
                                                 
112 The member would not have their second opportunity to speak, until each MC wishing to speak had 
spoken as well. 
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adequate speaking time for all those wishing to speak to a motion, and preventing the 
filibuster-like domination of the floor by one or more individuals. Speaking of the 
filibuster, the House rules provided for a previous question motion to cut off debate, but 
it was used inconsistently and infrequently (De Pauw 1977, xxiv). The House generally 
devoted long periods of time for deliberation and debate, sufficient to allow all those who 
wanted to speak to do so, but did not give the right of unlimited speech to any MC. 
Second, the standing rules structured the process of introducing and marking up 
legislation, providing continuity to what otherwise could have been a very confusing and 
chaotic process, given the lack of formal agenda leadership by any individual or party.  
The standing rules stipulated that a bill may only be introduced with permission of the 
house, or by order of the House on the report of a committee – and in either case a 
committee to prepare a bill was appointed (De Pauw 1977, 14). As discussed above, this 
feature immediately interested at least 3 Representatives in the fate of the bill, and 
designated a chair, or legislative leader for that bill.  The standing rules further 
established the traditional parliamentary practice of bill reading, dictating that bills must 
receive 3 readings on 3 separate days (14).  More than simply setting up this practice, the 
standing rules descended to characterize the nature of each reading.  The first reading was 
purely informational and always ended with the question, “shall the bill be rejected?” If 
the bill was not rejected at this stage (and they seldom were) the bill passed to a second 
reading, where line by line markup, amendment, and debate were to occur.  This markup 
could either be done by a select committee or the Committee of the Whole House. The 
third reading was for the integration of amendments to the whole and a vote for final 
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passage. The formal language of the time termed this last process, ‘engrossment’ (14-15).  
That is, the bill was reduced to a formal parchment version, in a legible script, and 
delivered to the Senate. 
Third, the standing rules were set up by knowledgeable legislators who were 
familiar with the use of parliamentary procedures in a dilatory or obstructive fashion: 
they reflected a desire to pass adequately debated bills, rather than a checking or stopping 
function.  As an example, the first version of the standing rules featured a rule to prevent 
a type of cycling.  To set the stage, one must recall that once a bill was returned to the 
House by the Senate with amendments, the possibility for the bill to die due to lack of 
consent between the two bodies is ever-present. To eliminate the cycling of a proposal 
from one chamber to the other, bills amended by the Senate were ordered not to be 
committed to select committees. Instead they must be hashed out on the floor (De Pauw 
1977, 15). The rule against commitment attempted to prevent a tennis-ball like bouncing 
of a bill back and forth between the two chambers.113 
The final section of House rules pertained to Committee of the Whole House 
(COWH). The COWH was structured by rules that dictated that the standing order of the 
day was to begin each day with a COHW for the state of the union.  The specific features 
of the COWH discoursed on above were in fact regulated by rule, rather than custom or 
113 The rule prevents the formation of a select committee that might amend the bill per their narrow wishes 
and move the bill yet further from the necessary point located somewhat between the House and Senate 
proposals. 
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norm.114 Indeed, to ensure that the deliberations of the COWH could be sufficiently 
flexible and tentative, a standing rule held that, “After the report [the new marked up bill] 
shall again be subject to be debated and amended clause by clause before a question to 
engross be taken” (De Pauw 1977, 15). Rather than creating precedent by practice, the 
Congress preferred to decide these matters by rule. While a norm likely would have 
developed in the COWH for less formal debate, the House specifically provided for rules 
in the COWH to continue unabated, with one exception: the COWH rules relaxed 
speaking time restrictions (15), to allow select committee chairs managing the bill and 
other interested parties to speak more often to the bills that they advocated. 
The Senate Rules were very similar to the House Standing Rules, but sparer in 
their phrasing.  The Senate resolved 19 standing rules total: these rules also facilitated 
legislative and deliberative activity on the floor, in a decentralized manner (De Pauw 
1972, 18-20). The Senate Rules were nearly identical to the House rules in the following 
respects: (1) they imposed a rough equality on members (by prohibiting members from 
speaking “more than twice in any one debate on the same day, without leave of the 
Senate”); (2) provided for a previous question motion to cut off debate; (3) allowed bills 
to be introduced only with the permission of the Senate and one day’s notice; (4) required 
three readings on three different days, “unless the Senate unanimously direct otherwise;” 
(5) required that the Senate only commit a bill after the second reading; and (6) allowed 
the Presiding Officer (the Vice President) to punish lack of decorum by ruling a member 
                                                 
114 One such rule stated that, “the Speaker shall leave his chair [in forming a COWH] and a chairman to 
preside in committee shall be appointed” (De Pauw 1977, 15). 
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out of order (18-19).  The main differences in the rules dealt with the size of the assembly 
and the difference between the Speaker and the Vice President. The Senate allowed each 
Senator to speak on the bill twice per day, without the proviso allowing each speaker an 
opportunity to speak once, as there was less constraint on speaking time in an assembly 
of 26 senators, compared to 65 representatives. Also, the Vice President was not given 
the power to form committees at all, while the Speaker was given the opportunity, at 
least, to appoint committees. The Senate did not consent to giving an outsider the ability 
to manage their committee system. To be sure, the Senate of the First Congress was not 
just a body of “remote majoritarianism” (see Schickler and Wawro 2006, 280), but a 
body of strict majoritarian rule, as there were no privileges given to minority parties or to 
individuals. 
Despite the minor differences between the chambers, the rules governing each 
was very similar.  Indeed, each body was governed by a system of standing rules that 
empowered the majority on the floor. Furthermore, the rules proscribed central leadership 
or the development of hierarchies in the body. Such rules, although not identical with 
those of the institutionalized Congress, were nevertheless effective in structuring a 
robustly capacious degree of deliberation in the Congress.115 For further evidence of this 
115 The Standing Rules were adopted in the very beginning stages of the First Session, on April 7, 1789, in 
the House and April 16 in the Senate; as a sign of their general effectiveness only very few of these were 
revised after experience. One standing rule of the House held that the Speaker, when he heard opposition to 
a motion, was supposed to order those in the affirmative to move to the right and those opposed to move to 
the left (De Pauw 1977, 12). Besides being confusing (should the MCs move to their left or the speaker’s 
left?), this rule must have anticipated only a very small number of disagreements per day, otherwise this 
method would require considerable delays as 65 members (of various ages) move around the room. This 
obviously cumbersome method was changed only two months later, with the more sensible provision that 
those in the affirmative would stand, while those opposed would remain seating (85). Senate rule changes 
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claim, let us turn to deliberation in the First Congress regarding that familiar standby: 
molasses. 
Examining democratic deliberation on a most narrow and seemingly parochial 
issue, the appropriate level of an import duty to be placed on molasses, is a good test case 
for congressional health.  This topic, prima-facie, seems the least favorable to high-
quality and substantive deliberation.  The question to be resolved by Congress, after all, 
seemingly is just the appropriate number of cents per gallon that molasses ought to be 
taxed. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. I submit that in a healthy legislative 
body, one ordered for deliberation of maximal quality, politicians proceed outwards from 
the narrow parochial (or technical) question immediately at hand so that all members of 
the body, including those without a parochial interest (or technical expertise) in the 
matter, can discuss and deliberate over the merits of the proposal. While this seems an 
overly idealized manner of deliberation, evidence exists in the debates of the First 
Congress of just such behavior among the MCs, and even at the self-conscious level.  
See, for instance, the way Representative Thatcher (MA) introduced his remarks to the 
House, when debating the molasses impost: “I did not intend to rise on this occasion, 
because commerce is a subject with which I cannot pretend to be well acquainted; yet as 
were also rare, as only two appeared to occur during the First Congress.  One important informal change 
occurred regarding the status of standing rules, and their suspension: on last day of the Second Session, the 
Senate was pressed for time, and an enterprising senator called for the rules to be suspended to more 
rapidly progress through the three readings of an appropriations bill than the calendar would allow (489). 
The Senate upheld this suspension of the rules, unanimously, giving precedential value to the concept that 
the rules could be suspended with the unanimous consent of all senators, a practice remaining with the 
body to this day. Stepping back, one can see that the number of rule changes, throughout the three sessions, 
was very small, and the rules adopted in the first weeks after producing a quorum for the first time served 
to bind the MCs for the entire First Congress.   
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the interest of my constituents are at stake, and the impolicy of the measure is so glaring 
as not to require any very deep researches–I may venture to give my opinion without 
being deemed presumptuous” (Bickford et al 1992, 368). In this manner, parochial, 
technical or narrow questions are converted into political questions – both ‘higher’ ones 
addressing the ends of the government, the legitimate reach of its laws, and ‘lower’ ones 
addressing the distribution of benefits and costs in society, as well as those concerning 
the effectiveness of the means proposed in the policy.  I further contend that this attribute 
of the First Congress speaks most clearly to today’s Congress: the political questions (and 
capacities necessary for resolving them) arising from parochial matters like molasses 
duties will nonetheless seem quite familiar to students of Congress – even if the parochial 
issues of yesterday and the technical issues of today are quite different. In short, in 
healthy Congresses, MCs develop tools and techniques of deliberation that provide each 
topic with the appropriate level of debate, and the greatest chance of being resolved 
successfully (from the point of view of effectiveness, representativeness and 
responsiveness). 
Molasses, while just one of the dozens of items which were to be taxed under the 
new scheme of import duties, was seemingly pivotal to those representatives, and many 
days in April and May 1787 were spent discussing this duty. While the interests that MCs 
represented were canvased above, it is important to note that MCs needed to defend the 
interest of their constituents in terms answerable to representatives outside of their 
section of the nation if they were to be successful in advocating for them. The first move 
many MCs made was toward wider regime level questions about the purpose of 
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legislation.  Indeed, upon considering the question of the appropriate level for the 
molasses impost, representatives immediately spun out important normative and political 
questions that might be hidden at first under the seemingly banal nature of the question.   
The first question that emerged in debate was whether the impost on molasses 
was an attempt to indirectly tax rum, and to discourage its drinking. MCs thus moved to 
consider whether the Congress would be in the business of establishing the political 
morality of the nation and imposing costs on immoral acts and incentivizing moral ones.  
Representative Ames (MA), for one, despaired of the power for legislation to touch the 
morality of its citizens and preferred the Congress to focus on commercial matters.  He 
held it, “good policy to avail ourselves of [a duty on rum] to procure a revenue [and] to 
talk of the political interest committed to our charge… If gentlemen conceive, that a law 
will direct the taste of people from spirituous to malt liquors, they must have more 
romantic notions of legislative influence than experience justifies” (377).  Others 
supposed that the alleged pernicious nature of imbibing intoxicating drink was poorly 
defined.  Representative Wadsworth (CT) thought that, “the arguments respecting the 
morals and health of people are not well grounded–the fisherman and seamen belonging 
to the eastern states are the principal consumers of country rum, they drink more of it 
perhaps than any other class of people, yet they are a healthy robust set of men; and as for 
their morals, I believe they will not suffer from a comparison with their neighbors” (367).  
Faced with the prospect of directly insulting the constituents of their colleagues, 
advocates of the high molasses impost demurred from rejoinders to this argument.   
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Supporters of the impost instead turned to the fact that the impost would be 
legitimated by popular opinion, thereby avoiding the question of “legislating morality.” 
While raising a tax of any kind is generally not thought to be popular, Representative 
Sherman (CT) proposed a more refined account of popular opinion in a long speech 
meant to lower the tensions aroused by the weeks-long debate over this topic.116  
Sherman stated that: 
 Gentlemen have had recourse to popular opinion in support of their 
arguments. Popular opinion is founded in justice, and the only way to 
know if the popular opinion is in favour of a measure, is to examine 
whether the measure is just and right in itself… The people wish that the 
government derive respect from the justice of its measures… I believe the 
popular opinion is in favour of raising a revenue to pay our debts (580). 
Sherman converted the zero-sum debate over the level of the tariff, into a positive-sum, 
consensus account: all were in favor of paying the debt and the impost on molasses was a 
means to this unanimously acclaimed end. Sherman further barbed his opponents, who 
claimed to know on good authority that hundreds of thousands of their constituents 
resolutely opposed this impost: “When gentlemen have recourse to public opinion to 
support their arguments, they generally find means to accommodate it to their own…” 
(581).  Whatever the merits of the question respecting an attempt to legislative morality, 
116 Roughly one-hundred of the pages of the debates of the House of Representatives concern the molasses 
impost, out of a total of 794 covering the two months when this impost was debated. 
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Rep. Sherman suggested that the MCs were sent to Congress to ensure the United States 
would be solvent, and thus authorized them to (fairly) tax the nation’s imports. 
The question of taxing imports also raised important economic questions about 
the ends of legislation, and whether the impost should be devoted solely to revenue, or 
whether industrial protectionism was a legitimate usage of the taxing power. After 
hearing a week of arguments on the merits of the industry relying on molasses 
importation,117 and the various ways it benefited all manner of Northeastern mercantile 
interests some had heard enough.  Representative Bland (VA) complained that the 
Congress had “Lost sight entirely–that was the purpose of raising revenue. We spent 
several days now–instead of pursuing that end, we are now extending our view to the 
encouragement of commerce” (208).  Representative Ames (MA) differed, however, 
holding that, “The two subjects are so connected that [I] don’t see how we can separate 
them” (208).  He suggested that all he aimed for, “was to lay such a duty as should 
protect the manufacture” (104). Ames, seemed to get the better of the argument, as 
subsequent speakers seemed to accept the interconnectedness of import duties and the 
promotion of American industry; there were few doctrinaire free-traders in the First 
Congress. 
The political questions bearing on the morality and ends of lawmaking were not 
the only ones addressed; MCs also ferreted out important questions regarding the 
117 Northeastern representatives argued that molasses imports formed an important link in the industries of 
the region; they argued that molasses was imported from the West Indies and that fish caught by 
Massachusetts fishermen were in turn sold to the Caribbean islands.  Too high of an impost, they 
suggested, would decimate this trade. 
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distributive nature of the policy, as well as potential roadblocks that would stand in the 
way of the efficacy of the impost.  In many ways these questions were the most pivotal 
ones facing the House as they debated the impost, as there seemed little question that 
there would be an impost, despite the protest of the Northeastern mercantile 
representatives.  The question instead was whether the tariff on molasses should be low 
(2 or 3 cents per gallon) or high (5 or 6 cents per gallon). In terms of distributive impact, 
there was a heated debate over how the costs and benefits of the impost would be borne 
by a nation with diverse economic interests and industries.  Representative Fitzsimmons 
(PA) argued that the impost of molasses did seem too high, until one considered other 
decisions already made with respect to duties laid on other goods: 
[Molasses] has been mentioned as a necessary of life – the fact is 
admitted, but shall it be inferred from thence, that no duty ought to be 
collected from molasses, while you impose one on sugar, which is equally 
a necessary of life, among the middle and southward states; although the 
remark has been made already, I must repeat it, and beg the committee to 
bear in mind, that whenever a tax on a particular article, seems to bear 
harder on one state than another, we must endeavor to equalize it by 
laying some other to restore an equilibrium to the system (98, emphasis 
added). 
Some opponents of the impost were unmoved. Ames (MA) remarked that the 
distributional cost of the impost was not the only problem with the proposed level of the 
impost. He held that it would be “scarcely possible to maintain our fisheries with 
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advantage, if the commerce for summer fish is injured, which I conceive it would be very 
materially, if a high duty is imposed on [molasses], nay it would carry devastation 
throughout all the New-England states, it would ultimately affect all throughout the 
union” (101).  Nearly every representative from Massachusetts reiterated this argument 
throughout the debates, all the while trying to insist that the claims they were making 
based on the needs of their constituents were ultimately tied to the common good of the 
nation. 
The response of those favoring a higher level of impost to this direct argument 
from interest was revealing of an important attribute of debate in the First Congress. In an 
important sense, it was necessary to publicly to disclaim direct sectional interest as the 
reason for favoring or disfavoring a bill.  Responding directly to Ames, Rep. 
Fitzsimmons reminded his colleagues of his profession: he was a merchant.  And yet, “as 
a member of this body, [I] consider it proper to forego a pertinacious adhesion to [the 
mercantile] system when its interest came in competition with the general welfare” (103, 
emphasis added).  The arguments made by Ames and the other Massachusetts 
representatives were met with a kind of withering fire by other members of the House.  
Representative Boudinot (NJ) stated that he was, “very sorry… to hear any thing that 
sounds like attachment to particular states, when we are laying a general duty on the 
whole. For my part, I consider myself as much a representative of Massachusetts as of 
New-Jersey, and nothing shall prevail on me to injure the interest of one more than the 
other” (370).  Representative Madison (VA) reiterated the idea of a balance or 
equilibrium that must hold, or the entire edifice of the impost system would unravel.  
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While it was true that, “parts of this system … bear harder upon some states than others,” 
this was not the appropriate way to deliberate on the policy.  Instead, one should examine 
the whole impact of all the duties that the Congress was proposing.  Analyzing the 
proposition in this fashion, one should “take the whole together,” indeed seen in this 
light, “the duties will not be unequal” (375).  While not strictly ruled out of order, the 
norms of debate encouraged MCs to make arguments for their interests that would reach 
out beyond the needs of their constituents and make plausible cases for the advancement 
of the general welfare of the nation. 
The point of emphasizing this norm is not to claim that MCs in the First Congress 
were in some sense superior by nature to contemporary MCs. In fact, they were not: it is 
clear from deliberation that the incentives operating on MCs were very similar to those 
that would exist in a contemporary House debate. Namely, self-interested members 
sought to protect the interests of their constituents. Much like today’s MCs they were 
sometimes wont to launch into hyperbole or launch specious arguments. Representative 
Ames was the chief purveyor of such arguments in the debate over molasses.  On April 
28, the molasses impost was still set at 6 cents, despite his efforts to get it reduced.  
Grasping for new arguments Rep. Ames came up with some rather exaggerated and 
dubious rhetoric. One particularly heated exchange included a claim that setting the 
molasses duty too high would lead to disunion, as Ames stated to his opponents, “I 
conceive, sir, that the present constitution was dictated by commercial necessity more 
than any other cause…If the duty which we contend against is found to defeat [the 
manufacturing interests], I am convinced the representatives of the people will give [the 
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Constitution] up” (375). Unwilling to leave the matter at that, Ames doubled down 
insisting that the loss of faith in government would be multi-generational: “Mothers will 
tell their children when they solicit their daily and accustomed nutriment, that the new 
laws forbid them the use of it, and they will grow up in a detestation of the hand which 
proscribes their innocent food [changing] the favorable opinion now entertained [towards 
the government] to dislike and clamour” (380). The chain of reasoning connecting a tax 
on molasses to children not receiving molasses-derived candy to the ultimate conclusion 
of revolution seems a bit of a stretch. 
The norm against clearly particularistic arguments was strong; even though Ames 
had struck a perhaps low blow, counterattacks in kind were not mounted. Instead 
proponents of the higher amount stuck to the considerations they had already offered: that 
the tax was equitable when compared to the duties leveled elsewhere in the system, such 
as a tariff on sugar, and that the duties were necessary for paying down the national debt.  
Overall, the deliberation on this topic allowed the representatives who favored a lower 
tariff to indicate the intensity of their preferences, and provide arguments as to why the 
lowering the tariff would benefit the general welfare.  The House hearing these debates, 
lowered the tariff from the 6 cents proposed by Madison to 5 cents.  
Deliberation in the House does not end the story of the molasses impost.  As was 
treated in detail above, petitions served an important purpose in the First Congress, 
notifying MCs of issues where particularly strong interests were being affected.  Indeed, 
petitions were received from citizens regarding the impost bill, a goodly portion of which 
concerned molasses.  These petitions informed the Congress that the merchants and 
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traders of Portland, Massachusetts (now Maine) considered the duty on molasses 
“astonishingly” high, and asked for it to be made “intirely [sic] free from all imposts and 
duties” (Bickford and Veit 1986, 969).  A second petition from distillers in Pennsylvania 
made a more moderate request: they proposed the Congress increase the difference 
between the duties on rum and molasses, suggesting that this would operate to the benefit 
of their business and hence the “true interest and prosperity of the United States” (971).  
They deferred to Congress whether this could be most efficaciously done by reducing the 
molasses duty or increasing the duty on rum.  The Senate, receiving the bill from the 
House, chose the former. The final amount, settled upon by the Senate, was thus lower (2 
½ cents), as the petitions verified the claims of the Representatives from Massachusetts; 
they were not wrong about the public opinion of their constituents. Senators were 
uninterested in testing to find out whether a lesser version of Ames threats would come to 
pass and lowered the tariff accordingly. 
CONCLUSION: DELEGATION IN COOPERATIVE SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS 
The First Congress, of course, did a lot more than simply create the nation’s first 
revenue act; it also was the first Congress to deal with the pressures of our separation of 
powers system. This institution did not, however, hew to the belief that its role or 
legitimacy came from obstructing or fighting with the president. There was, by most 
meaningful measures, more conflict within the bicameral structure of the legislative 
branch than between the branches in the First Congress. Even ceremonial matters 
generated conflict within the legislature.  One prominent example concerned the great 
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consternation in the first months of the First Session on the question as to whether to 
annex additional honorific titles on the President of the United States. In the Senate, 
chiefly instigated by Vice President Adams, there was intense preference for additional 
titles, while the House persisted in the belief that to be called President itself was an 
honor. It took many weeks for the Senate to capitulate, being “desirous of preserving 
harmony with the House of Representatives… think it proper … to act in conformity with 
the practice of that House,” addressing the chief executive as President of the United 
States (De Pauw 1972, 45). Inter-branch relations, on the other hand, appeared much less 
conflictual due in large part to the personage of George Washington.118 President 
Washington vetoed (and threatened to veto) exactly zero bills during the First Congress 
(De Pauw 1977, xxii). Congress was generally deferential to presidential nominations, 
although there was an exception that will be explored below. The Congress was very, 
although not universally, responsive to formal communication from the Executive Branch 
or the President. 
In fact, Congress utilized its relationships with the Presidency and the Executive 
branch to cooperatively facilitate its lawmaking and representative functions.  The First 
Congress featured more cooperative separation of functions, than competitive separation 
of powers. The Congress fully occupied itself with policymaking and representing the 
American people, calling upon the President and the newly-minted Executive 
118 In fact, many factions within Congress engaged in contestation, not with Washington, but rather with 
each other to gain the favor of the President. This applied to the Executive as well, where different factions 
of the cabinet “battled” one another to gain favor with Pres. Washington. While not strictly speaking a 
history, the musical “Hamilton” has made this feature of politics in 1789 into something of common 
knowledge. 
 158 
Departments to provide expertise, and direction to aid them in the completion of their 
duties. The First Congress featured MCs who freely admitted that they were not experts 
in finance. Nevertheless, they did not therefore abdicate or defer the final decision-
making to those who were. When relevant, the Congress itself called upon experts, such 
as Treasury Secretary Hamilton, to prepare policy, but they expected the reports to be 
presented to them for deliberation. Although MCs chose not to initiate finance policy, 
they were (and considered themselves) qualified to sharply debate the propositions within 
any executive branch proposal. MCs who were inexpert in matters of high finance were 
nonetheless prepared to consider the policy and determine if it was consistent with the 
interests of the nation and their constituents. 
Congress, both the House and the Senate, were very responsive to Executive 
Branch communications.  Congress prepared formal responses to both the state of the 
union and inaugural addresses (De Pauw 1972, 33 and 218).  The process, inevitably, was 
commenced in committee.  Each chamber formed a select committee to draft a response 
to the President when he communicated with the Congress.  The formal addresses 
developed by these committees, and approved by the plenary body after debate, allowed 
the Congress to orient themselves toward fulfilling their mandate: to be responsive 
toward the needs of the union more broadly, and “promote the general welfare.”  One 
might wonder if mere words, even composed in a formal speech, could accomplish this 
weighty goal: in fact, the formal response of each house also corresponded to the actual 
agenda of Congress. Thus, Congress ended up responding, through legislation, to 
virtually all the topics expressed in President Washington’s Inaugural and his first Annual 
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Address (now called a State of the Union address). Every action proposed to Congress in 
those addresses were at least debated in at least one of the houses of Congress, save one. 
Washington had a stellar ‘batting average’ in getting his agenda items considered, except 
for his proposal for the Congress to consider founding a national university or funding the 
already existing universities to promote “science and literature” (Washington 1790).119 
This finding inverts the contemporary situation of Congress responding to only a small 
number of items placed in a State of the Union or Inaugural Address. The President fully 
took advantage of his powers listed in Article II, Section 3, to “give the Congress 
information on the State of Union.”  Congress, for their part, certainly considered “such 
measures that [Washington judged] necessary and expedient.”  Washington, of course, 
did not provide modern forms of presidential leadership (such as “going public” [Kernell 
1986]) to support those efforts, but in the absence of formal agenda setting powers in any 
single hand in Congress, these speeches were no doubt useful in focusing the body on a 
smaller set of topics. 
Congress and the Executive Branch relations went beyond what would be 
suggested by a clause-bound understanding of interbranch affairs.  Even though there was 
no specific clause or article of the Constitution directing them to do so, Congress utilized 
the executive branch as a source of expertise that could ensure that the bills they 
119 George Washington saw the national patronage of education and the diffusion of knowledge to be 
important tasks.  He specified that Congress to could be trusted to determine, “Whether this desirable 
object will be best promoted by affording aids to seminaries of learning already established, by the 
institution of a national university, or by any other expedients will be well worthy of a place in the 
deliberations of the legislature” (1790).  The Congress did not take him up on this request. 
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proposed reflected coherent and well-reasoned policy.120 Furthermore, the Congress 
turned to the Executive Branch when it wanted to revise laws on the basis of the Treasury 
Department’s experience in administering them.  Even at a time long before the rise of 
the administrative state, the Congress used its relationship with the newly established 
Executive Branch Departments to provide the information necessary for the provision of 
effective and efficient policymaking.  
One way to do so was straightforward: The House of Representatives simply 
asked the Executive Departments for reports that would help them be responsive to both 
the exigent needs of the nation, and properly handle requests for constituency service.  
One relatively minor, but useful function of interbranch relations was thus the 
development of a division of labor.  The House, as explained above, received hundreds of 
petitions, most of which pertained to the Revolutionary War. Congress, after officially 
hearing such petitions would generally refer those to the Secretary Henry Knox in the 
newly created War Department. The War Department, they trusted, could ascertain if the 
claims for relief were credible.  Instead of investigating each claim on their own, the 
Congress (and especially the House) delegated the determination of these matters to a 
former military officer of the Continental Army, Knox, and his secretaries. This 
delegation allowed the House to continue developing policy devoted to national aims, all 
the while providing a helpful service for their constituents. 
120 “Congress could not resist the potent combination of information and concrete proposal which has ever 
been the special advantage of the executive” (Chamberlain 1946, 11). 
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Similar degrees of delegation even occurred in salient political conflict. Indeed, 
near the end of the First Session, in September 1789, the House of Representatives 
formally requested the Treasury department prepare a report and a plan to provide for “an 
adequate provision for the support of the public credit” (De Pauw 1977, 220). This 
request represented the genesis of Hamilton’s famous “First Report on the Public 
Credit.”121 Congress, in the case of Hamilton’s debt relief plan, delegated the formation 
of policy and the position as prime legislative mover to him. This was not delegation in 
the modern form, where the Congress passes a bill and leaves “filling out the details” to 
the regulatory capacity of the Executive Departments. Instead, the bill the Congress itself 
drafted was responsive, and largely duplicative, of his report.  Even though Treasury 
Secretary Alexander Hamilton possessed a greater degree of expertise on matters of high 
finance than any individual in Congress (Bordewich 2016, 160),122 the Congress certainly 
did not take his proposal on faith.  Instead, Congress trusted that it had structured the 
Treasury Department properly, and chose the right individual to lead it.  Allowing a piece 
of legislation to be initiated by the Executive at all was a large step, but the Congress, and 
especially the House, saw the need to exhaustively debate this plan – the debate was so 
extensive and divisive it nearly led to the loss of the plan (Bordewich 2016). 
121 The broader fame of this debt plan would be questionable, if not for its important place in “Cabinet 
Battle #1,” a song from the hit musical Hamilton.  No longer is this plan famous only with scholars of the 
Early Republic. 
122 George Washington was inclined to offer the job of Treasury Secretary to his friend, Senator Robert 
Morris.  Morris declined, saying of Hamilton, “he knows everything sir” (Chernow 2004, 286). 
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Yet, it is important to note that this request for information was not a one-time 
request. The House also asked the Treasury Department to report back on its progress in 
implementing three national laws: the impost act, setting the national duties; the 
collection act, setting up a bureaucratic system to receive the revenue from the impost; 
and the coasting act, which established regulations on American vessels that engaged in 
trade along the Atlantic seaboard.  All these laws were written in the First Session of 
Congress; the Congress, and the House in particular, wanted to inquire into the 
implementation of those laws, thus it asked the Treasury to discover if there were “any 
difficulties which may have occurred in the execution of the several laws for collecting 
duties…” (De Pauw 1977, 267). This cooperative relationship between administrative 
and legislative capacities of the government resulted in a report form Secretary Hamilton, 
and the creation of a select committee to respond to this report; this select committee was 
rare for having remained in existence after its first report, as it reported back revisions to 
each of the national laws listed above, to overcome the difficulties pointed out by 
Secretary Hamilton. 
The First Congress was therefore not in an adversarial relation with the new 
Executive Branch Departments or the President himself. Yet, the First Congress had not 
abdicated its role.  The Senate in particular, behaved in a very similar manner to Justice 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, as it exercised its prerogatives in a manner as 
inoffensively as possible to its rival.  Even though the vast majority of the President’s 
appointees were accepted, and with very little debate, the Senate did peremptorily reject 
one of Washington’s selections for a federal naval officer – “a new federal post… created 
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in accordance with the revenue acts” (Bordewich 2016, 132).  This action, which was 
actually carried out by one senator because the nominee had caused him a personal slight, 
nonetheless reaffirmed the constitutional ability of the Senate to refuse consent of an 
appointee, for their own reasons, and not accountable to the Presidency for an 
explanation thereof (133).123   
That Congress failed to act in opposition to the President did not necessarily 
provide evidence of a wholesale deference. Consider the controversy concerning advice 
and consent concerned the “contested removal power” (cf. Alvis et al. 2013).  While the 
Constitution explicitly stated that the Senate ought to have a say on nominees (through 
the “advice and consent” provision), it was silent on which branch or individual ought 
have say in firing a member of the executive branch.  When the Departments of War, 
Treasury and State (originally called Foreign Affairs) were created, Congress realized it 
needed to resolve this question. Four possible ways of reading the Constitution were 
proposed: 1) that impeachment is the only way to remove executive branch officials; 2) 
that officials ought to be removed the same way they were approved, through the advice 
and consent of both president and Senate; 3) that Congress had the power to delegate this 
power to whom they wished; 4) that the president has this power, naturally from his 
Article II powers (Alvis et al. 2013, 7).  Eventually, Congress (led by Representative 
                                                 
123 President Washington actually came in person to the Senate chambers to try to change the senators’ 
minds.  He discovered that the President does not gain any voting privileges by stepping across the 
threshold, and his nominee remained rejected, even after strenuous objection (Bordewich 2016, 133). 
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Madison) settled on the last answer, which could be called “executive power theory” 
(24).   
If one analyzes this position from the basis of pure-power relations, it appears that 
the Congress chose the most deferential option, when designing the executive branch. 
Yet, viewing the choice in this manner downplays the significance of the fact that it was 
Congress that had this grand debate, and the House, in particular, that was the initiator of 
it.  Subsequent experience has shown that it would have been possible for the Congress to 
simply establish the Departments, leaving it to the Courts to determine the appropriate 
answer to this question. The First Congress, was not satisfied with such a course of 
action, if only because there were advocates for each of the constitutional options in the 
Congress. In fact, if any of the other viewpoints had prevailed the removal power would 
have been vested in Congress rather than in the President.  This fact meant that even 
advocates of executive power had to submit, in a sense, to the decision being made by 
Congress; Congress, in the end, decided to favor a construction of the Constitution that 
enhanced executive power. Thus, this construction was decided on by the Congress, 
rather than just imposed on the polity by Courts or by the president himself. The First 
Congress, then exercised its constitutional prerogatives, paradoxically, even while 
renouncing or declining to assign power to itself. 
A final evaluation of the First Federal Congress requires a return to a 
consideration of what had come before: The Confederation Congress. The First Congress 
ultimately resolved many of the debates that were roiling the nation throughout the 
1780s.  The questions in many cases were identical. The Confederation Congress had, in 
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fact, considered and deadlocked three of the most important questions settled by the First 
Congress: the former failed to 1) determine a site for a national capital; 2) ascertain 
whether to assuming the debts of the states to place the nation on a firmer fiscal 
foundation; and 3) establish a national revenue system.  The similarity of agenda was not 
the only “constant,” the personnel inhabiting the Articles Congress were in many cases 
also MCs in the First Federal Congress.124 What could account for such salient 
differences in the legislative outcomes of the two bodies? 
There were three outstanding differences.  First, and necessary for the success of 
the Congress, the constitutional context had changed.125 The old unicameral body 
structured by bloc voting by state was thrown out, and a bicameral legislature voting by 
individual legislator replaced it. Further, the structure of the new Constitution lent 
credibility to the efficacy of the measures adopted by the Congress. Lawmaking (devising 
policy, developing coalitions through bargaining or persuasion, protecting the policy 
from hostile amendments, etc.) is a difficult and costly endeavor for politicians; they 
clearly will not do it if the costs are unlikely to turn benefits. The prospect of an active 
administration carrying out the body’s policies (and even helping to draft them) certainly 
increased the prospects for institution-maintaining and facilitative behaviors. MCs of the 
First Congress felt comfortable making sacrifices of time, energy or political capital, to 
carry out the legislative process, since the system could conceivably generate political 
124 12 MCs in the First Federal Congress were also in the Articles Congress in 1783, the last time many of 
these issues were seriously addressed (Wilson 2002, 307). 
125 This change in the constitutional situation of the polity was necessary for congressional health to 
develop in the First Congress, but not sufficient condition by itself. 
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benefits to themselves and welfare benefits to their constituents.  It is important to note 
that this difference was outside of the control of the MCs, however, as the quality of the 
Constitution (and the extent of its success in encouraging these actions) was dependent 
on the actions of the framers of 1787, not their determinations in 1789. 
The Members of the First Federal Congress were, however, directly responsible 
for the other two distinctions: they chose the rules that ordered the body, and their actions 
set the norms that would guide the body’s deliberations and processes. Cogent work on 
the Confederation Congress shows that the rules chosen by that body were well known to 
be dysfunctional by nearly all involved (Jillson and Wilson 1994), but delegates were 
unwilling to bear the costs involved in devising better rules. MCs of the First Congress 
devoted considerable effort to adopting rules and procedures that generated a consistent 
workflow, and tried to control the deficiencies that would naturally emerge in the 
decentralized lawmaking process that they constructed. A major problem in the 
Confederation Congress concerned committees that stretched on interminably, did work 
that duplicated the work of other committees or failed to report (Jillson and Wilson 
1994).  At the beginning of the Second Session, the House spent time creating a 
committee to examine the Journal to determine all the unfinished business of committees 
formed in the First Session that had not yet reported (De Pauw 1977, 256-257). This 
committee ensured that the House was aware of which agenda items would have 
otherwise fallen through the cracks, so to speak, and ensured that the choice of which 
items to work on was a deliberate one of the body, not a result of a lack of oversight. This 
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self-conscious attitude of the body toward its internal regulation has been richly 
documented above. 
The final difference concerned the issue of norms.  It seems clear from the results 
of Congress that a certain more pervaded the actions of the body – a firm determination 
to resolve the questions before it. While the difference in constitutional context and 
procedures explain much, but not all, of the difference between the spectacularly 
unsuccessful Articles and the prodigiously productive First Congress, this norm was 
pivotal in allowing the body to successfully address its agenda.  Given state equality in 
the Senate, there is no reason deductively to expect that body to resolve a question like 
the location of the capital, especially absent central leadership or strong parties. All the 
ingredients for collective choice instability are present; absent this norm it is certainly 
possible to imagine each state delegation voting for a capital within its boundaries, and 
only for that proposition. Knowing that the body is working toward a decision, and that 
one will be made, meant that few contended for a capital in New Hampshire or Georgia.  
Once New York City’s dreams of permanently hosting Congress were dashed 
(Bordewich 2016, 248), only relatively central locations remained in the running.  
Members were looking to bargain and were open to resolving the debate through the 
expedient eventually chosen: there would be two capitals, one temporary and the other 
permanent. As indicated in the figure (see Figure 3-5), the capital was placed just as near 
to the “center” of the nation as was possible.  This same dynamic played out on many 
other topics.  If each state had resolutely set about to protect one significant import from 
tariff, it is scarcely possible to imagine the way the Congress could have successfully set 
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an impost schedule capable of raising the revenue. In the end, the First Congress achieved 
its goals because of a constitutional context outside of its direct control (providence), its 
self-consciously devised internal procedures (laws), and its operative norms (mores).126 
Figure 3-5: Location of Temporary and Permanent Capitals of the United States 
 
                                                 
126   Cf. Tocqueville (1840/2004, 319) for a similar accounting of the success of the polity overall. 
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Chapter Four: The Antebellum (33rd) Congress 
At the opening of the 33rd Congress in December 1853, the political world was 
calm. President Franklin Pierce (1853) confirmed, in his annual written message to 
Congress, that the nation was “not only at peace with all foreign countries,” but also, 
“exempt from any cause of serious disquietude in our domestic relation” (24). Pierce was 
especially heartened by the end of the sectional conflict over territorial policy. The 
President thus lauded the peace between the sections of the nation prevailing after the 
Compromise of 1850, which had ostensibly pushed the topic of slavery off the 
congressional agenda for good.127 “The controversies which have agitated the country,” 
Pierce confidently declared, “are passing away with the causes which produced them” 
(24). Not only did he pronounce the controversy over, he stated that the subject had been, 
“set at rest by the deliberate judgment of the people” (34). Pierce nevertheless lingered 
over this issue returning to it several times in his message. His final word on the matter 
was a solemn (if-awkwardly worded) pledge: “That this repose is to suffer no shock 
during my official term, if I have power to avert it, those who placed me here may be 
assured” (34). 
127 Pierce’s recapitulation of the situation of 1850 is worth recounting: “A successful war had just 
terminated. Peace brought with it a vast augmentation of territory. Disturbing questions arose, bearing upon 
the domestic institutions of one portion of the confederacy, and involving the constitutional rights of the 
States. But, notwithstanding differences of opinion and sentiment, which then existed in relation to details 
and specific provisions, the acquiescence of distinguished citizens, whose devotion to the Union can never 
be doubted, has given renewed vigor to our institutions, and restored a sense of repose and security to the 
public mind throughout the confederacy” (1853, 34). 
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The 33rd Congress was nevertheless determined to place the President in 
contradiction with these words. Congressional leaders and members chose to organize the 
territories of the American West, even with abundant foreknowledge that doing so could 
reopen the issue of slavery (Eyal 1998).128 It was well known, at the time, that the 
Compromise of 1850 posed certain ambiguities. The earlier Missouri Compromise had 
created a literal line of latitude (36°30') past which slavery could not spread in the 
Louisiana Purchase north and west of Missouri. The Compromise of 1850, while fixing 
the border of Texas, placed no such lines on the national map, and instead relied on the 
principle of popular sovereignty (Potter 1976, 157).129 The Compromise of 1850 raised a 
question: did the line demarcated in the Missouri Compromise still prevent the growth of 
the institution of slavery into the area of present day Kansas and Nebraska? 
The 33rd Congress sprang into action to resolve this ambiguity by abrogating the 
Missouri Compromise line. The Congress, which persuaded President Pierce to agree, 
made the triumph of popular sovereignty throughout the unorganized territory of the 
United States the essential plank in the Democratic Party platform. The Congress enacted 
128 Eyal (1998, 212) states the matter very clearly: “much of the nation understood with remarkable 
sophistication what perils lay ahead should Congress enact the Kansas-Nebraska legislation. For some 
observers, this awareness merely translated into a vague premonition that ‘agitation’ loomed on the 
horizon, while for others it assumed a specific and precise form: predictions of violence in Kansas and of 
… political turmoil within the nation's two major party organizations.”
129 “Popular sovereignty” was the principle that the local inhabitants of a territory ought to choose and 
regulate their own “domestic institutions.” This latter phrase was, of course, a pseudonym for the institution 
of slavery. The choice popular sovereignty referred to, therefore, was whether to prescribe or proscribe 
slavery in each territory. Popular sovereignty gave rise to important and difficult legal questions, such as 
when exactly a locality would choose: either in the territorial stage or when they first presented a state 
constitution to be ratified by Congress. 
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this position into law, thereby annulling the earlier Missouri Compromise, by passing, 
“An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas.” Canonically referred to as 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act, a century and a half of historiography has confirmed that it 
was among the most important and catastrophic enactments of American history 
(Malavasic 2014, Rensink 2008, Wolff 1977).130 Historians note the conflict spurred by 
the act was unprecedented in intensity and consequence: “The struggle over this piece of 
legislation ruined the Whig Party, severely crippled [the Democratic Party], and produced 
a higher level of bitterness between Northerners and Southerners than anything that came 
before it” (Wolff 1977, 47). If that were not enough, historical consensus also places this 
enactment at the beginning of a chain of consequences that led to both the bloodshed in 
Kansas and the greater tragedy of the Civil War (Freehling 1990, Freehling 2007, Nichols 
1956, Potter 1976, Wolf 1977, Wunder and Ross 2008).131 
The Kansas-Nebraska Act thus pushed the ship of state, otherwise stable, and 
facing no major domestic or international crises, into troubled waters. As a law, its origin 
is clear, and its consequences are reasonably attributed to the institution that framed it. 
                                                 
130 Rensink provides a clear statement: “The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, in large part an ordinary 
document, nevertheless had a catastrophic impact on its nation’s history—leading to turmoil, division, and 
national crisis without precedent” (2008, 63). Malavasic is blunter still, “it was one of the most destructive 
pieces of legislation in United States history. It destroyed the second American political party system, 
stripped Native Americans of their land in Kansas and Nebraska territories, started internecine warfare in 
the Kansas territory, and ultimately led to the American Civil War” (2014, 270). 
131 Indeed, in the debate surrounding the Kansas-Nebraska Act, “the southern members of Congress for the 
first time organized and presented a well-nigh solid political front and among them traditional party 
divisions were largely laid aside. It was but a few steps onward to secession, the Confederacy, and the Solid 
South (Nichols 1956, 212). Debate generally only concerns where the event is in chain of causes and how 
pivotal is was, not whether it was a long-run cause of bloodshed. Freehling (2007), for instance, suggests 
the actions of Border Ruffians subsequent to the bill was more important than the bill itself (63). 
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The Congress is designed chiefly as a lawmaking institution. Its laws ought to be 
dedicated to Preambular ends: in promoting the general welfare amidst national 
tranquility. In passing the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Congress pursued a course of action 
leading in the opposite direction: toward sectional aims and into domestic turmoil. The 
case of the antebellum Congress shows, profoundly and clearly, why a healthy national 
legislature is necessary in our constitutional regime. While extreme, this example 
illustrates just how costly the consequences of rampant legislative dysfunction can be – 
such failures can lead to a chain of consequences imperiling even the existence of our 
body politic. 
In the chapter that follows, I present the case of a failed Congress, one lacking 
nearly all attributes of congressional health. I demonstrate that it is possible for Congress 
to configure its norms, rules, and structures in a way so damaging as to be reasonably 
termed a failure. To prepare the ground for this argument one needs important 
methodological and historical background regarding this case study. A methodological 
preface is needed because of the problems posed by investigating the antebellum period. 
While conflicts related to slavery powerfully reverberate through American history, I 
show that the standards I elaborated in Chapter Two are flexible enough to handle these 
issues. Then, to aid in the development of my analysis, I present stylized historical facts 
regarding the nature of sectionalism in American society circa 1854. 
After this preface, I move to the key argument of this chapter: that the action of 
Congress in passing such a damaging, ill-considered, and unresponsive measure was not 
merely an idiosyncratic failure, but rather the foreseeable and direct result of a 
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dysfunctional institutional makeup. The 33rd Congress was plagued by (1) 
unrepresentative standing committee membership and leadership, leading to sectional 
cartels; (2) failures of democratic responsiveness attributable to excessive party loyalty; 
(3) expressive debate which ultimately crowded out deliberation on the merits of policy; 
(4) partisan choices to abdicate clear constitutional powers enumerated in the 
Constitution. Importantly, none of these problems were foisted on Congress, but rather 
created through the action and inaction of MCs. These individuals were not coerced to 
frame such a poor-quality policymaking process; instead they did so acting through an 
institution structured by their choices. In the end, the electoral connection alone could 
have been sufficient to prevent the adoption of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, but even this 
salutary version of self-interest was overthrown by enough of the MCs in the House of 
Representatives to lead to passage of a massively unpopular bill. Altogether, these 
problems led not just to a dysfunctional Congress, one that has difficulty achieving its 
essential tasks, but rather to a failed Congress. I define a failed Congress as an institution 
that literally adds to the problems faced by the polity in a damaging way, without 
ministering to the general welfare. The 33rd Congress epitomizes such a flawed 
institutional state. 
CASE STUDY A – THE NADIR 
 In this dissertation, case studies are utilized to concretely illustrate the theoretical 
and normative concept of congressional health. As a reminder, the cases selected aim to 
treat a “diverse” set, rather than a typical configuration of Congress. This chapter, like the 
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previous one, treats an “extreme” case.  Only this time I investigate Congress when it was 
configured in the manner very unlikely to achieve its institutional ends. In short, the aim 
for the current chapter is to identify and explicate an institutional configuration that can 
serve as the opposite of the “ideal-type” presented by the First Congress.  In selecting 
such a case, one searches for something more analytically precise than a Congress that 
produced legislative outcomes that the researcher disfavors. Moreover, the goal is to 
exclude those Congresses that produced bad outcomes for the nation due to idiosyncratic 
factors, or ones that are otherwise unaccountable. To find such a case one must identify 
and select a Congress that was institutionally was predisposed to failure due to its lack of 
institutional structures aligned with responsiveness, deliberativeness and 
representativeness. When searching for failure, additional signs can be sought out as well. 
A substantive failure in lawmaking is an important tell-tale marker of institutional 
dysfunction. That the Kansas-Nebraska Act is such a failure is not open to doubt. But to 
say something about institutional realities rather than just historical happenstance requires 
more than a reiteration of this historical consensus. Thus, the remainder of this chapter 
provides the argument that the 33rd Congress was a failed institution by analytically 
decomposing its norms, rules and structures. I thereby demonstrate that the 33rd Congress 
lacked the primary elements identified as essential to congressional health. 
Nevertheless, important problems are raised by turning to the antebellum era for 
an archetype of failure. The most obvious concern raised by the selection of this case is 
important historiographical and constitutional controversies can get in the way of an 
institutional analysis of politics in that period. While several such problems potentially 
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exist, the two most powerful objections to examining the antebellum Congress might be 
respectively classified as historiographical and theoretical. Indeed, a powerful 
historiographical objection to selecting this case might be made as follows: “You choose 
the 33rd Congress as your example of failure because its status as the progenitor of the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, but your claim that the institutional makeup of Congress caused 
this failure is implausible. It is simply not credible that the institutional rules, norms, 
procedures and structures of Congress truly caused the Civil War.” The second and more 
profound theoretical objection might be stated as follows: “You analyze the Congress, 
but the problems of the 33rd Congress were caused by the institution of slavery, which 
had deep roots in the polity and was sanctioned by the Constitution. It is instead either the 
existence of slavery, the Constitution, or both that caused the problems facing the 33rd 
Congress. Your analysis is therefore flawed, as it places responsibility where it does not 
belong.” 
Responding to each of these concerns requires a reiteration and explication of the 
analytic framework undergirding the concept of congressional health. As a reminder, to 
be healthy a Congress need not be perfect, and in fact will not be perfect. No ideal 
institutional design could possibly guide the national legislature to design perfectly 
responsive laws, in a fully representative deliberative body, with perfect efficaciousness. 
Instead, congressional health refers to the aspects or attributes of institutional design, 
formation, or maintenance that maximize the probability that the substantive aims of 
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Congress will be met.132 Congress will be unhealthy to the extent that its structures, 
norms, and procedures minimize this same probability. In an extreme case, the one to be 
presented here, the Congress failed as an institution; as its structures, norms, rules and 
procedures served aims other than those that Congress was designed to attain, rendering it 
extremely improbable that the substantive aims of Congress will be achieved. Since these 
aims are so critical for the continued functioning of the regime, the failure of Congress, 
as conceived here, is likely (although not guaranteed) to have extremely detrimental 
consequences for the polity. 
The relation of this analytic framework to the historiographic problem is clear: 
while I am arguing that the 33rd Congress is such a failed Congress, I need not and do not 
argue that the radically dysfunctional attributes of that institution caused the Civil War. 
Neither do I need to show that a counterfactual “healthy Congress” would have prevented 
the Civil War or led to the peaceful abolition of slavery. In short, it is important to not 
over-read or over-interpret the simple claim of this chapter.  My argument is descriptive, 
rather than casual in orientation.  To be descriptive rather than causal does not imperil my 
claims, however. The argument of this chapter is clear, bold and subject to empirical 
falsification.133 To repeat, I argue here that the institutional makeup of 33rd Congress 
                                                 
132 This probabilistic treatment has several corollaries. One is that even a maximally healthy institution can 
conceivably make mistakes; likewise, an unhealthy institution could accidently give rise to positive 
outcomes for the polity as a whole. 
133 Falsification in this context is possible, but more complex than typical scientific falsification. I assert, 
for instance, that the deliberation in the 33rd Congress was of poor quality and quantity. Falsification of this 
claim would consist of evidence or arguments adduced to show that either (a) my conception of 
deliberation is improperly framed or defined (b) that I have undercounted or undervalued actions that 
should count as deliberative (c) that the standard I am holding congress to is objectively unreasonable 
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contributed to its substantive failure. I demonstrate throughout this chapter that it was an 
institution exceptionally unlikely to achieve the goals for which it was designed. In fact, it 
was so deficient that its general tendency would have been (and was) to make laws that 
failed to represent the nation, that would disregard the fundamental capacities of the 
Congress, that would fail to discover potential problems of conception or constitutionality 
in bills, and that would fail to respond to citizen input. 
The theoretical objection respecting slavery is likewise mostly obviated by this 
framework, although a substantial concession to this point is necessary. Anticipating and 
responding to this objection is indeed important as it is critical to offer a balanced and 
analytically precise critique of the 33rd Congress if my claims regarding its failure will be 
credible. Therefore, several caveats are in order.  Although many Northerners perceived 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act as the act of an aggressive “slave power conspiracy” (Douglass 
1854/1950, 323; Lincoln 1854/1953), several Southern MCs opposed the principles 
embedded in the Kansas-Nebraska Act because they were not favorable enough to 
slavery! The existence of MCs accurately representing the unjust and extreme views and 
interests of their constituents (i.e. faithfully representing the perspective of a slaveholder) 
posed a critical problem for the polity from the Founding onward. Moreover, the 
Constitution, by allowing states to have equal representation in the Senate, far over-
represented the views of slaveholders in the polity.  By 1854, when the 33rd Congress 
(which is to say that no Congress has every deliberated at that level) or perhaps (d) all of the above. 
Thinking about the falsifiability of descriptive and interpretative claims is helpful to ensuring that these 
tasks are carried out at the highest degree of rigor possible. 
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met, the free states made up over 60% of the population of the nation, but had about the 
same number of senators as did the so-called slave states.  These facts are important for 
proper evaluation. The Congress, as an institution, cannot be held responsible for the 
existence of views that would be difficult to compromise with, or for the political support 
provided by the Constitution to slavery.134 In short, I concede that it was supremely 
difficult for any Congress to deal with the problem of slavery. 
But the Congress, as an institution, can and should be held responsible for 
aligning its deliberations and decisions with its purpose as described in the Preamble and 
authoritative commentary on the Constitution – to refine and enlarge the views of 
constituents to seek the general welfare. In the 33rd Congress, the purpose of Congress 
was submerged beneath the needs of sectionalism and partisan demands.  While neither 
of those demands are obviously illegitimate, responsiveness to those forces should not be 
paramount for Congress as an institution. Contrariwise, the politicians of 1853-4 detected 
considerable factionalism within their respective political parties – and acted as if 
resolving this internal factionalism was the chief role of Congress.  Indeed, “This 
insecurity produced a tendency among politicians to grasp any possible advantage which 
might arise from current interests and to push it to extreme length. It was above all else a 
                                                 
134 This is an understatement, but it is important not to let the reasonable feelings of moral aversion and 
animus toward the positions, speeches and actions of slaveholders in the 33rd Congress unduly affect the 
terminology used by the political analyst. In this chapter, I contend that a healthy Congress could have 
succeeded in checking slaveholding factionalism in proportion or even in advance of the majority opinion 
against “slave power” in the society at large. The 33rd Congress, on the other hand, magnified the voice of 
the slave-holding bloc, as two factions traded favors at the expense of the general welfare.  More will be 
said about this in the following two sections. 
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period of political expediency and sometimes of desperate expedients” (Nichols 1956, 
197).135 Placing other goals before the common good, as defined in terms of a consensus 
of the interests of even a majority of the nation, the Congress seriously erred. 
The errors made by the 33rd Congress are rendered clear by contrast with the 
relative success of earlier Congresses in dealing with slavery-related issues. The 
Congress had faced crises dealing with the problem of slavery several times in its history 
– and only in 1854 did it produce a “settlement” adverse to the interests of the popular
majority of the nation.136 Responding rather to a majority of the majority party in 
Congress, the partisan 33rd Congress managed to destroy the party system reigning at the 
time. The destruction of the party system was assured when the minority party and a 
substantial minority in the majority party (together making up a popular majority of the 
nation) was virtually ignored in the “deliberations” of both the House and Senate. While 
this chapter should not be read as attributing full responsibility for the breakdown of the 
antebellum polity to the Congress, it is entirely fair to adjudge the 33rd Congress failed, 
especially when one can be secure in the knowledge that other Congresses had managed 
this decisively difficult matter with more care, finesse, and ultimately efficaciousness. 
135 This scholarly analysis is not a one-off or idiosyncratic. Regarding the MCs of the 33rd Congress other 
historians concur. One clear statement runs as follows: “The Kansas-Nebraska Act was one of the most 
fateful measures ever approved by Congress… Seldom was the irresponsibility of politicians more glaring 
than in their reckless agitation of this issue, heedless of long-term national consequences, for personal and 
factional advantages” (Gienapp 1987, 81-82). 
136 Several previous settlements, such as the “stricter” Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, were directly averse to 
the interests of the enslaved and free Blacks, who were obviously not consulted for these compromise 
measures. The Kansas-Nebraska Act broke new ground, however, in being averse to the interests of the 
popular majority of the nation, alongside its clear injustice to the black population of the United States. 
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: SECTIONALISM IN AMERICA CIRCA 1854 
Before analyzing Congress at the institutional level, it is important to clarify just 
what sectional interests were particularly relevant to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. 
Fortunately, historians have richly mined the sectional realities of American politics in 
the antebellum period. The stylized facts I extract from this rich literature act as useful 
aids to the reader by providing a parsimonious picture of the assumptions I make 
regarding MCs and the interests they represented in the Congress from 1853-55.137 
Starting with the easy case of the southern United States is reasonable. It is all too 
apparent that slaveholding made up the most prominent and frequently referenced 
southern interest in Congress, especially in the debates regarding the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act. Protecting the “property rights” of slaveholders and protecting the institution from 
disparagement or infringement by abolitionists consisted of a powerful interest for 
southern MCs. Some MCs even expressed a sense that all other interests paled in 
comparison with this one. One southern (border-state) MC, Senator Archibald Dixon 
(KY), said that “‘Upon the question of slavery, [he knew] no Whiggery, And [knew] no 
Democracy…’ He was, instead, ‘a pro-slavery man’ who sought to maintain the ‘rights’ 
of his ‘slaveholding constituency’” (Holt 1999, 808). While it is true that other interests 
characterized the South, including an interest in gaining federal funds for internal 
improvements in the Deep South, and securing at least one southern route of the 
                                                 
137 These stylized facts distinguish my analytic account, with certain generalization being necessary, from a 
fully comprehensive historical account. Within each section of the nation to be canvased below, there was 
substantial diversity of partisanship, local and state factions within parties as well as interests (cf. Holt 
1999). 
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transcontinental railroad, their pivotal interest is clear (Potter 1976, 152 – 153). I 
therefore posit that southern MCs had to represent one interest above all else; they must 
ensure that “slave property” was secured.  
Figure 4-1: The United States in 1854 
 
Source: Author created modification of an image from a public domain work of the U.S. Federal 
Government, The National Atlas of the United States (1970), 145. Numbers on the map represent 
the total number of electoral votes for each state in the Electoral College. 
Operating from the frame of the present, and with foreknowledge that the United 
States would soon split into “Union” and “Confederacy” it is common to read these 
distinctions into the past. Calling the remainder of the nation the “free states,” however, 
in contradistinction to the enslaved South, is a mistake regarding the interests in play in 
the 33rd Congress. Of course, “free states” did share salient interests, including protecting 
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and encouraging “free labor.” The problem in lumping the entire free North together is 
that it conceals important differences in their interests relevant to the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act. Given differences, to be articulated below, I posit the existence of two sections 
within the free states, the “eastern states” and the “western states.” 
In the eastern states, including all those free states part of the Union when it was 
founded plus Maine and Vermont, the primary sectional interests were manufacturing, 
trade and internal improvements. The main economic interests sought to find markets for 
the products of a newly industrializing economy and a diversified system of agriculture 
(Potter 1976, 32). Thus, I posit that the fundamental interest to be served by eastern MCs 
is the economic growth of their region, secured either through protective tariffs, internal 
improvements or direct federal subsidy to railroad or finance interests. In the western 
states -- the free states not part of the original Union of 1787 -- political interests diverged 
from their eastern kin. Not nearly as industrialized as the East, the West focused on the 
continued expansion and development of America. Although it initially seems out of 
place in this list of primarily economic interests, one of the primary aims sought by the 
west was the organization of the territories of the American frontier (Hodder 1913, Potter 
1976). MCs accurately representing constituents, saw territorial organization as an 
instrument to satisfy their preferences: the desire of constituents to continue the westward 
march of Manifest Destiny, as well as to improve the material prosperity of western 
states, which would see economic growth as their cities developed into entrepôts of trade 
with the frontier. The major boon aimed at by citizens in the West, and thus represented 
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by their MCs, was the creation of a transcontinental railroad, to link the west with 
California and the Pacific trading world.138 
Alongside these sectional interests, a clear and overwhelming majority of citizens 
of every region in favor of a continuation of the national union in 1854. The compromise 
measures of 1850 and 1820 (and the initial founding of the union in 1787) depended on a 
shared interest in preserving the union, because narrow sectional interest alone would 
often mean defecting against compromise. Indeed, sectionalism nearly triumphed in 
1850, when MCs did defect against compromise when the measure was arrayed as an 
omnibus measure, but accepted it piecemeal, (after significant tactical changes suggested 
by Senator Stephen Douglas [D-IL]). MCs generally voted for the parts of the 
compromise that benefited their section, while generally voting opposed to ones that were 
perceived as harming it (Theriault and Weingast 2002). I thus posit one additional 
interest held by all MCs, an interest in favor of continuing the union and avoiding 
unnecessarily threatening the tenuous national piece recently established in 1850. 
138 While one might wonder if MCs at the time recognized any such distinction between eastern and 
western free states. But, in fact, prominent legislative leaders did recognize such a distinction! Trying to 
mollify his southern allies, Sen. Cass of Michigan insisted that he did not share in the free-soil tendencies 
of his eastern colleagues. Sen. Cass said that such voices did not “speak for the North,” and “as a western 
man [he disavowed their] authority in toto” (Congressional Globe Appendix 1854, 292). Here is an MC 
from Michigan describing himself as a westerner. While this is strange to contemporary ears, this is 
accurate regarding the views of Sen. Cass and the perceived interests of his constituents. He simply did not 
share the interests (or principles) of many eastern MCs. 
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Table 4-1: MC Count by Region in the 33rd Congress 
REGION SENATE HOUSE 
 No. of Seats % of Chamber No. of Seats % of Chamber 
EAST 18 29% 92 39% 
WEST 14 23% 52 22% 
SOUTH 30 48% 90 38% 
TOTAL 62  234  
Source: The National Atlas of the United States (1970), 145. 
While the intensity of these interests certainly varied even within sections,139 clear 
evidence for of validity of these proposed cleavages emerges from differential voting by 
section on the Kansas-Nebraska Act in both the House and Senate. On the rollcall votes 
for final passage, there was a clear and distinct difference between voting in the eastern 
states, the western states, and the southern states. MCs from eastern states were strongly 
opposed to the measure while those from western states were mixed. The southern states, 
moreover, were more uniformly in favor of the Kansas-Nebraska Act than the East was 
opposed (see Table 4-2). One additional element speaking to the cogency of dividing the 
nation in this manner is that the voting differential holds up even when you control for 
                                                 
139 The slaveholding interest was stronger in the Deep South than in the Border States (and even stronger in 
the Black Belt of these states than other less enslaved areas) and the railroad interest was significantly more 
intense in the states bordering the unorganized territories as well as Illinois, which hoped to be the eastern 
terminus of the transcontinental railroad. 
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the potentially confounding variables of party and chamber. Just examining Democrats in 
the House, southern representatives broke 55-3 in favor of the bill, while most western 
representatives supported it 19-14. Eastern Democrats in the House, meanwhile, were 
narrowly opposed to the measure, 26-27. One can thus say with a fair level of confidence 
that United States of 1854 can be divided into western, eastern, and southern sections.140 
Table 4-2: Vote on the Kansas-Nebraska Act by Region 
REGION SENATE HOUSE 
Yea Nay % Support Yea Nay % Support 
EAST 5 8 38% 26 63 29% 
WEST 9 4 69% 19 27 41% 
SOUTH 23 2 92% 68 10 87% 
TOTAL 37 14 113 100 
Source: Senate Journal. 33rd Cong., 1st sess., 3 March 1790, 235. U.S. House Journal, 33rd Cong., 
1st sess., 22 May 1854, 923-924. 
140 The regional distinctiveness of the cleavage is stronger in the Senate than in the House. As indicated in 
the table above, a bit more than a third of eastern senators supported the Kansas-Nebraska Act, while more 
than two thirds of western and nine out of every ten southern senators supported the Act. The distinction 
between the eastern and western section is less stark in the House, although the same general relation 
obtains (i.e. support grows as you move from East, to West, and finally, to the South. 
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UNREPRESENTATIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP 
 The three sections of the United States did not find their interests equally or 
proportionally protected in the 33rd Congress. Instead, the sectional interests important to 
eastern MCs were imperiled by unrepresentative structures within Congress. To talk of 
unrepresentative structures requires something to be said about representation. In the 
context of the conception of congressional health developed in this dissertation 
representation need not be (and frequently ought not to be) descriptive to be legitimate. If 
defined descriptively, the Congress, its committees, and its committee leaders would need 
to be a mirror to the population of the United States. As explained in Chapter Two, the 
Constitution does not generate or mandate such a reality. Congress is designed instead to 
accurately represent interests substantively. Representation in Congress is pluralistic: the 
ideal is for all legitimate interests in society to have the best arguments on their behalf 
aired in a deliberative body. A type of rough approximation of the weight in society of 
these interests is provided by the fact that many different MCs may share an interest: they 
represent the same interest on account of their separate constituencies’ shared interests.141 
Legitimate and numerous interests are then reinforced. 
The practical and concrete upshot of this theoretical matter is that we should not 
evaluate a Congress based on a standard of literal and direct proportionality. Instead we 
should evaluate Congress as unrepresentative only if certain interests cannot be heard at 
all in the legislative process, or if the weight of interests in the Congress is 
                                                 
141 In the 33rd Congress, sectional interests provided the glue that connected multiple MCs in natural 
coalitions. These coalitions of interest were intersected (sometimes orthogonally) by political interests 
provided by party. 
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disproportionate to their weight in society. To show that the 33rd Congress possessed 
unrepresentative committee leadership and membership then is not demonstrated through 
a simple statistical test. Instead, one engages in a more comprehensive historical analysis 
of the interests at play in the Congress. Given the stylized facts presented in the previous 
section, one then gauges the relative success or failure of those interests in gaining a seat 
at the table in the institutional structures of the legislature that count, like committees. 
Quantitative analysis of the committee system of the 33rd Congress shows that the 
interests of the slaveholding states (the south) and the states of the old northwest (the 
west) were weighted heavily at the expense of the free states of the eastern seaboard. 
Committees in the Senate and House were largely dominated by MCs from the southern 
and western regions of the nation. The memberships of several important committees 
were similarly cartelized, with some committees possessing absolute southern majorities, 
in the face of the fact that the southern MCs only made up 40% of the House. While 
partisan representation and the dominance of Democrats in the 33rd Congress explains 
some of this malapportionment, it hardly explains it all. With its important leadership and 
committee positions dominated by a cartel within the majority party, the Congress was 
not able to predict the outcry which would emerge from the Northern and Western states 
over the repeal of the Missouri Compromise countenanced by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. 
The disproportion of power of the South within the committee system mattered, 
as the 33rd Congress possessed institutional characteristics speaking to the importance of 
committees, such as a standing committee system with settled jurisdictions. In the 33rd 
Congress, committees were utilized extensively to draft legislation, to evaluate the 
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contents of petitions for individual relief, carrying out very much the same tasks 
described in Chapter Three, only in standing form. These committees were not, however, 
fully institutionalized. These committees did not subdivide formally into sub-committees, 
lacked a permanent attached staff, had no formal hearings or other forms of deliberation 
(Deering and Smith 1997, 26 – 28). Immediate inspection of the lists of committee 
membership reveals that the committee assignments were set up in a similar proportion to 
the partisan make-up of each body. Analyzing these lists in terms of their sectional make-
up, however, reveals the degree to which committee leaderships had been cartelized by 
the southern and western states. While the partisan makeup and leadership of committee 
was reasonable (although not likely ideal for deliberation) the total lockout of eastern 
representatives from leadership is startling. 
Table 4-3: Committee Chairs by Region 











EAST 6 22% 29% 10 27% 39% 
WEST 9 33% 22% 10 27% 22% 
SOUTH 12 44% 48% 17 46% 38% 
TOTAL 27 37 
Source: Senate Journal. 33rd Cong., 1st sess., 12 December 1854, 31. U.S. House Journal, 33rd 
Cong., 1st sess., 12 December 1854, 55. 
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Even a cursory inspection of the data provides evidence of significant 
cartelization of the committee system by the south and west. Whereas the eastern part of 
the nation had around 40% of the total seats in the House of Representative, only about a 
quarter of committees were led by eastern representatives. To check if eastern interests 
would be disadvantaged by this proportional underrepresentation, additional investigation 
is necessary. To supplement the initial quantitative analysis, I clarify the matter by 
presenting a narrower list of familiar major committees, supplemented by the addition of 
the Senate and House Committees on Territories, which was doubtlessly seen as 
important in the 33rd Congress.142 Not one eastern senator or representative was a 
chairperson of an important committee (see Table 4-4). Simply put, differential partisan 
composition of the sections does not excuse or justify this. In the House, the Democratic 
caucus was 157 strong. Out of that number 54 were eastern. Yet not one of these 
representatives received a pivotal chairmanship.143 While their constituents no doubt 
were pleased with the fact that their MC chaired the Committees on Manufactures or 
142 To determine which committees should be classified as “important” I turned to the list given by a 
Senator of the 33rd Congress, Hannibal Hamlin of Maine. Hamlin, speaking in the 35th Congress, stated that 
the Foreign Relations, Military Affairs, Naval Affairs and Judiciary committees were “the principal 
committees, that reflect the Government, [and] establish its policy abroad and at home” (Congressional 
Globe 1857, 39). To this list, I added the Finance and Territories Committees, due to the broad important of 
authorization and appropriation in every Congress and the obvious topical focus of the latter.  For the 
House, I list that chambers analogues to those listed by Sen. Hamlin, with one addition; the Committee on 
Elections, which managed disputed elections, a common occurrence in the nineteenth century. 
143 In the Senate, committees were formed after unanimous consent was given to a suspend a rule formally 
requiring committees to be chosen by ballot. Instead one slate was accepted without debate, presumably 
with informal input from the party caucuses (Congressional Globe 1853, 23). In the House, the Speaker 
announced the list of committee assignments, without the necessity of a vote to approve the slate. 
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Patents,144 these committees were not pivotal in the same way as the Committee on 
Territories. Further demonstrating the disproportion, the memberships of many important 
committees were just as skewed toward the west and east as leadership. Table 4-5 
presents several committee profiles for illustrative purposes. 
Once again, it is not reasonable to call the committee membership of the 33rd 
Congress unrepresentative just because one committee over represents one interest, one 
time. Disproportional influence in the 33rd Congress was much starker than this. 
Table 4-4: Major Committee Chairs by Region 













EAST 0 0% 29% 0 0% 39% 
WEST 3 50% 22% 1 14% 22% 
SOUTH 3 50% 48% 6 86% 38% 
TOTAL 6 7 
Note: Major Senate Committees: Judiciary, Finance, Military Affairs, Naval Affairs, Foreign 
Relations, and Territories. Major House Committees: Elections, Ways and Means, Judiciary, 
Military Affairs, Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Territories. 
144 The jurisdiction of these committees no doubt served the sectional interests of the eastern region of the 
nation. 
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The House Committee on Roads and Canals could hardly be thought to be a 
sectional bailiwick of any one region, yet it too was disproportionately favorable to 
westerners and southerners. The nation relatively uniformly required internal 
improvements (or funding for the maintenance of existing ones). Nevertheless, a western 
Democrat was the chair of the committee with a plurality of the members being from the 
south. And this was not the worst culprit in terms of lack of representation. The House 
Committee on Territories was in fact chaired by a western Democrat with an absolute 
majority of seats occupied by southern representatives. Despite the foreknowledge that 
the peace and stability of the nation had been threatened by difficulty of setting territory 
and state admission policies, the (southern) Speaker and members of the 33rd Congress 
set up a committee structure guaranteeing that one section would be less well-represented 
than their number of seats in the Congress would suggest. 
The consequences for this internal structure should not be overstated, but they 
were not beneficial for the 33rd Congress.145 One of the most important consequences of 
setting up the committee system in the way undertaken by Congress in 1854 was the 
creation of a leadership in both chambers that is disproportionately representative of pro-
slaveholding interests far more than the degree encouraged by the Constitution or by 
partisan realities. Given the sectional composition of the Senate Committee on Territories 
145 Committees, as mentioned above, were important in the 33rd Congress, but lacking many of the 
structural features of the institutionalized 20th Century Congress. Thus, one should not over read my claims. 
The House or Senate Committees on Territories did not, for instance, have the right to submit bills under a 
closed rule, which could super-empower the preference outlying MCs who were members of this 
committee. One might calibrate this position as follows: the unrepresentative nature of the committee 
system was detrimental to the health of Congress and the soundness of the lawmaking process, but it did 
not automatically render the institution a failure.  
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it is no surprise that the legislation reported out from Douglas’s committee on territories 
catered almost exclusively to Southern and Western interests. Additional troubling 
features of the committee system in the 33rd Congress compound, rather than alleviate 
this tendency. The committees were set up with relatively small memberships; the Senate 
Committee on Territories, for instance, only had six members. During the stages where 
the Kansas-Nebraska bill was drafted, a pro-compromise Whig, Sen. Bell (TX) was not in 
Washington (Holt 1999, 807). His absence removed one of the few advocates for the 
Missouri Compromise from deliberations at the pivotal moment when informal 
deliberation was occurring among the members of this committee.  
Table 4-5: Selected Standing Committee Membership 
Committee Committee Chair Membership Profile 
House Territories Western Democrat Southern Majority 
House Ways and Means Southern Democrat Southern Majority 
House Manufactures Eastern Democrat Eastern Majority 
House Roads and Canals Western Democrat Southern Plurality 
Senate Territories Western Democrat Western Plurality 
Senate Finance Southern Democrat Southern Majority 
Senate Military Affairs Southern Democrat Southern Majority 
Senate Judiciary Southern Democrat Southern Majority 
Source: Senate Journal. 33rd Cong., 1st sess., 12 December 1854, 31. U.S. House Journal, 33rd 
Cong., 1st sess., 12 December 1854, 55. 
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In the 33rd Congress none of the committees to which the bill could be referred 
would be incentivized or structured to discover the ways that the proposed bill might put 
eastern Democrats in a tough spot politically. The Kansas-Nebraska Bill did nothing to 
advance the interests of eastern Democrats. Beyond this, it symbolically went after their 
constituents as well, especially when the bill was amended to clearly indicate that it was 
meant to render the Missouri Compromise inoperative. Closer contact with and 
leadership provided by eastern Democrats may have alerted party leaders to this fact 
much earlier in the process. 
Furthermore, the systematic nature of the problem across both chambers and 
many committees means there was little that could be done to rectify the problems of the 
bill once they emerged. When the Kansas-Nebraska Bill was passed in the Senate, there 
was no way to have the committee on territories work on the bill in the House to see if 
anything can be done regarding the Missouri compromise. The House Committee on 
Territories, for instance, was completely dominated by allies of Douglas and southerners. 
It was therefore broadly unrepresentative of the chamber which the final vote shows was 
much more narrowly split. The House Committees on Territories in particular was thus 
definitionally a preference-outlier (cf. Krehbiel 1990, Shepsle and Weingast 1987), as its 
median member was a southerner, strongly in favor of the repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise.  Rather than be checked by their chamber median, however, this tendency 
was inappropriately policed by each chamber and even augmented by the overall 
tendency of the 33rd Congress to empower the preference-outliers of the majority party. 
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 While the sectional and partisan interests represented in the Senate guaranteed 
consideration of a territorial organization bill complaisant to southern interests, nothing 
about the unrepresentative committee structure of the Senate or House made the final 
result necessary or inevitable. In Chapter 3 it was explained that in the First Congress 
Houses and Senates frequently appointed “grand committees” composed of an MC from 
each state when it was deliberating over policies likely to affect the interests of states qua 
states. While perhaps Congress had grown too large for a literal one per state 
representation, intense sectional interests (based on the geographic, demographic, and 
economic attributes of states) had only grown more intense in the years subsequent to the 
First Congress. The need for testing the potential partisan and sectional ramifications of 
policy proposals had only grown more acute in the Antebellum Congress, while the 
institutional means for handling these sectional conflicts withered in the face of sectional 
cartels, and the partisan cartels to be discussed next. 
RESPONSIVENESS TO PARTY RATHER THAN TO CONSTITUENTS 
 In some cases, a given Congress may find itself hampered by one dysfunctional 
practice, norm, or procedure, but with compensating advantages elsewhere. The 33rd 
Congress, by contrast, exhibited multiple interlocking failures. Along with the structural 
advantage given to western and southern interests in its internal workings, the 33rd 
Congress was simply not responsive to a popular majority or in fact any other kind of 
popular pressure. The second institutional failure (of four) was thus one of behavioral 
norms rather than rules or structures. Norms of MC behavior in the 33rd Congress were 
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dominated by intense responsiveness to perceived partisan needs, rather than the 
concerns, ideas and grievances of their constituents and state leaders. 
The 33rd Congress was informed of intense citizen opposition to its plan to 
organize Kansas and Nebraska early in the legislative process but did not alter the 
proposal at all in the face of this opposition. Indeed, the Congress continued to receive 
and review citizen petitions to inform them of exigent and popular needs. The petitioning 
system thus continued to function as a transmission belt of popular ideas into Congress, 
just as described in Chapter 3. Yet, the behavioral response of MCs to the information 
provided by this process seemed defective. In the time since the First Congress, partisan 
establishments were developed, and in the 33rd Congress these partisan loyalties swelled 
to an unsustainable level, especially among Democrats who were in the majority. While 
one is hesitant to reach such a conclusion, considering the evidence marshalled, it is clear 
that many MCs of the Democratic Party acted with blithe disregard for the preferences of 
their constituents, dramatically misreading the intense preferences of their voters. 
It should be remarked that the failure to appropriately respond to citizen input is one of 
the gravest deficits a legislature can face. Making laws responsive to the will of a popular 
majority is an important role for Congress. While the legislative branch must oversee or 
aid other national institutions in their attempts to implement policy, scrutinize the 
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constitutionality of enactments, and protect the nation from external threats, only through 
Congress is a popular majority able to translate its will into law.146 
With its fundamental task in sight (acknowledging that this role cannot be played 
by any other actor) a healthy Congress aligns its deliberations with measures than have 
the conceivable support of a popular majority of the nation at large. This is not to say, 
however, that MCs ought to simply parrot or reduplicate the public opinion of their 
constituents. Especially in a democratic age it is worth nothing that the genuine 
preferences of citizens can often be dramatically uninformed (Bartels 1996, Campbell et 
al 1960, Converse 1964, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Alternatively, even informed 
and responsible citizens may be incompletely informed about the remote consequences of 
laws under consideration.147 But the limitations of the populace do not grant Congress a 
license to blatantly disregard durable and broad public opinion, that which is expressed 
strongly, across multiple constituencies, and over a large stretch of time. A bare 
minimum of responsiveness requires Congress to respond – that is take substantive action 
to remedy legitimate citizen grievances – when a clear majority of the nation is activated 
in opposition to either a measure under debate or an already existing law. 
                                                 
146 Congress must oversee the executive departments and agencies, attend to constitutional questions if it 
hopes for its laws to be upheld, and appropriate funds for national defense, but other institutions are chiefly 
concerned with these other roles. While democratic deliberation is important and crucially legislative in 
nature, it is certainly the case that other institutions do deliberate as well. Only Congress has a conceivable 
claim to being representative; only Congress has the diverse sources of information that could ensure that 
our nation’s laws reflect those which might be reasonable consented to by its citizens. 
147 These caveats are certainly a key part of the insights provided by the most important figures in 
American political thought, with Madison, Hamilton, and Tocqueville all pursuing the consequences of the 
limitations of direct and unrefined representation of citizen preferences. 
197 
So far from passing a law consonant with general desires of the majority, the 33rd 
Congress “succeeded” in repealing a policy intensely supported by an overwhelming 
majority of both the eastern and western sections of the nation. The policy which the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act repealed was the Missouri Compromise, the provision of the 1820 
law which had allowed Missouri into the union with the stipulation that “in all territory 
ceded by France…which lies north of the thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north 
latitude … slavery…shall be, and is hereby, forever prohibited.”148 Given the word 
“forever” in the Missouri Compromise, it was perhaps unsurprising that citizens of the 
east (was well as significant parts of the west) exploded in protest. They were, simply 
put, outraged at potentially expanding the institution of slavery into the areas north of the 
Missouri Compromise line. The sheer number of petitions and petitioners in favor of the 
Missouri Compromise and opposed to the Kansas-Nebraska bill would have been 
apparent to MCs in both houses. Examining the petitions presented on just one day in the 
Senate provides a clear look at citizen reaction to the bill. 
On February 20, 1854, several weeks deep in Senate deliberations, the Senate 
opened its session with the presentation of petitions. Senators Seward (NY), Wade (OH), 
Everett (MA), Fish (NY), Foot (VT), Chase (OH), Broadhead (PA), Sumer (MA) all 
presented petitions from their constituents “remonstrating against the passage of the bill, 
in its present form, to organize the territory of Nebraska” (Congressional Globe 1854, 
148 An Act to authorize the people of the Missouri territory to form a constitution and state government, 
and for the admission of such state into the Union on an equal footing with the original states, and to 
prohibit slavery in the territories, Sec. 8. Act of March 4, 1820, ch. 22, 4 Stat. 545. 
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447). These petitions, while largely coming from eastern states, also included western 
petitioners as well. Several senators presented more than one petition, so that in total 34 
petitions against the bill were read to the Senate. Those senators even introduced petitions 
on the behalf of voters outside their states, including New Jersey and New Hampshire. 
The petitions came from groups of electors, citizens, religious leaders, and at least one 
petition designed to cut across partisan lines signed by the “citizens of the town of 
Webster, Massachusetts, without distinction of party, remonstrating against the passage 
of the bill to organize the Territory of Nebraska” (Congressional Globe 1854, 446). 
Against this array of nearly three dozen petitions, signed by well more than a thousand 
individuals, was a sole petition presented by Sen. Dodge (IA), in favor the bill. This 
petition was signed by one individual, “the Delegate from the Territory of Nebraska,” 
who approved of repealing the Compromise. This petition is itself of questionable 
provenance, as one wonders how the senator came to call this individual a “Delegate” 
from an unorganized territory. Regardless of this oddity, the weight of opinion expressed 
by citizen petitions on February 20 in the Senate, and indeed throughout the deliberations 
more broadly, would not be exaggerated at 1000-1 opposed.149 
 The weight and intensity opposed to the bill overcomes potential defenses of MC 
behavior, and even imperils a key substantive argument made on behalf of the bill. In 
attempting to align itself with a bill responsive to majority input, the Congress may 
                                                 
149 If opinion polling had existed in the 1850s, in no way would opinion have been 1000 or even 10-1, but I 
take this overwhelming margin in terms of petitioning as a good indication of the intensity of preferences 
on this issue. 
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occasionally find itself bombarded with the sentiments of an intense minority, in the face 
of a relatively quiescent majority. If the majority is truly indifferent to a measure, but 
intensely approved or disapproved by a small number of citizens, responding to that 
intensity of preferences may be reasonable. In the 33rd Congress, on the other hand, it was 
demonstrated through days after days of petitions similar to those presented on February 
20, that an overwhelming majority of eastern citizens opposed the bill, with little to no 
organized activity by southern or western citizens in favor of the bill. Thus, even if MCs 
misapprehended the nature of the opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska bill, they had to be 
aware of the lack of interest expressed by citizens and organized constituencies in favor 
of the bill. 
The mere fact of extensive, vociferous and durable protest rendered one 
substantive argument in favor of the bill problematic. On February 20, Sen. Pettit (IN), on 
the same day which had seen so much petition activity directed toward the bill, 
audaciously told his colleagues to “pass this bill…and banish [the question of slavery] 
from these Halls; and bequeath to our successors a peace and tranquility which we have 
never known here, and never shall know until we pass this bill” (Congressional Globe 
Appendix 1854, 218). The only way to accomplish such a comprehensive peace would 
have been to pass a policy that was in acceptable in principle and in fact to the various 
parties and sections of the nation. The actions of ordinary citizens showed MCs in both 
chambers that this bill was most certainly not such a measure, but eastern and western 
Democrats seemed averse to admitting this fact. 
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The lack of responsiveness is even more glaring in the context of the unusual ire 
directed by states at their senators and representatives. The legislature of one state, 
Connecticut, even went so far as to censure one of its own, Sen. Isaac Toucey, because he 
voted for the bill after the state had already sent a memorial opposing its enactment.150 
More typical but just as strongly worded was the joint resolution of the House and Senate 
of New York, which declared the Kansas-Nebraska bill, “an unjust and unworthy 
violation of good faith, and an indignity to the free States of the Union” (Congressional 
Globe 1854, 442). The state legislature thus requested that their MCs strongly oppose that 
measure. Hearing almost uniform tumult from back home and having been requested to 
vote against the measure by their state legislature the behavior of MCs from New York 
would be unaccountable, if not for the perils of partisanship. While both of New York’s 
senators voted against the bill (as they were Northern Whigs), over one third of New 
York representatives voted in favor. Even more favorable were New York Democrats, 
who voted for and against the measure about evenly.151 The margin of final passage was 
so close – thirteen votes – that had these NY representatives followed the revealed 
preferences of their constituents and the recommendations of their state legislature the 
bill would not have passed. 
150 Sen. Toucey, for his part reasonably contended that he had a free choice in voting his conscience on 
bills in Congress as part of “the duty which the sovereign people of the State… had imposed upon [him]” 
(Congressional Globe 1854, 1615). Toucey, a Democrat, added that he was uninterested in the will of a 
legislature governed by the fusion of two parties (the Whigs and the newly forming Republicans) who 
differed from completely. This partisan discounting would be reduplicated in the House with serious 
consequences for eastern and western Democrats. 
151 Not one NY representative who voted for the bill was returned to the 34th Congress. 
201 
Table 4-6: Final Vote on Kansas-Nebraska Act in the House by Region and Party 
Region Eastern Western Southern 
Votes Yea / Votes Nay (Percentage Voting in Favor) 
Party 
Democratic 26 / 53 (49%) 19 / 33 (58%) 55 / 58 (95%) 
Whig and Free 
Soil 
0 / 33 (0%) 0 / 11 (0%) 13 / 20 (65%) 
Source: U.S. House Journal, 33rd Cong., 1st sess., 22 May 1854, 923-924. 
Across the east and west, a similar pattern to New York played out. Even though 
easterners or westerners who were not part of the Democratic Party voted against the bill, 
eastern and western Democrats split evenly for the measure or were even narrowly in 
favor (see Table 4-6). The Democratic Party leadership, including the president, included 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act in the official party platform and subjected dissenters to 
pressure and promises of patronage if they stuck with the party line (Nichols 1956, 210 – 
211). Faced with the choice of responsiveness to their party leaders or their constituents, 
a (narrow) majority western and eastern Democrats favored their party over their voters. 
Given the fact that voters were so engaged, mobilized over this affectively charged issue, 
this decision was ultimately costly electorally for eastern and western Democrats. 
Overall, only 12 Democratic representatives from the east or west returned to the 34th 
Congress, out of a caucus of 94. In the entire Congress the swing against the Democrats 
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amounted to a net loss of 72 seats, an amazingly high number in a House of 
Representatives with only 234 seats. The Kansas-Nebraska Act wrecked the Whig Party, 
which split over the issue of slavery, but also decimated the Democratic Party in the east 
and west. 
In the 33rd Congress the prospective duty to propose, deliberate and vote on 
legislation in a manner responsive to popular (majoritarian) preferences broke down 
under the pressure of sectional and partisan forces. The short terms allotted to 
representatives were designed as a structure to align self-interest with the benefits of 
responsiveness. This electoral connection ought to discourage MCs from passing 
legislation opposed by mobilized majorities in their constituencies. But in some cases, 
MCs partisan behavior becomes so strong and pronounced that the prospective electoral 
connection all but disappeared. The majority of northern and eastern Democrats in the 
33rd Congress certainly exhibited behavior consistent with a belief that party trumps 
popular sentiment. In the elections of the 1850s, only a retrospective version of the 
electoral connection was in evidence, with the remarkable turning out of the Democrats 
from power after they failed to heed the warnings of their angry constituents. 
While this retrospective voting did enforce sanctions against MCs of a party 
deemed out of step with their constituents, several reasons explain why this version of 
responsiveness does not salvage the antebellum Congress from opprobrium. In the first 
place, retrospective voting in a “wave election” is a blunt instrument, ill-suited for 
appropriately rewarding and sanctioning MCs for voting behavior. Many free state 
Democrats who voted against the bill nonetheless were defeated. Out of the 14 western 
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Democrats who voted against the bill only 2 were reelected as Democrats,152 with the 
other 12 seats being lost to opposition parties in the confusing multi-party midterm 
elections of 1854. Breaking with their party to favor the position of their constituents did 
not result in reward. 
Second and more important, some congressional action, when done, is very 
difficult or practically impossible to undo. The Senate was strongly in favor of the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act. Since the House failed to veto this proposal – and gave their 
support to the bill even though it lacked popular support among many of its 
constituencies – voters would be (and were) powerless to overturn it by the next election. 
Selecting opposition MCs in the House elections did not change the massive majority in 
favor of the enactment in the Senate. To be effective in ensuring the responsiveness of 
national policymaking to majority preferences the electoral connection cannot be totally 
retrospective. Simply put, it is easy (in a mechanical sense) for a popular majority to 
block a bill in the House, but it is more difficult for subsequent majorities to repeal a law.  
The House of Representatives as an institution is the only aspect of the constitutional 
edifice of the nation were majority rule is even likely (and it is not guaranteed even 
there). To win repeal of a bill enacted without a mandate (or even against a clear majority 
of the engaged public), subsequent majorities must not only win the House, but also the 
Senate and the presidency to overturn a contentious bill. Even though angry voters turned 
the Democrats out of the House, it was not until 1860 that unified opposition control was 
152 Two addition representatives gained reelection, but only by switching parties! 
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established, leaving a fateful 6-year gap between policy action out of step with national 
majorities and the ability to countermand their actions. 
DEBATE AS EXPRESSIVE RATHER THAN DELIBERATIVE 
 The 33rd Congress was constituted in a dysfunctional manner. While a lack of 
representativeness and responsiveness imperiled policymaking, the legislature was 
afflicted by a compounding difficulty; its norms and rules inhibited “deliberative debate,” 
while incentivizing “expressive speech.”153 The MCs of the mid-1850s did a lot of talking 
on the floor (most assuredly more than today’s MCs), but by and large their discourses 
were not deliberative. Close examination of the Congressional Globe (the mid-nineteenth 
century precursor to the Congressional Record) shows that floor speech was largely 
expressive rather than deliberative. MCs spoke out regarding the concerns of their 
constituents and articulated their values in speeches on the floor of the Senate and the 
House, while engaging in very little give and take with each other over the merits of the 
policy under discussion. And even this large volume of expressive speech was of uneven 
quality. 
Although the mythic image of the Congresses of the nineteenth century (and 
especially the Senate) is one of great statesmen addressing each other (and their 
                                                 
153 While contemporary political science might label this latter term “position taking,” I think this may not 
be the best terminology to describe this legislative behavior. I will describe expressive speech, 
differentiating it from deliberative debate, in the following paragraph. 
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arguments) on the floor (see Tocqueville 1840/2004),154 one finds little evidence of such 
deliberation in the 33rd Congress. Confirming and expanding upon recent analysis of this 
era (see Wirls 2007), I find this low-quality deliberation to be evidence in both chambers, 
but with different root sources of the deliberative deficit.155 The Senate’s rules and norms 
encouraged long disquisitions on the governing philosophies and principles of the 
participants on the floor. These discussions, while sometimes sophisticated, occurred to 
the detriment of substantive exchanges or replies to the arguments of other senators. The 
House’s rules, norms, and size similarly inhibited deliberative debate, by placing a 
premium on parliamentary procedures over responding to the substantive positions of 
argumentative adversaries. Combined with a more informal committee structure than 
Congresses of the twentieth century, this lack of deliberation on the floor meant that there 
was very little public deliberation occurring anywhere in the 33rd Congress. This lack of 
deliberation imperiled the policy products of that institution. 
Clearly and precisely stated, expressive speech, a wholly necessary and valuable 
legislative behavior, crowded out deliberation in 1854, exactly when debate on the merits 
of policy was most needed. But more must be said about the distinction between these 
two sorts of speech. What makes some speech expressive rather than deliberative?  
“Expressive speech” consists of remarks given by MCs to justify their conduct to their 
154 Tocqueville says, of the Senate, “Every word uttered in this assembly would do honor to Europe’s 
greatest parliamentary debates” (1840/2004, 229). 
155 Wirls argues that deliberation in the Senate and the House occurs with relatively similar quality and 
quantity in what is reputed to be the “Golden Age” of the Senate. My analysis goes further, suggesting that 
for the 33rd Congress this similitude consists of a low quality and low quantity of deliberation in each 
Chamber. 
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district (or state) thereby showing that they share the same values as their constituents. 
High quality expressive address is thus valuable in Congress. It can guide civil society 
and can transmit important signals to voters. Expressive speech helps voters determine 
whether to retain the services of their representatives at re-election time, thereby 
increasing the meaningful responsibility of MCs to their constituents. Such utterances can 
also prove to be powerful cultural objects shaping worldviews for the party, section, or 
interest at stake in the speech. Expressive speech can also be characterized by its intended 
audience. Regardless of whom they are formally addressed to, such speech seems largely 
aimed at audiences outside Congress. Indeed, it seems especially likely that MCs of a 
minority party would be incentivized to make such speeches. Commonsensically, 
minority party MCs may aim to talk to citizens at large, rather than their colleagues, 
because of fears that they may not respond in good faith to their arguments. But all MCs 
use at least some of their time on the floor to make expressive speeches. 
Deliberative speech, on the other hand, concerns a debate on the merits of public 
policy with one’s fellow MCs. “Deliberative debate” is directed to materially improving 
the proposition under discussion. For legislatures, an important addendum is necessary to 
this formula. Deliberation in legislatures is “democratic deliberation,” that which occurs 
in public, between equals. The publicity and transparency of democratic deliberation 
ensures that arguments are being made which the MC is willing to stand behind at 
election time. Equality is essential in democratic deliberation, as a simulation and 
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aspiration toward a fully rational debate where the best ideas triumph.156 While this ideal 
is not as frequently attained in the hurly-burly of practical politics, the equality of 
speakers is an important norm which reinforces the idea that arguments ought to be 
investigated for their merit, not for the identity, power or prestige of their proponents (see 
Hamilton et al. 1787/1960, 30). Ideal deliberative debate in legislatures thus proceeds 
through MCs raising constitutional, distributive, normative, or pragmatic arguments for 
or against a given proposition. 
In a healthy Congress, deliberation will proceed down these multiple avenues. In 
most controversial cases, constitutional deliberation will be required. The necessity of 
this kind of deliberation arises from the fact that laws passed by Congress must be 
justified as falling within the confines of the Constitution,157 or risk the Court ruling them 
unconstitutional. Ideal deliberation also occurs across all important cleavages (sections, 
parties, and factions) within the Congress, otherwise the equality of all members of the 
debate would be undermined. Moreover, disproportionate voice given to certain MCs in 
deliberation will likely lead to policymaking incompletely representative of the needs of 
the entire nation.158 MCs must likewise respond to arguments that a given law under 
156 In the ideal, even the mathematics of voting becomes linked to deliberative reasons. If each vote can be 
said to comprehensively speak as a reason, then the winning side in a roll call vote becomes, literally, the 
position with more reasons on its side than the other (see Waldron 1999). 
157 Even viewed as a positive instrument, the document still has limits. 
158 In the 33rd Congress, the informal bargaining and deliberation that occurred off the floor frequently 
contained skewed samples of MCs, very much like those presented in the section on unrepresentative 
committees. It is unsurprising that a “working group” of Senators Douglas and the F Street Mess (all 
southern slaveholders) failed to understand the political costs to eastern Democrats that would be posed by 
their bill, since they failed to include any eastern members in their informal meetings (Malavasic 2014). 
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consideration is unethical, impermissibly regulates morality, or other similar moral 
concerns. While “economism” is sometimes expressed in Congress,159 failing to consider 
issues of normative or ethical valence is incredibly problematic. Congress must consider 
the justice of the bills it proposes, because law poses serious moral obligations – citizens 
must obey the law or face penalty. Finally, MCs proposing a bill must respond to 
critiques that the law is inexpedient or inefficient, because no matter how laudable the 
goal, an ineffective law is a bad one. Defining deliberation in this manner has important 
consequences, the foremost of which is that speech acts are potentially deliberative only 
when addressed to equals – and become “deliberation,” in turn, if and only if those equals 
respond. Deliberation is thus a kind of a conversation, requiring, at minimum, the give 
and take of two equally-situated individuals. 
Expressive speech and deliberative debate are not mutually exclusive. Instead 
each are differentiated by their qualities or affinities as different types of speech acts. The 
most famous debate in American history, the Lincoln-Douglas debates, certainly 
consisted of both expressive and deliberative components. Lincoln and Douglas famously 
addressed each other in their equality as candidates for the Senate,160 traded arguments 
regarding the wisdom, constitutionality, and morality of popular sovereignty, and 
                                                 
159 Even in the First Congress, some MCs sought to evade moral questions. Rep. Ames (MA) said that 
MCs ought, “not to consider ourselves while here [in Congress] at church or school, to listen to the 
harangues of speculative piety; we are to talk to the political interest committed to our charge” (Bickford et 
al 1992, 377). While it is true that Congress is not a church, a school, or an Oxford Union debate, in a 
health legislature MCs would talk of more than the mere political interests committed to their charge. 
160 In 1858, Lincoln and Douglas were in fact not equals, as Douglas was a sitting senator and the leading 
candidate for President at the next election. But their debates were staged as if they were equals, where 
each speaker received the same amount of time, and Douglas received no special rights based on his status 
as Senator. 
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provided substantive and sophisticated declarations on behalf of important values they 
expected their constituents to share. It is not always possible, however, to combine 
expressive speech with deliberative debate, as certain expressive appeals effectively 
militate against true deliberation over arguments, rather than mutual recrimination. If one 
alleges that one’s opponents are criminals, agitators, or disloyal enemies of the common 
good, one’s opponents are unlikely to respond in good faith to those arguments.161 While 
deliberation will likely contain expressive components (for instance a declaration by an 
MC that their constitutional claim is not only sound, but also just and valued by his 
constituents), it is easy to see that expressive speech will often have no deliberative 
component at all. 
Another consequence of conceptualizing deliberation as involving a conversation 
is that speech delivered in a manner conducive to deliberation may instead remain merely 
expressive if the equal to whom one addresses one’s argument does not respond to it. 
Expressive speech can be done by any individual in a society, and indeed it need not 
occur in Congress at all. Deliberative debate, on the other hand, requires multiple 
participants. The democratic version of deliberation is in fact best housed in Congress, 
out of all possible venues in political or civil society.  In our national lawmaking 
institution equality is enforced (to the maximum extent possible) through an equality of 
voting power. Unlike in the society at large, equality is rather strictly enforced. 
                                                 
161 Potter argues that the opponents of the Kansas-Nebraska Act were especially likely to make such 
claims, “attacking the defenders of slavery not on the merits or demerits of their position, but on the 
grounds that they were vicious, dishonest, and evil” (1976, 163 – 164). 
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Representatives of rich district and poor districts, as well as senators of large and small 
states, possess equal voting power in their respective houses. This equality is sometimes 
even enhanced further, as it is in the modern Senate, with requirements for unanimous 
consent to proceed. 
The upshot of this abstract distinction bears on institutional design: A healthy 
congress will structure rules, enforce norms, and provide rules that maximize the 
opportunity for democratic deliberation in Congress. In some sense, Congress need not 
concern itself with expressive speech. The modern political science literature on 
“position-taking” well articulates the existence of incentives guaranteeing the existence 
of this type of speech (see Mayhew 1987, 23). Deliberation, on the other hand, requires 
MCs to respond to rivals in Congress whom they may find distasteful or even repugnant, 
and to respond substantively to their arguments. This difference necessitates the 
construction of structures or norms to incentivize deliberative speech, while discouraging 
(or at least not overtly encouraging) speech addressed exclusively to outside actors. 
Unfortunately, the 33rd Congress saw most opportunities for deliberative debate 
lost through a structuring of debate around rules, norms and practices that discouraged 
exchange of ideas. While it is true that some speeches debating the Kansas and Nebraska 
Act were of a generally high-toned quality (and perhaps more sophisticated than 
contemporary legislative address), these disquisitions were largely delivered and received 
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as expressive speeches.162 Deliberation occurred with relative infrequency and with 
considerable pathologies, leading to antagonistic and ad hominem attacks on rival MCs. 
When MCs did engage in deliberation with each other, they frequently began deliberating 
over a value, or more frequently their interlocutor’s betrayal of a value, sidestepping 
debate on the merits of the concrete proposal under investigation. 
The structure of the debate in the Senate nearly guaranteed a disproportionate 
amount of pure self-expression from senators. From January 30 to March 3, 1854, the 
debate on the Senate floor was structured by giving each senator unlimited time to debate 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The functional result of this structure was not, however, 
unconstrained and free-wheeling debate. Instead, unlimited speaking time paired with a 
limited number of hours on the floor per day devoted to the bill resulted in a de facto 
limit on speaking time. Senators were limited to speaking for around three hours, because 
most speeches were interrupted by the end of the legislative day. Indeed, the time of day 
became an issue since the Senate continued working on other issues throughout the time 
it was debating the Kansas and Nebraska Act. The Senate would turn to the Kansas-
Nebraska Act only at the end of a relatively long day of floor activity. Giving each 
senator unlimited time to “debate” thus ensured, in many cases, that one multi-hour 
speech was delivered by a senator on the floor, with little or no response from opponents. 
162 The expressive remarks are indeed impressive rhetorically. Sen. Douglas, for instance, provided a 
formal statement of the Democratic Party platform as it was slated to apply to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. 
“That principle to which the Democracy are pledged, not merely by the Baltimore platform, but by a higher 
and a more solemn obligation, to which they are pledged by the love and affection which they have for that 
great fundamental principle of Democracy and free institutions which lies at the basis of our creed, and 
gives every political community the right to govern itself in obedience to the Constitution of the country” 
(Congressional Globe 1854, 280). 
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Systematically combing The Congressional Globe (and its Appendix), it is evident that 
expressive rather than deliberative speech dominated the debates over the Kansas-
Nebraska Act (see Table 4-7). 
Table 4-7: Senate Deliberations on Kansas-Nebraska Act, January 30 – March 3, 1854 
Summary Statistic No. of Speakers No. of Speeches Substantive Interactions 
Median 5 1 0 
Mode 5 3 0 
Average 7.1 2.6 2 
Average for      
Jan 30 – Mar 1 
6 1.3 0.6 
Average for     
Mar 2 – March 3 
15 15 15 
Total N/A163 55 41 
Source: Cong. Globe, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 275-532. (1854). Data collection scheme given in text. 
Given the definition promulgated above, institutional health on the dimension of 
deliberation ought to be evaluated both quantitatively and qualitatively. One can certainly 
count the number of speakers who discoursed on the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the number 
163 A sum of all speakers would lead to significant double-counting. It appears that all senators who wished 
to speak on the bill could do so. This was likely the only area in which the Senate achieved ideal 
democratic deliberation. 
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of speeches (whether prepared or impromptu) given, and the number of substantive 
interactions between MCs on each day of debate. A speech is defined as a set of remarks 
of any quality that treats the Kansas Nebraska Act while taking up at least one column in 
the Globe. Each column of the Globe has around 80 – 85 lines with 7 or eight words a 
line, for around 600 words. Such a length likely corresponded to a speaking time of five 
to seven minutes. A substantive interaction is defined as a response from one MC to 
another refuting or supporting an argument given by another speaker. Personal attacks 
(“that MC is lying or is defaming me,” etc.) are not counted as substantive interactions, as 
deliberation is focused on arguments not persons. Systematic analysis also allows a 
binary categorization of each day: were opposing views on the merits of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act exchanged on that day of deliberation or not? 
The results of quantitative investigation are not auspicious for the quality debate 
in the “world’s greatest deliberative body.”  In the Senate, only one third of the days 
devoted to debate (7 out of 21) saw an exchange of views on the merits of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act. The most typical pattern, by far, was the Senate moving to set aside their 
current work and hear debate on the question of the territories bill, having the president of 
the Senate recognize a speaker for (or against) the bill, and then the presentation of a long 
discourse on the bill. At the end of this discourse several senators would move for the 
Senate to adjourn, and this motion would generally be successful. One interesting feature 
of the debate is that for the first 19 days of “deliberation” there was very little democratic 
deliberation. Sustained, substantive deliberation only occurred on the last two days of 
debate. 
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Given the sparseness of deliberation, as compared to mere speech, it is 
unsurprising that that short burst of deliberation did not fully (or even partially) address 
the substantive difficulties found in the bill. Qualitative analysis of the legislative floor 
speeches of the last two days reveals that pathologies of deliberation continued, even as 
the Senate floor could finally be characterized as a site of debate. Turning to qualitative 
investigation of only two-day span is useful because it aids in economy of presentation. If 
even the most intense days of debate included many exchanges on subjects other than the 
merits of the policy, surely the other days were likely to include the same or lower quality 
deliberation. 
The Congressional Globe (and its Appendix) shows clear evidence of deliberative 
debate during the last two days, but it was not sustained. This scattershot, and often low-
quality debate, mostly exhibited a style of discourse emphasizing honor, scoring 
quibbling points, and debating high rhetorical subjects, rather than matters of potential 
constitutionality, efficacy, or the merit of the bill under consideration. Indeed, one 
common way that deliberative exchanges were sidetracked was through the 
overdeveloped sense of self-respect that seemed to compel speakers to exercise a kind of 
“right of reply” when words had been spoken that they felt unduly insulted their honor. 
Amid what was becoming a very substantive discussion regarding the legal consequences 
of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise,164 a southern senator took great umbrage to 
164 The specific matter under discussion was whether repealing the Missouri Compromise would 
immediately put French laws in favor of slavery back into force in the territory (Congressional Globe 
Appendix 1854, 290 – 291). 
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“threats” made against slaveholding interests. Sen. Butler (SC) expressed outrage at 
claims that northerners may stop enforcing the fugitive slave clause because of the repeal 
of the Missouri Compromise, stating that his blood boiled at the attempts made to 
humiliate the south (Congressional Globe Appendix 1854, 292). The angry set of 
denunciations expressed by Sen. Butler, led his interlocutor, Sen. Walker of Wisconsin, 
to request an apology, which he did not receive. Shortly thereafter, the two senators 
commenced arguing about whether one had impugned the honor of the other, drawing the 
discussion far away from the bill at hand. This digression took up five full columns of the 
Globe, likely taking nearly half an hour (292-293).  
Personal replies were not the only aspects of debate that led senators away from a 
high-quality investigation of the merits of the bill. As noted above, constitutional 
deliberation is one type of necessary discourse for MCs debating controversial bills. 
During a constitutional debate over the power of Congress to regulate slavery in the 
territories, a key topic, senators revealed a preference for needling and quibbling with one 
another rather than responding in good faith to the claims made by interlocutors. While 
one certainly would not expect senators to renounce a chance to win a debate, their 
interactions evinced a lack of argumentative good faith. The main speaker on this 
question on the final of debate was Sen. Fessenden, who argued that Congress clearly 
possessed the power to regulate (and prohibit) slavery in the territory. He referenced the 
clause in the Constitution which stated that “the Congress shall have power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States” (Art. I, Sec. 3). Speaking about this clause Sen. 
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Fessenden spoke of the power to regulate the territories, and two senators interrupted him 
at three different occasions to insist that the Constitution only speaks of territory, not 
territories. On the other hand, they did not answer Sen. Fessenden at all when he asked 
them, “What does the expressions mean ‘to make all needful rules and regulations?’” 
(Congressional Globe Appendix 1854, 322). By quibbling over plural versus singular 
nouns, not explaining the significance of why this should matter, and refusing to respond 
to clearly expressed questions in debate, Sen. Fessenden’s interlocutors showed an 
interest in poking fun of a speaker for allegedly making mistakes, rather than 
substantively persuading him to their view of the Constitution. 
Finally, many of the debates of the last two days failed to turn on questions 
regarding the merits of the bill at all, instead turning primarily on the meaning of the 
Declaration of Independence and the proper historical interpretation of past events. These 
debates were matters of interest, but given the importance in determining whether the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act would function to successfully organize the territory and resolve 
standing sectional grievances, this retrospective rather than prospective focus was 
somewhat questionable. On the final day of debate, senators took time to debate the 
history of the territories of the United States, in general terms seemingly disconnected 
from the question of what to do about Kansas or Nebraska (Congressional Globe 
Appendix 1854, 315). 
More perplexing (but simultaneously illuminating) was the debate on this same 
day regarding the literal truth of the Declaration of Independence. Sen. Wade (OH) was 
discoursing on individual rights and the incompatibility of slavery with individual rights 
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when he was interrupted by two other senators. Sen. Butler (SC) quizzed him over 
whether the terms of the Declaration meant that “a negro [was] equal to a white man” in 
Ohio (311). This inquiry was put to embarrass the Senator from Ohio, as the record 
confirms that laughter broke out in the chamber at the putting of that question.  
The Senator from South Carolina was not the only person interrupting the Senator from 
Ohio. He was stopped by another interlocutor, who wished to debate the meaning and 
significance of the Declaration. Sen. Pettit, rose to argue with Sen. Wade, saying that he 
took issue with the claim that “all men are created equal… with certain inalienable 
rights.” Instead, Petit suggested that all rights are alienable, and that there was no human 
or governmental duty to protect equality under the law or otherwise (311).165 Even as 
matters of substantive debate, these points of inquiry were not designed to enlighten. Sen. 
Pettit, said that “would have no quarrel with anyone on the subject, if the language had 
been that all men ought to have been born equal,” but then proceeded to quarrel with Sen. 
Wade when he said he could accept that construction of the Declaration. Sen. Petit, 
explaining his continued contrariety said, “I mean to say what I think” (311). 
The informal norms of the Senate gave rise to such debate, that which lacked a 
substantive relationship to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, not necessarily because they led to a 
lack of comity or civility, but instead because of an explicitly stated contention that the 
purpose of debate was expression. Indeed, Senate leaders made clear that the purpose of 
                                                 
165 Pettit said, instead, that he must leave the task of making men equal “to the Almighty. I cannot do that” 
(311). This comment was only following up on a previous speech where he said, without contradiction by 
other senators, that he held the Declaration, “to be a self-evident lie” (214). 
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the debate was primarily expressive, when they affirmatively expressed the view that the 
point of debate was to let “enemies of the bill” air grievances before final passage of the 
bill. While allowing opponents to express themselves is superior to the complete closing 
of debate (or a gag rule), norms such as these foreclosed the possibility, in advance, that 
the opponents of the bill might have good arguments against the bill’s constitutionality, 
efficacy or morality. Senator Douglas (IL), who was unquestionably the Kansas-
Nebraska Act’s manager, spoke explicitly to this norm during his “opening statement,” 
explaining how he would run debate: 
I am in favor of giving every enemy of the bill the most ample time. Let us 
hear them all patiently, and then take the vote and pass the bill. We who 
are in favor of it know that the principle on which it is based is right. Why 
then should we gratify the Abolition party in their effort to get up another 
political tornado of fanaticism, and put the country again in peril, merely 
for the purpose of electing a few agitators to the Congress of the United 
States (Congressional Globe 1854, 280, emphasis added). 
The Senator of Illinois’s words spoke volumes about the attitude expressed toward debate 
in the 33rd Congress. The bill would be the subject of no deliberative debate at all. Instead 
the proponents of the bill would patiently suffer the “Abolition party” and then go on to 
pass a bill which they know unquestionably is right. The structuring of debate, whereby 
most speech was not even responded to, shows clear evidence of conforming to this 
stated norm. And while one can understand the conviction of senators who already had 
strong value commitments and were unlikely to be swayed by arguments that those 
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principles were wrong or immoral, it seems quite culpable to foreclose in advance the 
possibility that a bill would, on its own principles, prove to be disastrous and wrong-
headed. 
The low quality and quantity of deliberation in the Senate could not be rectified in 
the House. Given its size at well over two hundred members, House rules prioritized 
limiting the length of speeches to ensure the ability for more speakers to speak. Also, 
debates in the House (true to its twentieth and twenty-first century image), featured 
parliamentary wrangling over rules, rather than substantive debate. Other than ensuring 
that speakers where given an opportunity, no attempt was made to order the one-hour 
speeches into deliberative debate. It was not uncommon in the House debate to hear the 
same side of a speech redoubled or even tripled. On April 26, 3 speeches in a row were 
given against the Kansas-Nebraska Act with virtually no feedback from other MCs 
(Congressional Globe 1854, 1002 – 1003). Many members in the House spoke, but their 
debates raged regarding the rules of debate and policing speakers’ time. 
One prominent example of this phenomena was the address given by Missouri 
Representative Thomas Hart Benton. Presenting a rich and layered speech on the 
constitutional status of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, he suggested that there was something 
unmanly about that enactment’s abdication of congressional responsibilities. Rep. Benton 
brought to light many of the substantive constitutional arguments that are addressed in 
the final section of this chapter. Yet, Benton’s colleagues not benefit from this speech, at 
least not in their deliberative capacities. Rep. Benton, channeling his memory of his days 
in the Senate, prepared a speech that was longer than could be given in the allotted time. 
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Once he reached the end of his time, the next speaker, Rep. Wentworth (IL) sought to 
yield some of his time to the Rep. Benton so that he might finish. Benton’s transgression 
and Wentworth’s action produced a scene of disorder as many of the bill’s allies rose to 
object to allowing Benton to break House rules (They also were certainly not eager to 
grant Benton more time to expound his cogent arguments against the bill). The speaker 
on Benton’s side in debate was able, after some searching, to find a parliamentary rule in 
his favor; one which dictated that a new speakers list was created when an amendment to 
an amendment was made. He thus created a meaningless amendment to the bill to create 
the opportunity for Benton to talk. The opponents of Benton strenuously objected to this 
artifice, but Wentworth was persistent and was upheld by the chair (Congressional Globe 
1854, 988-9). Rep. Benton thus took the floor again and finished his address. But the 
debate over the yielding of additional time to the Representative had proceeded across 
more than six columns of the globe, no doubt taking more than thirty minutes. After 
Benton finished speaking, the House adjourned. With adjournment, and no one picking 
up where Benton left off on the succeeding day, what might have been the first address in 
a fine deliberative exchange was converted to mere expressive speech. The history books 
received Rep. Benton’s perspicacious speech, but it was not the subject of debate in the 
House. 
 In sum, the rules and norms on the floor of Congress (in both chambers) restricted 
the possibility of deliberative exchange and inhibited the revelation of important 
problems of constitutionality and efficacy in the bill. As Rep. Benton’s speech showed, 
these flaws did not require the hindsight of history to discover. The rules, structures, and 
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norms seemed to be set up to maximize the chance of each member of Congress to have 
their say, rather than to the maximize the deliberative capacities of the body. While this is 
initially understandable from a standpoint of an MC who is literal single-minded seeker 
of reelection (see Mayhew 1987), it was ultimately hurtful even when viewed in terms of 
the narrow self-interest of MCs. Members were denied access to information that would 
properly apprise them of the quality of the bill they were debating, and the likelihood that 
passing said bill would make their own reelection a truly perilous prospect. The 
reelection chances of Senator Pettit (as well many of his fellow Democrats) were not well 
served by the passage of this bill, no matter how open the floor was to self-expression, as 
his (and their) incumbency came to a sudden end with the election of 1854. 
CONCLUSION: AN ABDICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
In the 33rd Congress the rules and norms governing debate, unrepresentative 
organizational structures and partisan behavioral norms all placed the legislature in a 
dangerous position: one which maximized the chance of experiencing the substantive 
failure. This hazardous condition was not noted, however, by proponents of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act. They contended that it was in fact the institution of Congress that caused 
or exacerbated political conflict over the problem of slavery. The strategy suggested by 
this premise was the doctrine of congressional noninterference in the territories (also 
known as popular sovereignty). By permanently removing the topic of slavery from the 
halls of Congress, thereby delegating it to the inhabitants of the territories (and future 
states), the hope was that sectional strife could be avoided. While the principle of non-
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interference was a pleasing one from the perspective of reelection-seeking politicians,166 
Congress failed when it passed a law formed on a flawed and unconstitutional 
prospective principle, by focusing its efforts on a clear attempt to avoid responsibility for 
decision-making, and pursuing a policy which, viewed even on its own terms, was self-
defeating. Ultimately, the Kansas-Nebraska Act was inimical to the spirit and the letter of 
the existing U.S. Constitution, was thus founded on an act of abdication, and it even 
failed to be effectual as it was predictably unsuccessful in removing such agitation from 
the congressional agenda. 
 The Constitution of the United States, by both its letter and spirit, was 
inconsistent with the doctrine of congressional noninterference. By passing the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, proponents of the bill said that they sought to show neutrality, holding that 
this doctrine did “not mean to put slavery in or out of any State or Territory” 
(Congressional Globe Appendix 1854, 559 – 560).  The bill’s detractors were unmoved. 
“To that polite abnegation,” Rep. Benton replied that, “it is an abdication of constitutional 
power and duty; it being the right of Congress to legislate upon slavery in the territories, 
and its duty to do so when there is occasion for it—as in 1787 and 1820” (559 – 560).167 
The Constitution explicitly gave Congress plenary control over the territories of the 
United States, when it declared that “the Congress shall have power to dispose of and 
                                                 
166 One campaign-oriented benefit of the principle was that it placed their opponents in the position of 
defending Congress and congressional interference, a prospect never greatly desired by an MC. 
167 Rep. Benton elaborated this view as follows: “The States in Congress are the guardians of the 
Territories, and are bound to exercise guardianship; and cannot abdicate it without a breach of trust and 
dereliction of duty. Territorial sovereignty is a monstrosity, born of timidity and ambition…” (559). 
223 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States” (Art. I, Sec. 3). Furthermore, the theory of the “extended 
republic” (Hamilton et al. 1787/1960, 76 and 322) on which the Constitution was 
founded, suggested the straightforward results of trying to delegate this power to the 
inhabitants of the territories. Simply put, localities and smaller political bodies are more 
likely to resolve conflict in a factious manner than the entire polity, because of the 
smaller number of interests comprehended within their limited “sphere.” The 33rd 
Congress disregarded this principle, provoking political and armed conflict in Kansas. 
Such a constitutional abdication also had important secondary characteristics, 
especially an abdication of constitutional responsibilities promoted by the President and 
party operatives, leading to attacks on the institution of Congress. An operative principle 
of our constitutional order is the presumption that political actors will zealously guard 
their power against diminishment by actors outside their institution (cf. Hamilton et al. 
1787/1960, 319). This assumption is especially important role in Congress, as that 
institution will face numerous critics in society, as its laws and partisan operation will 
inevitably grate against some large portion of the citizenry. If the majority of MCs join 
others in Congress-bashing, this can lead to a decay in the institution’s capabilities. When 
Congress delegates its power to others, no similarly situated institution is left in the 
society to defend its place. Rep. Benton warned that, “This House will have fallen far 
below its constitutional mission, if it suffers itself to be governed by authority [The 
President], or dragooned by its own hirelings [party papers and operatives]” 
(Congressional Globe Appendix 1854, 557). Benton argued that the role of an MC was 
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instead to “vindicate [Congress’s] privileges, protect its respectability, and maintain it in 
the high place for which it was intended—the master branch of American government” 
(557).168 The Congress did not follow Benton’s request; to recall, it failed to even discuss 
it. Rather it delegated national policy setting powers to the territorial inhabitants of 
Kansas and Nebraska. 
The final problem for the advocates of congressional noninterference was the self-
defeating nature of that proposition. Since Congress would ultimately accept state 
constitutions or reject them, the problem of slavery would arise again, in all controversial 
cases, as soon as the question of statehood arose. In only a few short years, proslavery 
forces in Lecompton, Kansas would support and send a state constitution to the Congress 
for approval, requiring Congress to act affirmatively to accept or reject a new slave state 
into the union (Stampp 1990, 290).  Hindsight was not required to note this problem. 
Rep. Benton pointed out that the, “principle of non-intervention is but the principle of 
contention—a bone given to the people to quarrel and fight over every election, and at 
every meeting of their Legislature, until they become a State government. Then, and then 
only, can they settle the question” (560). 
The ability to reject the principle as untenable on its own merits is important. 
MCs from the south, and important leaders from the west such as Senators Douglas and 
168 Rep. Benton also objected to the manner in which the Missouri Compromise was repealed, through the 
declaration that it was to be henceforth “inoperative and void,” rather than straight-forwardly saying it was 
repealed. While this terminology was written to appeal to MCs who held that the original Compromise was 
unconstitutional and those who viewed it as superseded by the Compromise of 1850, it was certainly 
indirect. Benton objected, “to this shilly-shally, willy-won’ty, don’ty-can’ty style of legislation. It is not 
legislative. It is not parliamentary. It is not manly. It is not womanly. No woman would talk that way… It is 
one thing or the other with them; and what they say they stick to” (560). 
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Cass, were confident that the reading of the Constitution described above is wrong. Their 
reasoning suggested that such a reading unjustly removed the power of local self-
governance from territorial inhabitants. But it would and should have been possible to 
persuade MCs to see that congressional non-interference could not be successfully 
upheld, at least not within the frame of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The Constitutional 
abdication of the majority of the 33rd Congress (and thus the Congress as an institution) 
set the precedent for further abdication in deferring to the President in matters related to 
the territories later in the decade, and in the doleful attempt to have the Supreme Court 
resolve the problem (Stampp 1990, 87).169 While maximally representative committees, 
significantly more robust deliberation, and responsiveness to citizen preferences would 
not have guaranteed successful resolution of this issue, it would have at least given a 
chance for ideas such as those of Benton (a Missourian, who was no radical abolitionist) 
to positively improve the bill. Alas, no substantive response to Benton’s speech in the 
House was made. Instead a debate raged over whether he ought to be allowed to talk for 
75 rather than 60 minutes. This substitution of procedural wrangling for substantive 
debate starkly illuminates the Congress’s failure to deliberate. 
In labeling the 33rd Congress a failure it is important to remember that its chief 
product, the Kansas-Nebraska Act was worse than futile, as it “accomplished nothing that 
                                                 
169 The attempt to get the Supreme Court to settle the problem of slavery was surely foredoomed to failure 
based on the even more unrepresentative nature of the Court relative to the views of political society at 
large (i.e. it was even more pro-slavery than the already skewed Senate). The Supreme Court in the Dred 
Scott case consisted of “five proslavery southern Democrats, two northern Democrats, one northern Whig, 
and one northern Republican” (Stampp 1990, 86). 
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anyone intended and a great deal that no one intended” (Potter 1976, 173, 176). While the 
bill was ostensibly intended to provide for sectional peace, sectional tensions were 
inflamed by its debate and passage. One chief aim of its proponents was to swiftly 
generate the groundwork for a transcontinental railroad, but none could be built until 
sectional animosity abated. And most importantly, while the bill was designed to remove 
the topic of slavery from the halls of Congress, slavery and then civil rights for the 
freedmen dominated the agenda of Congress for the next twenty years. With respect to 
the last goal, contemporary observers and participants were incredulous. Rep. Benton 
stated that, “we are told [that the aim of the bill] it is to keep the question of slavery out 
of Congress! To keep slavery out of Congress! Great God! It was out of Congress! … 
The question was settled, and done with. There was not an inch square of territory in the 
Union on which it could be raised without a breach of compromise.” (Congressional 
Globe Appendix 1854, 560). While abolitionists would certainly not agree with the idea 
that the issue of slavery was settled, his narrow claim with respect to the legal status of 
the territories seems simply correct. 
The mere fact that ruling factions within Congress even aimed to promote such 
ends through such questionable means reflected a disordered approach to lawmaking. 
Citizen response to the proposal immediately showed that sectional peace could not be 
achieved by the Kansas-Nebraska Act; its second aim, if meant to be achieved by the bill, 
was certainly not present within the text of the enactment, and therefore did not come to 
pass. Unchastened, proponents sought to “keep slavery out of Congress,” an end certainly 
ill-considered with respect to promoting the general welfare. The Congress, as venue of 
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democratic deliberation, is designed to pose, debate and resolve the conflicts roiling our 
society. The intentional choice to delegate national policymaking power to local 
institutions and communities not yet even formed had the regrettable but predictable 
effect of encouraging strife and bloodshed in Kansas. A healthy national legislature 
would have been much less likely to establish such a policy. A healthy Congress would 
have been responsive to the outcry of citizens opposed to such an eventuality, open to 
deliberation over the very questionable merits of “congressional noninterference,” and 
well-structured to develop representative accounts of the potential political fallout of such 
a policy. In fairness, even a healthy Congress likely would have struggled to conquer the 
scourge of slavery; but the 33rd Congress was nothing of the sort. 
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Chapter Five: The New Deal (73rd) Congress of the First Hundred Days 
At the opening of the 73rd Congress, meeting in March 1933, conditions 
prevailing in the nation were grim. Virtually every bank in the nation was closed. 
Deflation in the price of agricultural and industrial products was combined with 
decreasing wages, hurting producer and consumer alike.170 “Government of all kinds … 
faced … serious curtailment of income; the means of exchange [were] frozen in the 
currents of trade; the withered leaves of industrial enterprise [lay] on every side; farmers 
[could] find no markets for their produce; the savings of many years in thousands of 
families [were wiped out]” (Roosevelt 1933, 5). Further and more importantly, “a host of 
unemployed citizens [were faced] with the grim problem of existence, and an equally 
great number [toiled] with little return. Only a foolish optimist [could] deny the dark 
realities of [that] moment” (5). In a comprehensive sense, the Great Depression saw the 
worst conditions prevailing in the United States since the years of the Civil War. 
No mere stress test of the American polity alone, the Depression placed a 
tremendous strain on nations across the globe. With the fall of the Weimar Republic in 
1933 marking an unabating world-wide economic and political crisis, social 
commentators suggested that liberal democracy was itself to blame. Liberal democracies, 
it was said, “were too pusillanimous to challenge … dictatorships, too effete to mobilize 
their citizens, and too enthralled with free markets to manage a modern economy [and its 
170 Statistical measures of economic health were poor, both in the United States and across the 
industrialized world. In the United States GDP had declined by nearly 26 percent from 1929 levels, while 
aggregate stock market prices had declined around 70 percent. Deflation in wholesale prices, based on a 
weighted average of 17 industrialized nations, led to price level of 71.7 (with 100 pegged at prices in 1929) 
(Crafts and Fearon 2013, 1-2). 
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business cycles] successfully” (Katznelson 2013, 7). No less figure than Il Duce, Italian 
Dictator Benito Mussolini (1935, 10), claimed that constitutional democracy was being 
“deserted by the people who feel [it is leading] the world to ruin.” President Roosevelt 
(1933, 6) gave yet more credence to the notion of world-wide crisis in his inaugural 
address when he labeled the United States: “a stricken Nation in the midst of a stricken 
world”. 
While Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the executive branch exerted tremendous 
effort in responding to this challenge, “The legislature remained an effective center of 
political life” (Katznelson 2013, 20). In the chapter that follows, I show that that 
legislative norms, rules and procedures helped Congress of the Hundred Days to promote 
the general welfare, even in the gravest crisis to face modernity.171 Though contemporary 
works such as Relic and The Executive Unbound contend that the Congress is too 
parochial, slow, or partisan to respond to the emergencies that typify modernity, the New 
Deal Congress stands out as a glaring refutation of this thesis. In the 73rd Congress, MCs 
responded to an energetic and expressed popular consensus in favor of emergency 
measures to combat the Great Depression. Further, the Senate operated as designed, 
closely examining and proposing amendments to the plan of action adopted by the House 
at the urging of the President. At critical moments the Congress even moved beyond (or 
against) what was requested by the President. The New Deal Congress was generally 
171 My argument buttresses Katznelson’s contention that one of the New Deals achievements was “the 
demonstration that liberal democracy, a political system with a legislature at is heart, could effectively 
govern in the face of great danger” (2013, 6). 
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successful in framing policy that was representative of the increasingly disparate interests 
of labor, industry, finance, and farmers. Even so, its full representativeness was 
compromised by a continuing failure to minister to the welfare of black Americans and 
an over-reliance on the views of individual expert legislators.  
Canvasing the success of the 73rd Congress in structuring a responsive and 
deliberative, and (somewhat) representative lawmaking process is the task of this chapter. 
Before doing so, I defend the selection of the Congress of 1933 for analysis in the context 
of the overall purpose of this study: developing an account of congressional health 
relevant across the course of American political development. After this preamble, I show 
that MCs and congressional leaders, especially of the majority party in the House, greatly 
streamlined ordinary legislative procedures to respond to exigent crisis, marking an 
important use of Congress’s constitutional authorization to set its own rules. Continuing 
to investigate attributes of the lawmaking process, I demonstrate that streamlining 
occurred only to a point; the Senate nevertheless continued to uphold the norm that the 
Congress be deliberative. In its deliberations over the measures needed to prevent a 
reoccurrence of the Great Depression, for instance, MCs settled on deposit insurance as a 
critical measure to ensure that a bank-run would never again threaten the nation’s 
economy (Chamberlain 1946). Congressional experts on banking, Sen. Glass (D-VA) and 
Rep. Steagall (D-AL), pushed this enactment through in the absence of presidential 
support, illustrating the importance (as well as the limitations of) individual legislative 
leadership in Congress.  Finally, the 73rd Congress’s attempts to structure a representative 
lawmaking process are surveyed, leading to a mixed evaluation of Congress as striving 
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to, but incompletely meeting its responsibility to broadly bring to bear the views and 
interests of important sectors of American society. Congress sought to bring diverse 
economic interests into the fold when deliberating over pivotal bills such as NIRA, while 
measures such as a federal anti-lynching bill continued to fall short of even being 
considered on the floor of either Chamber. In spite of its general obligation to enforce and 
uphold the 14th Amendment, the Congress remained unmoved, solidly overrepresenting 
Southern minority interests (Katznelson 2013, 166). 
CASE STUDY C – THE TEST OF MODERNITY AMIDST CRISIS 
Understanding the institution of Congress (and developing standards that are 
applicable to Congress over its entire history) requires one to move beyond the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Publius claimed the United States Constitution was designed 
not only for the needs of 1787, but also to meet the challenges of remote futurity. It is 
incumbent upon the analyst to take this possibility seriously but not credulously. 
Considering the Constitution and its fundamental institutions, like Congress, in this light 
requires testing it against some degree of empirical reality.172 Congress must then be 
examined in an epoch when it faces an agenda far different from that of the 1790s. Prima 
facie, it seems logical to assume that modern conditions, technology, and the expanded 
agenda caused by industrialization, urbanization, and globalization may affect the quality 
of congressional health or functionality. Intuition suggests that the potential effects of 
172 One must also remain open to the hypothesis that the Constitution was not successful in meeting 
responding to the needs of remote futurity. That task, after all, is a difficult one. 
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modernity might be negative, whether a growing agenda overwhelming the parallel 
processing capabilities of the institution, or technology reducing the distance between 
constituent and MC to detriment of deliberation, or any number of other hypothesized 
effects. 
These intuitions drive one to seek cases in the twentieth century; if instances of 
congressional functionality exist in modernity, such cases could aid in the development 
of standards of congressional health tremendously. Given the complexity of the agenda 
and the likely increased difficulty of the task, any example of health is more probative: 
those Congresses are clearly robust in a way that is indicative of institutional health. 
Further, when casting about for such cases, one might test conception of congressional 
health advanced in this work by “loading the dice” yet further against congressional 
success. One can do so by looking at one of the crises or emergencies which seem 
increasingly typical in modernity. If the Congress is able, by exhibiting the characteristics 
of congressional health highlighted here, to serve as the key actor in meeting the 
emergency, so much more should we expect a healthy Congress to be able to handle the 
more ordinary conditions of contemporary political life. 
For these reasons an examination of the Congress of the Hundred Days (of 1933) 
seems especially useful for illustrating and evaluating Congress under the conditions of 
modernity. Especially due to its common reputation, even among scholars (see Rossiter 
1960, Schlesinger 1958), as a rubberstamp Congress which added little to emergency 
measures proposed by President Roosevelt, closely studying this institution holds great 
promise. If all that Congress added to FDR’s plan of action were delay, disruption, or 
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incoherent compromises, then it might well be the case that the standards arising from the 
Constitution would be relevant only to an earlier and simpler age. While such phrasing 
appears strident, one ought to keep in mind that it was not an unreasonable to fear the 
obsolescence of the Constitution and the Congress which it structures. President 
Roosevelt himself worried about his fellows in Congress. In his inaugural address he 
remarked that he would take action on his own if Congress failed to act promptly 
(Katznelson 2013, 121). Such a promise (or threat) takes very seriously the possibility of 
congressional failure. 
In our time, considering the possibility of inherent congressional inefficacy is yet 
more significant. Indeed, several contemporary works (Howell and Moe 2016, Posner 
and Vermeule 2010, Mayer and Canon 1999) present the thesis that the modern Congress 
is constitutionally incapable of promoting a national, general interest.173 The reputed 
causes for congressional failure in the present are legion, including its lack of dispatch, its 
parochial nature, its decentralized and reputedly irresponsible internal processes, or 
factional wrangling. These concerns must be factored in to any conception of 
congressional health that attempts to evaluate contemporary Congresses, rather than just 
judge those from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Consider one argument in particular: In their book Relic, William Howell and 
Terry Moe argue that Congress is simply not capable of delivering the coherent and 
173 The general scope of each argument is different, although the conclusion is the same. Howell and Moe 
argue that the Constitution was always ill-structured to produce good public policy, while Posner and 
Vermeule imply that this is a problem primarily emerging in modernity. Mayer and Canon present an 
account, based on a rational choice model, that the incentives operating on Congress make it permanently 
dysfunctional. 
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responsible policy necessary to meet the challenges of modernity. Summarizing their 
view, the authors say that: 
The founders crafted a government some 225 years ago for a simple 
agrarian society of four million people. Government wasn’t expected to do 
much, and they purposely designed a byzantine government that couldn’t 
do much. Compounding matters, they put Congress right at the center of 
the lawmaking process, and their design ensured that legislators would be 
tied to their states and districts and responsive to special interests. 
Congress is not wired to solve national problems in the national interest. It 
is wired to allow parochial legislators to promote their own political 
welfare through special-interest politics. As a problem solver, Congress is 
inexcusably bad (Howell and Moe 2017, e85). 
While the idea that the Constitution founds an intentionally inefficient Congress was 
strongly rebutted in earlier chapters in this work, Moe and Howell make an empirical and 
historical argument as well as a theoretical argument. Their empirical claims cannot be 
empirically refuted by constitutional theory or the existence of a healthy First Congress. 
Efficacious problem-solving in an “agrarian society” will not fully counter Howell and 
Moe. Pushing back against their view requires showing that Congress can forge effective 
policy under the conditions of modernity that Moe and Howell highlight. Simply put, the 
case under investigation in this chapter is exceedingly useful in examining and refuting 
these claims. Close study of the 73rd Congress shows that Congress is capable of 
responsive, nimble action in the face of crisis, and is capable of delivering well-crafted 
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policy, advancing the national interest (i.e. promoting the general welfare) in advance of 
the alternatives provided by “executive leadership.” 
Considering the overlapping crises characterizing the contemporary political 
scene in the United States (mass migration, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate 
change, exploding deficits, horrific mass violence and shootings), examining the New 
Deal Congress is useful beyond the task of scholarly refutation. The subject of this case 
study is important in its own right. In modern conditions of increased government 
mandate, state capacity, and complexity, the 73rd Congress found the capacity to deal 
with a problem bedeviling not only the US, but the broader world. In the gravest crisis 
since 1861–5, the Congress strove to make liberal democracy consistent with the changes 
in domestic and international political economy that occurred in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. 
Thus, beyond responding to Relic, this case study demonstrates several attractive 
(and a couple unattractive) features of congressional life in the twentieth century, further 
illustrating the attributes of congressional health. Such a modern case also has potential 
use for aiding in the reconstruction of a healthy Congress in the present. One of the most 
important considerations is that the institutional norms, rules and structures adopted by 
the New Deal Congress to tackle crisis of the Great Depression were all within the grasp 
of ordinary politics. Since the Constitution need not be changed to generate these 
efficacious practices, contemporary readers (or even partisans or activists) can especially 
take heart in the fact that the Constitution is more or less as President Roosevelt (1933, 6) 
said in his inaugural address. The impending crisis could be faced because, “Action … to 
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this end is feasible under the form of government which we have inherited from our 
ancestors. Our Constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible always to meet 
extraordinary needs…” The Constitution, and its creation of a polity with a legislature at 
its center, is no mere agrarian relic destined to failure; its structures are flexible and 
resilient, even under great strain. Showing that a set of structures, norms and rules can 
help a modern Congress meet its constitutional obligations is the aim of this chapter. 
RESPONSIVENESS AND ENERGY IN THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS 
The Constitution is premised on the principle that energy (or effective authority) 
in government is essential. Yet, the Constitution is often explicated as if energy is the 
sole possession of the executive branch.174 While it is true that the (theoretical) unity of 
the executive branch conduces to its energetic nature, Congress must participate in 
energetic government to some degree if laws are to be drafted, debated and passed to 
promote the general welfare, especially when these actions must be done with dispatch in 
a time of crisis. Indeed, one of the most characteristic aspects of United States politics in 
the twentieth and twenty-first century is the ubiquity of crisis. If the Congress is 
constitutionally incapable of acting effectively in the face of crisis, it would surely 
                                                 
174 The Federalist itself might conduce to such misunderstandings when it complements the statement that 
“energy in government is essential,” (Hamilton et al 1787/1961, 223), with a later claim that “energy in the 
executive is a leading character in the definition of good government” (421). To understand why the former 
statement is importantly not equivalent with the latter, imagine a government with an executive equipped 
with the exact same powers as those granted by our Constitution was appended to the Articles of 
Confederation Congress. This government would have an energetic executive, but the energy of the entire 
edifice would be sapped by a Congress which is not empowered to raise money to actually pay for the army 
which the President will command. While energy comes mainly from the executive, it cannot be thought to 
come exclusively from the executive. 
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deserve to be shunted aside in favor of a governmental structure which could. As it turns 
out, Congress need not be replaced or displaced.  
In FDR’s First Hundred Days the 73rd Congress showed flexibility, 
responsiveness and independence characteristic of a responsive national legislature. The 
Congress did not act alone of course, but it remained a critical actor in responding to the 
Great Depression. Indeed, in a profound crisis like the Great Depression it is important 
for Congress to generate a lawmaking process which can resolve the crisis. To do so it 
faces twin tasks; promoting the general welfare, while ameliorating the vices facing the 
lawmaking process under “ordinary” conditions. The 73rd Congress engaged in 
procedural innovation to overcome the legislative vice of sluggish irresolution. By yoking 
their lawmaking process to the presidential agenda of their popular co-partisan FDR, the 
House, and its Democratic caucus in particular, succeeded in passing a remarkable 
number of bills responsive to the prevailing emergency. House Democrats utilized special 
closed legislative rules for this purpose, successfully bringing every proposed piece of 
legislation to a vote. Pivotally, legislative dispatch did not come at any obvious cost for 
responsiveness to popular preferences; when FDR’s proposed solutions for the crisis 
appeared rational they were facilitated by Congress to the maximum extent possible, due 
in no small part to overwhelming popular pressure to do so; when FDR’s agenda pressed 
too hard on veterans and ignored the revealed preferences of constituents the Congress 
snapped back into a more independent posture toward FDR and pushed policy in the 
manner requested by their constituents. 
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It bears remarking that as Congress met in March of 1933 several factors outside 
the control of Congress affected its ability to responsively meet the needs of the hour and 
the preferences of its constituents. On the side of enhancements for prompt action, the 
Democratic majority in the House was very large (312 to 117 [with 5 Farmer-Laborites]). 
The size of this majority was an important consideration in explaining swift action in the 
House (Herring 1934, 65); without a close partisan division the Democrats could push 
items onto the floor without even needing a unanimous caucus. Moreover, the Republican 
members of Congress were somewhat demoralized by their poor election performance 
and their small numbers rendered reflexive opposition rather ineffective. Crucially the 
situation encouraged effective response; “The critical economic conditions made it 
essential that the House be organized for … united action and that it respond to the 
leaders” (68). On the other side of the ledger, “the presence of over 150 new members, 
bringing novel proposals for national salvation and knowing little of legislative problems, 
complicated the situation.” (Herring 1934, 68). The number of freshman members of the 
House was enormous: well over a third of all representatives were new to Washington. If 
the first several months of the session consisted of bringing these members slowly up to 
speed and humoring each of their individual plans which they had brought to the nation’s 
capital, none of the people’s business would have been accomplished. 
In the 73rd Congress, the House of Representatives quickly reconfigured itself to 
be a body for prompt and streamlined action, through the use of unorthodox lawmaking 
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procedures, especially special closed rules.175 Special rules allow a measure to be brought 
up for debate and passage out of order and with specified (and often restricted) 
procedures. Contemporary expert Barbara Sinclair (2012, 31) describes their function 
quite clearly, “Special rules can be used to save time and prevent obstruction and delay, 
to focus attention and debate on the critical choices. [Such] rules that restrict amendments 
and waive points of order also save time and prevent obstructionism.” In short, special 
rules “make it easier for the majority-party’s leadership to advance its members’ 
legislative goals” (Sinclair 2012, 49). Special rules, which were not generally used in the 
1930s, but have become exceptionally common in the contemporary Congress, are 
frequently criticized by members of the minority party. Special rules can have “the result 
of excluding the minority from meaningful participation in the legislative process,” 
because they are passed with only a majority vote (Sinclair 2012, 49). Similar concerns 
were expressed in the House of the 73rd Congress, even by members of the majority 
party, due to the frequency of their use. 
One finds it difficult to evaluate the use of these expedients negatively, however, 
in the context of the situation prevailing in 1933, especially at the opening of Congress in 
March. With nearly every bank in the country closed, immediate action was needed to 
reopen them. The House sprang into action in the first moments of the special session 
called by President Roosevelt. Immediately and even before the formation of committees 
the House acted: 
                                                 
175 “The Rules Committee reports such rules, which take the form of House resolutions— designated 
H.Res. A majority of the House membership must approve each one” (Sinclair 2012, 27). 
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[The] Majority Floor Leader [requested] ‘unanimous consent,’ introduced 
the emergency banking act with debate limited to 40 minutes. [The] 
Minority Floor Leader … stated: “The house is burning down, and the 
President of the United States says this is the way to put out the fire.” He 
asked for Republican support. The House had not yet adopted rules of 
procedure; the bill was not available in printed form; the members were 
acquainted with its contents by the reading clerk. But leaders of the House 
and Senate had met with the President the night before and had promised 
to expedite the measure. The bill passed the House without a record vote 
(Herring 1934, 70, emphasis added). 
Obviously, such streamlined legislative procedures place an extreme of deference to the 
initiator of policy, which in this case was the executive branch. Nevertheless, one must 
recall that speed was itself a criterion of merit in the bill. The crisis in the banking sector 
was real but exacerbated by a crisis of confidence. The banking system could be placed 
back on sound footing if the government showed a sufficiently energetic and decisive 
response. Debating the pros and cons of the president’s surprisingly conservative plan for 
reopening the banks was simply not of primary moment in the House.176 
176 “FDR’s plan for the [banking] emergency was conservative, perhaps because its origin lay in the 
Hoover administration… The emergency bill combined a hodgepodge of ideas, many proposed in February 
1933. Title I [in particular] would legalize FDR’s actions by authorizing the president to restrict banking 
operations during a national liquidity crisis. It would [also] authorize the secretary of the Treasury both to 
license member banks for reopening and to require delivery of all privately held gold or gold certificates to 
the treasurer of the United States” (Patrick 1993, 139–141). 
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A growing budget deficit presented the second topic quickly addressed in the 
House. While it may seem odd to contemporary readers, FDR had campaigned on a 
balanced budget and contended that the deficit would greatly constrain efforts of the 
government to promote the general welfare if it was not addressed (Schickler 2016, 32). 
President Roosevelt and other fiscal conservatives hypothesized that the nation’s credit 
worthiness would suffer if the deficit was not immediately addressed. FDR thus proposed 
a so-called Economy Act, requiring sharp cuts to the salaries of federal employees and 
benefits for veterans of the Spanish-American War and the First World War. The 
mechanism chosen by House leaders to move to a quick consideration of the economy 
bill was particularly clever. Rather than turning to a special rule, “the regular order” was 
used to generate a short debate and a quick vote President’s economy plan. “This was 
possible since the calendars were clear, [standing committees had not yet been 
organized], and there was no business before the House wherewith obstructionists could 
effectively delay action. This procedure was a masterpiece of simplicity and directness 
without precedent in Congress in many years” Herring 1934, 71-2). The use of such 
expedients reminds one that “the regular order” does not refer to a substantive state of 
affairs, but rather to the ordinary progression of a Chamber through its legislative 
calendar. The calendar being left strategically empty, the House moved quickly. “After 
the opening prayer and approval of the minutes, the House proceeded at once to the 
orders of the day. The floor leader introduced a resolution providing that debate on the 
economy bill be limited to two hours and ruling out amendments” (72). The unusual 
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resolution was favorably approved by the majority, and then the bill itself was approved 
in short order, closing much of the budget deficit in two rapid steps. 
While such radical expedients were turned only in these limited exceptions, 
special rules more broadly proved to be an important source of ensuring the timely 
consideration of bills proposed in the House. “The Rules Committee held the House to 
the strictest limitations in discussing legislation. Special rules directed the consideration 
of all the [other] important legislation of the session” (Herring 1934, 75). Even more far-
reaching, non-emergency legislation was thus subject to the same legislative martial law. 
H.R. 5081, The Muscle Shoals and Tennessee Valley Authority bill, for instance, passed 
after only six hours of general floor debate in the House. Another critical bill, aiming to 
give relief to owners of small mortgaged homes, only saw an hour and a half of floor 
debate (75). Such a sharp restriction of floor time ensured that all items on the agenda 
could be passed during the Hundred Days. “Critical times have been faced before and 
remedial measures found, but the hundred days of this session are unparalleled for the 
speed and discipline with which Congress was brought to face and finish its task” (65). 
It is certainly no great revelation that the Congress of the Hundred Days was very 
responsive to the agenda proposed by President Roosevelt, but it is important to note that 
this level of presidential leadership was authorized (in some sense) by the public. 
Attention to public opinion is important, because it made the leadership posed by the 
president conditional on an accurate reading of public opinion, and operated to reinforce 
rather than degrade the independent electoral connection between MCs and their 
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constituents. While some MCs made the President sound like the nation’s savior, matters 
on the ground were somewhat more complex.177  
Consider the issue of the deficit. In the first place, Roosevelt had prominently 
emphasized deficit reduction in his campaign platform in the 1932 election (Imler 1975, 
68).178 FDR’s wide electoral mandate presented clear evidence of popular support, 
perhaps not for every plank, but in general for the president’s proposed platform. But all 
budget cuts are politically hazardous, as no individual or group wants to see the resources 
dedicated to them be redirected or removed. In the case of the President’s “Economy 
Act,” there was a countervailing force to this natural unpopularity of spending cuts: an 
unusually activated group in favor of the president and his agenda. On the House floor 
many spoke, not unreasonably, regarding the deflationary consequences of focusing on 
the deficit and budget cuts in a depression. Others spoke of the deserving nature of 
veterans and the underserving nature of the bankers which just received the nation’s aid. 
Yet, “while orators droned, [MCs] studied the thousands of letters that had cascaded into 
congressional offices urging support of the administration” (Imler 1975, 74).179 
Apparently at every turn, literal truck-loads of letters descended on Congress urging its 
177 “‘This is the President's special session of Congress,’ declared Representative Blanton. ‘He is the 
Moses who is leading us out of the wilderness’” (Herring 1934, 80). 
178  Why did this issue arise? “Pension and disability payments to one percent of the population had 
spiraled until by 1933 they threatened to reach a billion dollars, nearly a quarter of the federal budget” 
(Imler 1975, 68). 
179 An interesting development question concerns determining when letters supplanted petitions as a means 
of interacting with and informing MCs. In any case, by the 1930s, technological capacity (that the letters 
could be cheaply and quickly carried to Washington) and state capacity (that the letters would reach DC) 
combined to facilitate communication between constituents and their MCs. Telegrams presented another 
alternative to the mail, and were also used by constituents in the 73rd Congress. 
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Members to follow the president’s lead. Likewise, “members of Congress, especially 
Democrats, who failed to support the administration, ran the risk of sharp criticism from 
home” (336). One House Democrat put matters rather bluntly, “It seems to be the purpose 
here to follow the President's leadership and though it may work hardships, and does in a 
great many instances, yet every mail brings letters of endorsement of the course of the 
Democrats in putting through the President's program” (336). Not just in terms of 
responsiveness to exigent needs, but in terms of responsiveness to constituent pressure, 
the House was urged to follow the FDR’s lead. 
Members were not, however, pushed to monomaniacally support the President. 
As the Hundred Days wore on a different dynamic emerged later in the session. Some 
groups of constituents began pushing their MCs to check and sometimes even oppose the 
president. “As the veterans' lobby publicized (and in some cases exaggerated) the impact 
of administration [budget cuts], letters and cards urged representatives to reconsider their 
position” (Imler 1975, 307). While the measure apparently used by MCs to judge public 
opinion, the literal weight of letters hitting their desk, were rather crude, it was apparent 
that the political winds had changed: 
Each mail delivery reiterated to legislators dissatisfaction at home. Hiram 
Johnson confessed: “In all my life I never want again to receive 
communications such as I have received in the last month and a half. I 
never want to read the appeals of misery and of want, of anticipation of 
hardship and horror, that I have read in letters of good people...” Johnson 
praised Roosevelt, but cited articles from the San Francisco News … and 
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letters from American Legion posts which led him to seek reconsideration 
of projected pension reductions (Imler 1975, 307). 
Adding the weight of the popular press to the collected correspondence from constituents, 
MCs grappled with the difficult choice of opposing an otherwise remarkably popular 
president. The Congress bit the bullet, moving to reverse some $100 million worth of cuts 
to veterans’ benefits. “The President objected to this compromise, but the veteran's bloc 
was ready to demand more” (Herring 1934, 81). Notwithstanding his immense 
popularity, FDR was powerless to stop Congress from adjusting his earlier attempts to 
balance the budget. 
Popular pressure not only forced a minor checking of some of the President’s 
plans, but also to was able to push the Congress entirely in opposition to his dictates. The 
emergency banking bill succeeded in restoring confident to depositors, ending the run on 
banks, but it had by no means fully set the banks on the path to recovery. The president 
favored broader efforts at bank reform but felt it was not an immediate concern. Most 
especially he was reflexively opposed to one of the most straight-forward plans for bank 
reform, the creation of an insurance system for depositors. “FDR and eastern bankers 
opposed deposit insurance because they thought it would force sound bankers to pay for 
mistakes of unsound ones” (Patrick 1993, 165). FDR’s opinion was not an idle one, and 
he backed it up with a threat, printed in the pages of the New York Times, to veto a bill 
containing deposit insurance (175). The public, on the other hand, was strongly in favor 
246 
of deposit insurance (165).180 The conflict between a popular president and a diffuse 
public interest did not end as one would think: “Throughout the 73rd Congress, 
legislators were more willing than the president to protect depositors. The Banking Act of 
1933 … was a result of constituent pressures in favor of deposit guaranty, which FDR 
was unable to ignore… It was constituent pressure, recognized first by Congress and only 
later by Roosevelt, that caused changes in public policy toward depositors” (Patrick 1993, 
189).181 In the 73rd Congress, it was possible to get a measure through the body even if it 
benefited a diffuse group of unorganized individuals, and was opposed by the president 
and powerful vested interests such as the banks. Even in the midst of the greatest instance 
of presidential leadership in the history of our polity, the Congress, through the individual 
political calculations of its members, retained a connection and an important degree of 
responsiveness to its constituents independent of and even occasionally contrary to the 
FDR’s agenda. 
It will not be said, however, that the reformulation of the House of 
Representatives as a conveyor-belt for the president’s agenda was costless. Surely, the 
immediate responsiveness of the House to popular presidential leadership came at the 
cost of some deliberative capacity in that chamber. Especially in the radical measures 
taken in response to the banking emergency, there was little independent evaluation of 
180 “Thousands of telegrams and letters, many from depositors of closed banks, inundated the politicians 
with pleas for a guarantee.” One single box of Senator Carter Glass’s (D-VA) Papers contain 1500 
telegrams in favor of deposit insurance (Kennedy 1973, 219). 
181 Representative Fuller (D-AK), stated that, “It is not the big banks that want security or guaranty. None 
of them wants it. It is the people who are demanding this law” (Congressional Record 1933, 4032). 
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the merits of the bill proposed by the president. “No member of Congress, not even 
former Secretary of the Treasury Glass, engaged directly in the formulation of the 
[banking] bill” (Imler 1975, 56).182 Even the more ordinary course of special rules had 
the practical effect of limiting independent evaluation of the bills as “committees reported 
bills without critical deliberation… members were expected to vote upon measures when 
no printed copies were available for study, and [occasionally] even those sponsoring a 
measure could not adequately explain the terms of their bill” (Herring 1934, 76). The 
power and prestige of a popular president continuously bore down on representatives in 
the House. In private, internal caucus deliberations over the FDR’s economy act, for 
instance, many House Democrats were opposed to the cuts, but as soon as members 
reached the floor, dissent ceased.183 In the House, there was some worry that power had 
been yielded: In the 73rd House, “asserted one member, ‘we are nothing but rubber 
stamps!’” (Herring 1934, 76).184 
                                                 
182 One MC presented a rather reasonable statement on the dangers of this course of action. He said that, 
“When we undertake to frame important banking legislation in an hour we are liable to get ourselves in 
trouble” (Imler 1975, 58). 
183 “Democrats who had viewed the bill unfavorably in secret caucus changed their viewpoint in the open 
debate, and the Democratic leaders found their hands strengthened by Republican support and by public 
approbation of the Administration's position (Herring 1934, 71). 
184  “Roosevelt also moved quickly to produce emergency relief and explore plans for recovery. He took 
advantage of his widespread support to send Congress a steady stream of legislation. One result, which 
worked to his benefit, was that members rarely had time to deliberate. ‘The bills came through in such 
bewildering succession you could hardly read them before it was time to vote on them,’ Stephen Young of 
Ohio remembered, and Borah wrote, ‘In these days the legislative hopper is grinding so rapidly, it is 
difficult to familiarize oneself with them until they approach a hearing.’” (Imler 1975, 337). 
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DELIBERATION AS DIVISION OF LABOR: BICAMERALISM ASCENDANT
While the independent deliberative capacity of the House had been compromised 
by streamlined procedures and the pressure of a popular chief executive, the existence of 
an upper house proved incredibly beneficial for congressional health writ large. The 
Senate of the 73rd Congress retained the independent capacity for democratic deliberation 
for which it had been designed. The upper house maintained this ability even in the face 
of crisis, a president with an inarguable mandate for change, and popular pressure to act. 
Rarely in the history of the polity had the theories and concepts expressed in The 
Federalist came into more complete realization than in FDR’s First One Hundred Days; 
while the People’s House quickly ratified the agenda of a popular president, the Senate 
emerged as a site for pushback, examination and criticism. 
The very first action of the Congress demonstrated the difference between the 
chambers in microcosm. The House passed the emergency banking bill without a printed 
bill and with MCs chanting, “Vote, vote, vote” before the forty minutes devoted to 
debated even had fully elapsed. Senators insisted on taking a closer look at the proposal. 
Sen. Huey Long (D-LA), held forth on the Senate floor about an amendment he proposed 
that would alter President Roosevelt’s proposal. Long hoped to modify the emergency 
bank bill to aid banks chartered under state law and outside the Federal Reserve System 
(77 Cong. Rec. 52, 1933). Long then took questions from other senators that revealed a 
lack of sophistication in his proposal, as it offered only symbolic rather than substantive 
aid, leading to its defeat. Such exchanges typify deliberative exchange on the floor, as a 
well-intentioned idea faced criticism designed to test its merit. Independent-minded 
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progressive, Sen. Robert LaFollette, Jr. (R-WI), focused a separate strand of critique on 
the fact that the bill would not address the causes of the crisis, and expressed 
exasperation than such a conservative attempt to ameliorate its consequences was being 
proposed (64). For more than two hours the conversation over the emergency banking bill 
continued, and terminated only after two votes were taken on proposed amendments to 
the President’s plan. 
From the very first moments of the special session, senators were sure to 
emphasize that they would not offer unqualified complaisance to either the President or 
the bills passed by the House under Democratic Party leadership. The United States 
Senate operated as an important independent voice, especially in the service of 
deliberation, by continuing to stand by its open floor process for considering bills. The 
Senate thus remained the deliberative center of Congress, generating critical amendments 
to administration proposals, conducting debate regarding their substantive merits, and 
carefully concerning the tradeoffs contemplated between different interests in those 
propositions. 
The House frequently passed bills identical in form and substance to proposals 
from the White House; the Senate was not eager to offer carte blanche to the President. 
Senate rules, which the experienced lawmakers were loath to give up, encouraged free 
debate and provided the opportunity to substantively amend bills. Senators were simply 
unwilling to become tools of the leadership (Imler 1975, 342). In the Senate, therefore, no 
special rules or other kinds of unorthodox procedural devices could be implemented to 
 250 
hurry along deliberation. Beyond simply having the opportunity or potential, senators 
frequently exercised their prerogative to amend legislation. 
Senators prevented the Congress from becoming a “rubber-stamp” on FDR’s 
proposals by exercising the ability, supported by their institutional place and norms, to 
promote their own conception of what would conduce to the general welfare of the 
nation.185 Just as popular preferences sometimes fail to genuinely conduce to the common 
good, the same truism applies to the proposals of the President. An active and 
deliberative Senate interrogates both popular preferences as well as the President’s view 
on what it would take to satisfy those preferences. Despite overwhelming Democratic 
control of the Senate, independent reasoning on the merits of proposals made “party 
control in the Senate was far less effective than in the lower chamber” (Herring 1934, 
78).186 The Senate took the lead in mollifying interests and in investigating the merits of 
bills through the process of amending bills, sometimes to the point of comprehensively 
altering the original proposal. As an example, Roosevelt signed a farm bill which he had 
proposed eight weeks to after his initial message to the legislature. “Far from ratifying the 
original bill, it had added 85 amendments, and in the process produced a more 
comprehensive measure” (Imler 1975, 142). 
On several key occasions senators passed amendments which were specifically 
opposed by FDR. Senators framed amendments which sought to mandate a 30-hour work 
                                                 
185 “The Senate was not so amenable as the House, and in the debate … [in that chamber] serious 
disagreement appeared.” Indeed, “The only effective criticism of the Administration came from the Senate” 
(78).” (Herring 1934, 78)  
186 “When important amendments were made, it was the Senate that acted” (80). 
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week, make public the income tax returns of individuals, and change the tax-exempt 
status of securities (78). Examining a crucial sample of Senate votes 34 on the president’s 
agenda shows an important degree institutional loyalty and independence from the 
Executive (see Appendix Figure A-1). Democrats voted with the president only around 
70% of the time on these pivotal votes; Republicans only voted with the President 40% of 
the time (Imler 1975, 346). As the president was guaranteed neither lock step opposition 
from Republicans, nor ironclad support from Democrats, the Senate could maintain its 
critical posture throughout the first one hundred days. 
Even smaller amendments were important in maintaining the independent role of 
the Senate. The process of connecting legislators with constituents (as well as 
legitimating the claim of the former to be good stewards for the welfare of the latter) 
depends especially on the specialized interests-based deliberation of reelection-minded 
MCs. Especially in terms of balancing interests, and justifying any sacrifices of one 
group to the overweighing consideration of another, it was critical that this open 
amendment process continue. While rural Americans were suffering severe privation in 
the Depression, city-dwellers had hardly emerged unscathed. Senators representing 
urbanized states needed especially to be able to utilize an open floor process to defend the 
interests of their constituents, and insure that the Senate’s pervasive imbalance in favor of 
low population states did not doom their prospects for relief. Consider the issue of urban 
foreclosure: “As reported by the Banking and Currency Committee … the Home Owners’ 
Loan Act of 1933 provided no moratorium on principal installments due on mortgages 
acquired by the corporation, a divergence from the farmers’ relief act” (Huthmacher 
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1968, 142). Utilizing the open Amendment process which prevailed after that bill was 
reported to the floor, Sen. Wagner (D-NY) proposed that the same benefits be provided to 
urban residents owning a mortgage that were provided to rural residents who owned a 
mortgaged farm. Besides accepting the idea itself on the merits, the chance for passage 
was increased by a sense of fair bargaining, as Sen. Wagner had supported the rural 
benefits, his amendment was incorporated. The version of the bill signed by the President 
in June 1933, “the Home Owners’ Loan Act … eventually benefited one out of every five 
mortgaged urban homes in the nation” (142). The Senate, acting as the deliberative center 
of Congress, succeeding in synthesizing policies which would broadly and effectively 
respond to citizen preferences. 
A close examination of the Senate debate regarding the deposit insurance (what 
would become the FDIC) provision of the Glass-Steagall act provides apt illustrations of 
both an open and deliberative process for considering the merits of public policy, and for 
the advancement of reasons that justify the sacrifice of interests for the sake of advancing 
the public good. As aforementioned, FDR opposed federal deposit insurance on the idea 
that well-run banks should not be required to bail-out depositors of poorly-run banks.187 
On the Senate floor, more reasons were brought to bear in favor of FDR’s view. Rising to 
speak with measured criticism, Sen. Hebert (R-RI) stated that while he believed “that for 
the most part [the Glass-Steagall Act] has a great deal of merit and will commend itself to 
                                                 
187 Even today, some contemporary economists and economic historians argue that the “moral hazard” 
presented by deposit insurance is a potentially larger problem than the issue posed by possible runs on 
banks (see Hogan and Johnson 2016; Neal and White 2012). 
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the consideration of the Members of the Senate… I cannot see my way clear to support 
that provision of the bill which would guarantee bank deposits. My investigation of that 
subject leads me to the conclusion that wherever that has been tried it has been a failure” 
(77 Cong. Rec. 4181, 1933). The Senator from Rhode Island was not in error: deposit 
insurance had been tried in many states, but none had a working system by 1929. Open 
debate over deposit insurance provided an opportunity for proponents of deposit 
insurance to provide reasons why this bill would succeed where state programs had 
failed, by specifying substantive changes to the bill to ensure that it would be efficacious. 
Sen. Vandenberg (R-MI) “was able to fend off those who criticized the federal program 
as merely replicating the earlier unworkable state programs,” by making an amendment 
to the bill which set a limit on the amount of deposits subject to insurance (Bradley 2000, 
6).188 “Senator Vandenberg’s amendment introduced an aspect of depositor discipline 
into the system by not covering all deposits with a guarantee [thereby incentivizing 
depositors] to be cautious in deciding where to put their money” (6). Setting a limit on 
how much of any given depositor would be insured substantively responded to the 
argument of his fellow Senator, improving the bill’s chances of successfully resolving the 
problem of banking instability. Since the argument was responsive to the President as 
well, it was similarly effective in helping the bill avoid a potential presidential veto. 
Another issue subject to intense debate on the floor of the Senate was the 
interaction between banking institutions and so-called postal savings banks (PSBs). 
                                                 
188 The limit started at $2,500; today the FDIC insures up to $250,000 of deposits in member banks. 
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Established in 1910, this system allowed small depositors to utilize the post offices as an 
access point for small-scale savings accounts. Since the interest offered by these banks 
was very low, they were often not competitive with commercial banks. In the banking 
crisis of the Great Depression, however, savers were attracted to a feature of the banks 
that had gone otherwise overlooked: their security. “The ability of PSBs to offer security 
to depositors, which bankers were unable to match, became a primary concern during the 
1933 congressional debates. PSBs had become legitimate competitors of other financial 
institutions, and in the year immediately preceding adoption of federal deposit insurance, 
deposits in PSBs increased by more than 125 percent” (Bradley 2000, 7). Instead of 
operating as an incentive to thrift by the working class, PSBs were replacing commercial 
banking for many individuals. The increased usage of PSBs caused a ripple effect 
through the financial system, especially in the rural hinterland of the US. The problem 
was that, “PSBs deposited the funds outside the jurisdiction in which they originated. 
Consequently, not only did the increase in PSB deposits mean a corresponding decrease 
in the funds held by private financial institutions, but the increase in PSB deposits further 
exasperated the financial chaos found in local markets by withdrawing money from the 
community itself” (Bradley 2000, 7). Creating federal deposit insurance for all banks, up 
to the limit of $2,500 specified by Sen. Vandenberg, had the additional effect of resolving 
this problem, “since it provided the same protection as the Postal Savings System while 
insuring over 90 percent of the depositors” (Bradley 2000, 8). Contrary to the argument 
of those who seek coherence in law through executive leadership, in this case effective 
legislation was produced by an open floor process where arguments against a proposal 
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could be advanced and in which responsive counterarguments could be deployed to 
resolve those difficulties. 
In the issue of deposit insurance, Senators also had to face a clash of interests, 
particularly between organized banking interests, which generally opposed the policy and 
unorganized diffuse interests (depositors) in favor. While one’s impulse may be to 
question the self-interested motives of the bankers, it is the role of Congress to air 
arguments in favor of a position, and through deliberation to discover if there is more 
than mere self-seeking there. On one hand, the banks which had made it through the 
crisis simply resented the imposition of costs upon their future transaction of business.189 
In addition there was certainly some intemperance in the bankers’ opposition as “New 
York bankers were threatening to withdraw from the reserve system if the Glass bill 
became law” (Patrick 1993, 175). But in debate it became apparent that real obstacles 
were in the way of setting up a working system of deposit insurance. “During the debates 
on the bill, bankers vehemently opposed the plan: There was no way they could 
reasonably expect to turn things around and pay such large assessments,” in the midst of 
the Great Depression (Bradley 2000, 8). While citizen preferences in having their 
deposits covered with insurance was reasonable, an inappropriately large assessment to 
fund the insurance would devastate the remaining health banks, destroying the whole 
system. Banking opposition to the insurance thus made proponents of the bill aware of 
                                                 
189 “Bankers, especially those in areas that had few failures, were appalled when the House passed a bill 
containing deposit and alarmed when the Senate followed with a plan for an immediate guaranty” (Patrick 
1993, 174). 
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obstacles to the success of the policy. Sen. Vandenberg was one again pivotal in 
addressing the concerns of opponents to his initiative to create deposit insurance. “Under 
his amendment, banks were assessed 0.5 percent of insured (rather than total) deposits; 
0.25 percent of the assessment was to be paid in cash, with the other 0.25 percent subject 
to call by the FDIC, and only one additional assessment could be imposed (Bradley 2000, 
8). Vandenberg’s change meant that large, healthy banking institutions, largely in the 
New York and other northeastern financial centers, had a much smaller proportional 
assessment to pay rather than smaller banks, where a greater proportion of total assets 
would be insured (Kennedy 1973). The 0.5% number itself was chosen on the basis of 
calculations regarding the amounts of money the banks could reasonably be expected to 
raise in the midst of economic decline. 
Ultimately, the Banking Act of 1933 represented the outcome of a truly 
deliberative process. Arguments were presented for and against the passage of the bill; 
grievances of interest groups were considered and examined in good faith; and reasonable 
compromises were forged with due attention to the prospective efficaciousness of the bill 
proposed. Significantly, the process remained one of public, democratic deliberation, 
confined to the upper house of the Congress. It was not accidental that the process of 
deliberation on the Senate floor resolved difficulties of conception and execution in the 
policy of deposit insurance. From the first day of the session the Senate had been 
operating as a site of deliberation between equals. In an earlier chapter, it was discovered 
that the image of the ideal senator as giving principled and lengthy speeches on the floor 
can lead to unfortunate results if those speeches are not responsive to the words of other 
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MCs. In the Senate of the 73rd Congress, senators still gave speeches, but they did not 
center their deliberations around those devices. Returning to the scheme of analysis 
carried out in the chapter regarding the antebellum Congress, I have examined the days of 
Senate debate devoted to the issue of banking. Examining the Congressional Record 
allows one to count the number of speakers who addressed the body, the number of times 
their speeches extended for at least one column of the Record (in this case greater than or 
equal to 500 words), and the number of times in a given debate that one senator directly 
responded to the previous senator regarding the merits of the bill or amendment under 
consideration. 
The results of such a quantitative investigation, (see Table 5-1), show that 
senators frequently responded to one another and infrequently gave speeches, allowing an 
environment of mutual give and take to exist. In an average day of debate regarding 
banking in the 73rd Congress the floor only saw two speeches given, maximizing the 
amount of time that could be spent in dialogue rather than in passive listening. Given the 
technical nature of financial and banking questions under debate, only a relatively small 
number of senators spoke on the floor,190 but those that did were engaged in a back in 
190  The technical nature of the debate made some senators rather reticent, but participants in the debate 
seemed to retain good humor and faith, even if not every senator was equally expert on matters of finance. 
One representative conversation proceeded between Sens. King (UT-D) and Glass. 
“Mr. KING. Before the Senator leaves the insurance features of the bill, I hope he will be tolerant of some 
of us who have not had the opportunity of becoming fully acquainted with the bill-speaking for myself, 
anyway asked which may not be very intelligent.  
Mr. GLASS. I have boasted recently of being the most tolerant Member of the Senate” (77 Cong. Rec. 
3728, 1933). 
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forth regarding the merits of the bill to an extent very similar to that seen in the First 
Congress’s model debate over molasses.  
Table 5-1: Senate Debate on Banking Reform: March 9, May 19 – 25, and June 13, 1933 
Summary Statistic No. of Speakers No. of Speeches Substantive Interactions 
Median 10 2 17 
Average 14 2.4 13.6 
Emergency Bill 
(March 9) 
29 7 17 
Glass Bill (May 
19-25) 
11.3 1 16 
Conference Glass-
Steagall (June 13) 
7 2 3 
Total N/A191 12 68 
Source: 77 Cong. Rec., 1933. 
Not only the merits, but also the purpose of the bill was investigated. Sen. 
Connally (D-TX) asked, “Why have all of this banking legislation? People talk about 
passing a bill for the aid of the banks. That is not our concern. Our concern is to pass 
                                                 
191 A sum of all speakers would lead to significant double-counting. It appears that all senators who wished 
to speak on the bill could do so. 
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legislation which will permit the establishment and operation of a banking system in 
order that it may serve the public, that it may serve the people, that it may furnish a 
reservoir of credit and money with which the people of this country can transact their 
normal business.” (77 Cong. Rec. 4170, 1933). Only on the very last day of debate, on 
which the conference report on the bill was considered, were remarks perfunctory. Only a 
few senators spoke, and those who did often did not respond to one another. 
Unfortunately, the debate held on June 13th was nearly the very last day of the hundred-
day session; the patience for extended debate almost always seems to flag by this point in 
a congress. 
While the Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass Steagall bill) was imperfect,192 the 
establishment of deposit insurance was rendered much more effectual because of the 
deliberations which occupied the Senate. The FDIC in particular “was for many years 
[the] most effective provision for preventing bank failures. It increased the safety and 
stability of the banking system because it reduced the possibility that frightened 
depositors would cause runs on solvent institutions” (Patrick 1993, 188).193 No less 
authority than Milton Friedman stated that the establishment of the FDIC was “the 
structural change most conducive to monetary stability… since … the Civil War” 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 434). In terms of financial self-sufficiency, the FDIC 
                                                 
192 Indeed, the sources of some of its imperfection will be examined in the next section regarding 
representation. 
193 “Ironically, the controversial issue of insurance succeeded for exactly the same reasons that its bitterest 
critics condemned it to failure: it made strong banks responsible for the losses of the weak. As a result, the 
more stable members of the system compelled their less sound colleagues to reform before disaster force 
them to seek refuge in the fund” (Kennedy 1973, 222). 
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needed no additional infusion of money after the original grant of 1933 until 1991, when 
the need for some reform became apparent (Patrick 1993, 293). The FDIC did so well 
that it more or less completely ended the problem of runs on banks: “from 1921 to 1933, 
depositors lost an average of $156 million per year or $.45 per $100 in commercial 
banks; from the establishment of the FDIC until 1960, losses average only $706,000 per 
year or less than $.002 per $100” (Kennedy 1973, 223). Contrary to the theory that only 
the President can propose efficacious, coherent policy for the nation, here is an example 
of a Congress deliberating over a popular proposal for economic stability, overcoming 
the opposition of a president and entrenched interests, and refining it to the point that 
even libertarian economic thinkers were impressed with its effects. The New Deal 
Congress of the Hundred Days deliberated well despite the restricted rules of the House, 
because the Senate played its role: “for breadth of knowledge, technical skill, analytical 
acumen, close reasoning and dignified presentation, [the addresses and debates of its 
senators] compare favorably with similar utterances made in the preceding century by the 
so-called great orators” (Beard 1942, 531). 
REPRESENTATION: INNOVATIONS AND LIMITS 
The 73rd Congress, aligned to a new-found responsiveness through the special 
rules in the House and devoted to democratic deliberation in its Senate, found it 
somewhat more difficult to structure a representative lawmaking process. On one hand, 
the leaders of the House were in fact aware of the potential that seniority in the body 
would lead to disproportionate sectional representation and attempted countermeasures in 
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response. The Senate for its part ensured that the diverse views and interests of the nation 
could gain a hearing on its floor, once again by maintaining an open floor process. On the 
other hand, in both the Senate and House the congressional lawmaking process was 
occasionally dominated by individual “experts.” When experts produce a bill nearly 
single-handedly, coherence may be brought to a bill, at the cost of forfeiting the 
opportunity to make the proposal more broadly representative.194 Finally, the intensity 
and number of interests joined together to advocate for black civil rights failed to make 
an impression on the body in any way. The Congress of the Hundred Days thus finds a 
mixed evaluation on the dimension of representativeness. 
Starting with the effects of seniority, House Democratic leaders were remarkably 
self-conscious that this ostensibly neutral device could have serious problems for 
representation in Congress. Since the southern region of the United States was virtually a 
one-party-state during the early 1930s, southern MCs has substantial advantages in 
seniority over their co-partisans from the rest of the nation.  Seniority dictated the that 
most senior member of each standing committee would get to be the chair of that 
committee, with all the perquisites that go with such a leadership role. Such a procedure 
led to a disproportionate influence over legislative leadership by southerners. 
“Southerners chaired twenty-nine of the forty-seven committees in the House, including 
Appropriations, Banking and Currency, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Military 
Affairs, and Ways and Means…” (Katznelson 2013, 149). Since southern Democrats 
                                                 
194 The general principles behind this surprising problem will be elaborated below; a concrete instance of 
the phenomena will also be presented in the domination of the Senate by banking expert, Sen. Carter Glass. 
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only made up only one third (146 out of 435) of the seats, controlling more than half of 
the committees was a pretty large disproportion. The Democratic caucus, when arriving 
at Washington in March of 1933, tried to remedy the sectional imbalance, first, by 
electing a northerner as Speaker of the House, Rep. Henry Rainey (D-IL). 
The election of Rainey as speaker was at least partially premised on the fact the 
candidate for speaker had promised to inaugurate a “steering committee.” The steering 
committee’s membership was to be drawn by dividing the nation into fifteen districts, 
with each having approximately the same number (21) of Democratic representatives 
(Herring 1934, 69). These districts were clearly created with an eye to reversing or 
tempering southern influence as the only districts which were overrepresented (districts 
with smaller numbers of Democratic representatives) were those representing the 
Northeast and the Inter-mountain West, hardly redoubts of traditional Democratic 
strength during this period. The Democratic members from each district voted on sending 
one representative to the steering committee. “The speaker, the whip, the majority floor 
leader, and the chairman of the caucus [were added as ex-officio members]. Since the 
speaker had sponsored the establishment of this committee, he could not very well ignore 
its existence or attempt to override it.” (69). The Speaker of the House thus had a more 
representative set of voices to consult regarding the proposals emanating from the 
President than he would had, should he have simply convened the committee chairs.195 
195 Yet, one must keep in mind that the steering committee system of “party organization was better 
designed for carrying out orders from above than for initiating policies.” The creation of whips from each 
district confirmed this impression. “Especially did the new members need direction and advice. Chief Whip 
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While not perfectly balancing the disproportionate influence in the lawmaking process 
possessed by southern Democrats, the attempt at least illustrated a self-conscious attempt 
to structure representation of the nation’s vying sections. 
While the Senate attempted no such representative schemes,196 it did continue to 
maintain a generally open floor, which had the effect of allowing advocates for interests 
to freely jockey for advantage, bringing views to bear on questions of recovery in a 
reasonable proportion to the presence of those ideas in the society at large. A prominent 
example of this general trend concerned views expressed on the Senate floor regarding 
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). NIRA was an ambitious plan to attack the 
Great Depression across three dimensions: (1) through an attempt to encourage the 
voluntary development of “codes of fair practices” by trade organizations, by relaxing 
anti-trust regulations through cooperative planning; (2) by providing workers the right to 
organize and bargain collectively; and (3) by appropriating funds for a massive $3 billion 
program of public works spending to immediately tackle the problem of unemployment 
(Katznelson 2013, 229-31). Despite the massive proposed change from the earlier general 
policy of laissez-faire, only six hours of debate were conducted in the House and only 
one substantive amendment was considered (regarding the distributive policy of highway 
fund allocation) to this policy (Herring 1934, Katznelson 2013, 240). It would then be 
                                                 
Greenwood accordingly named assistant whips for the regional divisions identical with the steering 
committee districts” (Herring 1934, 69) 
196 “In the Senate … southerners headed thirteen of thirty-three committees, counting the most significant, 
including Agriculture, Appropriations, Banking and Currency, Commerce, Finance, and Military Affairs” 
(Katznelson 2013, 150). This breakdown, however, was less disproportionate than in the House, as 
Southern states were represented by 34 (out of the 96 total) Senators 
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correct to say that, “When the National Recovery Act was before the House, an attitude 
of acquiescence characterized the debate” (Herring 1934, 80). The various ideological, 
principled, constitutional or interest-based considerations one might have for accepting or 
rejecting the bill were not really heard in the House. 
 In the Senate, however, the open floor process led to Senators being able to 
criticize the proposal, alongside substantive proposals to alter the plan. Fifteen 
substantive amendments were voted on, paired with a comprehensive airing of views, pro 
and con. Several of these critical amendments even emerged from the Democratic 
members. Some worried NIRA was going too far, like Sen. Clark (D-MO), who objected 
to the suspension of antitrust regulations, (Katznelson 2013, 239). Others, such as Sen. 
Long (D-LA), thought Roosevelt was not going far enough (Huthmacher 1968).197 
Indeed, “examination of the process of law-making during this session emphasizes the 
fact that despite the emergency conditions necessitating quick and decisive action, and 
despite the unified support given the President by the general public, factions remained in 
Congress. Blocs, such as the farmers', the veterans', and the inflationists', gained strength 
because of the critical economic situation” (Herring 1934, 82). In general, due to the 
perceived (and actual) support of the public for the president these blocs were not 
generally successful in opposing FDR during the Hundred Days. Especially on NIRA, 
                                                 
197 “On the whole the Senate’s debate on the recovery bill was conducted on an unusually high plane. For 
sustained periods Wagner matched wits with Borah, one of the most distinguished lawyers in the chamber, 
in discussions of the constitutional phases of the legislation… [Wagner] listened patiently … while Huey 
Long delivered a long tirade against the Roosevelt Administration and while, more thoughtfully, Hugo 
Black suggested that government limitation of profits might be a necessary corollary to the great powers 
conferred on corporations by the measure…” (Huthmacher 1968, 150-1). 
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substantive amendments, such as those of Sen. Clark, were voted down by wide 
margins.198 But there is no doubt that Senators, including of the president’s party, felt free 
in expressing the views critical of the course of action proposed by the chief executive. 
While the openness of the Senate floor operated to allow critics to have their say 
in the lawmaking process, norms of deference to “experts” within Congress operated to 
vitiate some of this diversity. One of the most important aspects of numerous legislative 
bodies is the fact that well-structured assemblies to allow different accounts of the same 
general phenomenon to be brought to bear. Different representatives might have various 
theories of what caused the phenomenon, and if the subject in question is a problem 
(which it almost always is in politics), then they might possess varying hypotheses 
regarding possible solutions. If the problem-solving process is dominated by one 
individual, this possible advantage of legislatures over single executives is lost. Problems 
of legitimacy arise as well, given the fact that whatever “expert” has been denominated 
by his peers was not so elected by the people.199 One chief example of the expert 
dominance concerned the Glass-Steagall Bank Act. 
198 Roosevelt’s proposal survived its trial by fire in the Senate, because “it avoided alienating supporters of 
the Black bill and gained backing from Republicans and Democrats as well as representatives of business, 
labor, and the unemployed. As in the past, interest groups complained about portions of the industrial 
recovery bill, but not to the point where they opposed final passage. Legislators naturally showed more 
enthusiasm for the public works title which meant jobs for constituents. Still, the final vote indicated that 
the President had conciliated shrewdly enough to insure passage of either title independently” (Imler 1975, 
285). 
199 Problematically, the “expert” themselves might very well deny they are such, deflecting attention from 
the problem with a mixture of play-acted humility and noblesse oblige. Senator Glass, was one such 
“expert.” Coming to the end of his defense of his banking bill, he stated: “Mr. President, I think I have 
about reached my limit in the explanation of the bill, but as we proceed with its consideration, I shall be 
glad to answer any questions that I can, reminding the Senate, if you please, that I am not a banking expert. 
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While sometimes bills are named after for political reasons or for the creation of a 
convenient shorthand title, in the case of the Glass-Steagall Act the bill was named 
correctly for the individuals who had the most impact of its substantive provisions, and in 
that order. Starting before the beginning of the session, “[Sen.] Glass composed the 
banking and monetary blanks of the [Democratic] platform, which the delegates [to the 
Convention] adopted without debate” (Patrick 1993, 97). Glass’s control of his bill 
caused real problems for the efficacy of the bill due to the fact that he possessed an 
idiosyncratic understanding of the monetary system: “Because Glass believed in ‘real 
bills theory,’ many provisions in his original reform bill would have had a deflationary 
effect…” (Patrick 1993, 100). The “real bills theory” refers to a monetary theory which 
held that only a very small range of financial instruments were credit worthy. This theory 
further held that if banks were limited to only this range of activity they would more or 
less automatically be safe. Such a monetary theory has proven inconsistent with 
subsequent experience; we can hardly blame Sen. Glass before the fact. But by being so 
critically dependent on one man’s reading of the situation, and not very curious about 
alternative views of how to address this complex issue, the Glass-Steagall bill would go 
on to cause deflation – which was the last thing that the nation needed in 1933. “In the 
Banking Act of 1933 Congress, led by Glass and … Steagall, misread events after 1920 
and consequently imposed many unnecessary controls on member banks. The Senate and 
House Banking and Currency Committees did not conduct detailed statistical studies of 
                                                 
Although people say I am, I am not; and I hope the questions will be as simple as possible (77 Cong. Rec. 
3731, 1933). 
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banking problems, relying instead on testimony from bankers, economists, and 
government officials. Such evidence was impressionistic and at times misleading” 
(Patrick 1993, 295). The result was that the portions of the bill overly reliant on Glass’s 
construction were not efficacious. Not only that, but they were likely harmful to the 
safety and efficiency of the banking system. 
While the controversy over deposit insurance drove debate regarding a wide range 
of opinions regarding their advisability and efficacy, the aspects of Glass’s bill which 
later became economically problematic were not addressed due to his dominance over the 
process. While legislative leaders like Glass typically exercise their control somewhat 
behind the scenes, Glass’s control over the banking bill (in the Senate) was overt and 
complete. One senator rose to offer an amendment to the bill, and began to give his 
argument for why this technical change was needed. The following is the complete record 
of what transpired: 
Mr. KEYES. Mr. President, I am prompted to offer that amendment-- 
Mr. GLASS. I have no objection, at all, to the amendment. 
Mr. KEYES. Very well. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the 
amendment proposed by the Senator from New Hampshire. 
The amendment was agreed to (77 Cong. Rec. 4181, 1933). 
Rather than listening to the reasons for or against the amendment and examining these 
views, the Senate voted simply to accept the change on the mere word that Sen. Glass had 
no objection. Recalling that Sen. Glass was not even the chair of the Banking Committee, 
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it becomes yet more clear that informal deference played a great role in determining not 
only the agenda, but also the substantive contents of bills in the Senate. 
Such informal norms of deference can lead to severe consequences for 
representativeness, even apart from the effect they might have on restricting the range of 
views expressed on the floor. In the Senate, a norm of avoidance of conflict with 
powerful southern Democrats (of which Sen. Glass was one) negated an effort to bring 
attention and policy change regarding the issue of black Civil Rights. While the nation as 
a whole was certainly suffering, the year of 1933 presented special problems for black 
Americans. Twenty-six individuals were lynched in the South, the second-highest total in 
a decade (Katznelson 2013, 166). While lynching was at its worst in the late nineteenth 
and first decade of the 20th centuries, clearly any taking of life by a lynch mob was too 
many. Despite the uptick in racial terror (often tolerated if not supported by local and 
state authorities), the Congress of the Hundred Days spent not one day on addressing the 
pressing violation of human rights in the South. 
Matters seemed somewhat different, at first, in the second session of the 73rd 
Congress in 1934. The Judiciary Committee was referred an anti-lynching bill, which 
proposed to apply sanctions to any state which did not sufficiently act to prevent these 
horrendous crimes. The committee did hold hearings, “taking testimony from a wide 
range of witnesses including spokespeople from the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), Young Women’s Christian Association, Women’s International League for 
Peace and Freedom, as well as academics, lawyers, and state officials from around the 
country. Also testifying were Walter White and other representatives from the NAACP” 
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(Jenkins et al 2010, 79). Examining the witness list, it is apparent that it included 
organizations outside the ambit of black organizations; a wide range of interests 
demonstrated strong favor for a civil rights bill to stop this brutal practice.200 
Surprisingly, given the fate of earlier anti-lynching bills which failed consistently for 
more than fifty years, the Costigan Wagner (Anti-Lynching) Bill was reported favorably. 
Helping matters was the fact that “Only three of the eighteen members of the Senate’s 
powerful Judiciary Committee in 1934 were southerners (Huthmacher 1968, 173). The 
bill even passed through the committee on a voice vote (Jenkins et al 2010, 79). 
Nevertheless, “southern senators threatened to filibuster and the Democratic leadership 
refused to take up the bill for full debate. As a consequence, the Senate 
adjourned…without considering the measure” (Jenkins et al 2010, 80). When a bill is 
favorably reported by committee after extensive hearing and substantial mobilization of 
diverse interests and views in its favor, and yet is blocked from even being considered, it 
must be said that the Congress as an institution lacks ideal representativeness.201 
CONCLUSION: EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP IN CONTEXT IN THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS 
In March of 1933 the polity faced a devastating crisis imperiling the general 
welfare. The Congress faced the emergency with a constitutionally-aligned division of 
200 While one might think that black Americans should not have to mobilize as an interest group to secure 
their constitutionally granted rights – this instance provides yet another example of the fact that even when 
they do play the game of interest group politics, there is no guarantee of success. 
201 The filibuster does not seem to have a place in encouraging deliberativeness (as actions such as these 
provoke no arguments on the merits), responsiveness (as popular majorities are ignored) or 
representativeness (as the less numerous views are not accommodated, but rather given control over the 
process). Accordingly, one must say that the filibuster is no aid to legislative health in Congress. 
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responsibility. The People’s House changed its internal structure to accommodate a 
popular course of action – a set of proposals emanating almost daily from a president 
fresh off an election mandate. Senators, however, leaned into norms emphasizing their 
independence, defended their traditional rules, and emerged as key critics of 
administration outputs. The Senate floor became a venue for substantive deliberation on 
the model of that practiced by the best statesmen of the First Congress. 
Such a comprehensive evaluation of Congress meaningfully differs, in key 
respects, from both contemporaneous and retrospective accounts. Harvard political 
scientist E. Pendleton Herring, who had observed the Congress in real-time, contended 
that, “despite federalism, bicameralism, factionalism, and the negative character of our 
political parties, the present governmental structure is capable of meeting a national 
crisis” (Herring 1934, 83). I would agree that the present constitutional regime of the 
United States has proven capable of meeting the test of emergency, but I would say that 
Congress succeeded because of bicameralism, not in spite of it. Columbia political 
scientist Ira Katznelson (2013) argues that, “In placing the recovery program entirely in 
the president’s hands, Congress did flirt with what might be thought of as a functional 
Enabling Act. But flirt though it did, the institution did not cross the line. Congress kept, 
and increasingly asserted, its legislative prerogatives. … Even the nineteenth-century 
ideal of a deliberative legislature where lawmakers sought to persuade one another by 
rational argument did not entirely disappear.” Katznelson 2013, 125). While more in line 
with Katznelson’s conclusion, this chapter shows that in no way did Congress flirt with 
an enabling act – even the emergency banking bill received deliberative attention and was 
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subject to amendment and challenge on the merits. Further, the technical deliberation 
undertaken in the Senate ensured that the conditions in the nation would indeed be 
ameliorated. Such debate was better, especially for the context, than the ideal of a 
speech-giving nineteenth century Congress. Norms encouraging exchange and 
discouraging solely expressive speech spurred the Senate (and hence the Congress) to 
pass laws which promoted the general welfare. 
 The important role played by the Congress, even in the First Hundred Days, 
illustrates the fundamental place of legislatures in our regime, and the insufficiency of 
purely presidential leadership. FDR was no doubt profoundly successful in the First 
Hundred Days, but the story of his success is not one of unilateral, heroic leadership. As 
aforementioned, Democrats dominated the House and utilized special rules to shepherd 
his bills to passage. The real key to the President’s success, however, was that he and his 
advisers literally targeted his bills to be supported by the median member of the Senate. 
Roosevelt’s pragmatic proposals were based on the knowledge that bills needed to meet 
muster with the median senator to pass. As evidence of this proposition, consider the fact 
that Roosevelt’s proposals received equal critique from both conservative and progressive 
(i.e. liberal) members of the Senate and higher support from moderates. On a set of 34 
key roll call votes, moderate support of the President’s position averaged 78%, whereas 
progressive support stood at 41%, and conservatives voted in his favor 45% (Imler 1975, 
353-7). The Senate, deliberating substantively over the pragmatic proposals of the chief 
executive often found reasons to urge changes, and thus hardly saw need to give the 
President cart blanche. Yet, the crisis and the president’s wise strategy placed the median 
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senator in a position where it would hardly be rational to comprehensively object to a 
presidential proposal. 
While Congress was clearly not the leader or initiator of most proposals in the 
Hundred Days, that is not a reason to evaluate Congress poorly over the course of this 
session. A healthy Congress is responsive, deliberative and representative so that the laws 
it passes will have the maximum chance of serving to promote the general welfare. These 
tasks do not require the Congress obstruct the president’s agenda for its own sake, 
especially if what he proposes is basically coincident with the sense of Senate. 
In crisis, the cooperation of a pragmatic president, and a deliberative Congress 
can yield large benefits for the polity, without leading to a permanent loss of authority or 
abdication for the Congress. As was seen in the example of deposit insurance and budget 
cuts, Congress could often be a force for moderating a president’s instincts to react to 
crisis, when those instincts led to politically unpopular or inefficacious policies. It was 
not therefore, as if FDR brought a coherent program to the presidency, which was forced 
to be watered down by appealing to the “parochial and grasping Congress.” On the 
contrary, “The President…brought no over-all plan of his own to Washington [and] 
picked and chose in his pragmatic way from among the proposals presented by 
competing brain trusters, congressmen, and pressure groups, and fashioned them into a 
program—a New Deal—that was ‘highly experimental, improvised and inconsistent’” 
(Huthmacher 1968, 130). It was in fact men with coherent plans, such as Sen. Glass on 
banking, Sen. Wagner on NIRA, or Sen. Norris on the TVA, who pushed to form 
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something more coherent out of the FDR’s agenda.202 “Thus, the ‘legislative miracle’ 
came not as a result of Executive dominance over a helpless legislature, but because of 
the cooperation between two often antagonistic branches of government in the face of a 
deteriorating economic situation and a clear mandate for immediate action” (Imler 1975, 
343).  
Congress decided to grant some remarkable power to the executive in that special 
session of the Hundred Days, but declined to permanently delegate or abdicate to the 
presidency. Even in the House, where deference was the order of the day, Representatives 
remained clear-sighted: “I confidently believe” said Rep. Blanton (D-TX), “in the ability 
and courage of our President to put us back on a sound financial basis. When the crisis is 
a thing of the past, then we can resume all powers which we are now temporarily 
transferring to the President” (77 Cong. Rec. 131, 1933). Not to put too fine a point on 
the matter, it is quite evident that constitutional change is not required to achieve 
executive leadership of Congress, when that leadership is both necessary and popularly 
acclaimed. 
While some of the products of the Hundred Days have come under scholarly 
criticism, the process settled on in Congress was no doubt generative of both renewed 
popular support and legitimacy for the regime. On September 1933, a parade rolled down 
the streets of Manhattan, with as many as two million looking on, to celebrate the passage 
                                                 
202 At this point it is wise to reflect on the fact that coherent is not, by itself, a synonym for good. The 
coherence of Glass’s banking bill nearly led to its failure – thankfully it was made “less coherent” by the 
addition of deposit insurance, primarily as advocated by Sen. Vandenberg, Vice President Garner and Rep. 
Steagall (Kennedy 1973, 219). 
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of NIRA. Infrequently do American celebrate astronauts (or even athletes) with the 
enthusiasm evident on that day; participation had to be limited by quota, and the parade, 
which started in mid-afternoon, extended well past midnight. It was organized, not by the 
Democrats of Tammany Hall, but by “seventy-seven trade and industry divisions—
including law firm, taxi garages, florists, furriers, barbers, banks, and laundries” 
(Katznelson 2013, 228). Even the Wall Street Journal, which was somewhat cool to the 
president’s agenda, admitted that “the celebration [was] one of the greatest in the nation’s 
history” (228).  
Beyond opinion (which can hardly be ignored in a democratic state), the Hundred 
Days corresponded with an end to the nation’s economic contraction (see Figure 5-1). 
With stability restored to the banking system and some public works spending beginning 
to be felt, unemployment began a slow march downward. While not in the position to 
assess economic causality directly, it would not have been unreasonable for MCs to insist 
that they had done their part in beginning to arrest the Depression. Although its 
representativeness was not surely not complete, as explained above, and demonstrated by 
the hostility of NIRA, both as written as implemented, to the interests of black 
Americans,203 (Katznelson 2013, 242) the Congress remained pivotal in promoting 
liberalism by responding to deep popular impulses and rationally deliberating over how 
                                                 
203 The only cold rationalization for Congress’s lack of representation consists in the fact that early (1932 – 
36) New Deal white liberals exhibited little if any interest in making the Democrat Party platform 
responsive to the needs of black Americans. Only the Communist Party platform substantively addressed 
the human rights of black Americans in the early 1930s (Schickler 2016). While this is an explanation, it 
certainly does not suffice as justification. 
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to bring those impulses to efficacious fruition.204 Congress, so far from being a relic, 
appeared essential to the economic recovery of the mid-1930s. 
Figure 5-1: Unemployment in the United States, 1929-1937 
204  “In the final analysis the Seventy-Third Congress in the hundred days way much like other Congresses. 
It passed more [landmark] legislation, but faced the most severe economic crisis in the nation's history. It 
was more responsive to the President, but in this merely followed the dictates of constituents…” (Imler 
1975, 348). 
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Epilogue: The Contemporary (115th) Congress 
The purpose of developing a comprehensive conception of congressional health is 
to make systematic evaluation of the institution of Congress possible. Given 
contemporary worries regarding the state of America’s national lawmaking body, it is 
important to offer a first-pass evaluation of the present Congress.205 While some caution 
needs to be taken in evaluating the 115th Congress, since its history has yet to be written, 
it labors under three self-inflicted difficulties: (1) its internal structures for policy 
initiation and formulation forfeit rather than capitalize on the diversity of views present in 
the House and Senate; (2) MCs systematically fail to make use of the rich contemporary 
environment of popular feedback for proposed policy (protests, polls, virtual town halls, 
social media, etc.), imperiling the ability for Congress to substantively respond to popular 
preferences; and (3) its norms and rules discourage deliberative exchanges regarding the 
merits of policy being proposed.206 In order to justify and present evidence for these 
claims, I will chiefly investigate the efforts of Congress in addressing two pivotal agenda 
                                                 
205 Some readers may instead wish that epilogue had turned to a process of hypothesis generation regarding 
the causes or conditions which gives rise to (or inhibit) congressional health. Given the case studies 
marshalled in this work some speculative possible variables of interest include the size of the operating 
majority in the Congress, the degree of partisan or sectional polarization in the body or in the nation at 
large, among many others. While this potential causal analysis presents an exciting opportunity for future 
research, I stay focused in this work on the question of what congressional health entails rather than why 
particular congresses succeed or fail. Extending this work to the contemporary Congress is thus in the 
service of continuing to articulate what makes a Congress functional or dysfunctional. 
206 One ought to notice the problems of Congress do not primary concern (1) lack of productivity; (2) lack 
of comity/civility; (3) partisan polarization, as such. It does seem possible that each of these three factors 
inhibit the Congress from developing appropriate reforms to address the bodies difficulties, but this 
requires further causal testing. See previous footnote. 
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items in 2017 and 2018: the attempt to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA or 
Obamacare) and the “open debate” regarding DACA. 
Though careful observation of those processes does not paint a flattering picture 
of the U.S. Congress, one relatively surprising attribute prevents the Congress from being 
labeled a “failure:” MCs themselves seem to be very aware of the fact that its 
deliberations and lawmaking process are not operating in an ideal fashion. Such self-
consciousness would not generally qualify as an attribute of health, especially given the 
fact that MCs do not fully appreciate the extent of their difficulties, often speculating, for 
instance, that a return to the “regular order” will fully rectify the institution’s disorders. 
Nevertheless, MC’s awareness that Congress is dysfunctional has had observable 
consequences for member behavior. At critical points in 2017 MCs were compelled to 
oppose the products generated by Congress’s broken processes, such as the AHCA. More 
impressively, MCs opposed these products at some political cost to their partisan teams. 
Such a body is reasonably described as unhealthy; but, its surprising self-restraint 
indicates that it has not yet succumbed to full-blown failure. Congress is perched on a 
precipice, where a continued acknowledgement of its difficulties without a concomitant 
effort at reform raises the danger of complete failure, in the foreseeable future. 
REPRESENTATION: LIMITED VIEWS CONSIDERED IN POLICY INITIATION 
The popular impression that the Congress fails to accurately represent the 
American people contributes to the American people’s disgust for Congress. Unfavorable 
polls are a dime a dozen; in one instance 59% of Republican and Republican-leaning 
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respondents to a Pew Research Center (2015) poll said that even congressional 
Republicans were not doing a good job representing their views. Pew did not even ask the 
participants to evaluate the institution as a whole, which would have doubtlessly yielded 
an even higher degree of distrust. Truly dispiriting degrees of popular approval for 
Congress continue in the current Congress: Only 14% of registered voters in a recent 
Rasmussen (2018) poll said evaluated the MCs as a good or excellent. Since constituents 
do not feel well served by their representatives, it is worth taking at face value the 
proposition that MCs are not representing voters appropriately. Indeed, examining the 
lawmaking process in the 115th Congress, it becomes quite clear that Congress is not 
operating in a representative fashion; the complication is that its representative deficit is 
not the one frequently appearing in journalistic narratives. 
Representativeness, in this study, is conceptualized as the ability for Congress to 
bring diverse views and interests to bear in the lawmaking process in some rough 
proportion to the existence of those same views and interests in the polity at large. One 
common intuition is that the growing polarization of parties prevent diverse views from 
being expressed in Congress. A partisan Congress, the accusation goes, takes the nation’s 
remarkable viewpoint diversity and flattens it into two diametrically opposed and 
homogeneous teams (Muirhead 2014, Drutman 2018, Wallach 2018). Yet, when one 
observes even a heated partisan debate in Congress, MCs express diverse views generally 
spanning the large range of publicly expressed viewpoints in the society. 
Consider the issue of DACA. During President Obama’s term Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), an executive action, was promulgated. This policy 
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effectively made a select group of undocumented immigrants who were brought to the 
United States when they were very young eligible for temporary work permits and 
protected them from deportation. In 2017, President Trump decided to wind down this 
program due to concerns regarding its constitutionality, but delayed implementation of its 
revocation to give Congress time to act to protect its recipients (Romo et al 2017). DACA 
thus found its way onto the agenda of Congress. 
Views among the citizenry regarding the substance of DACA run the gamut. 
Some object to the idea that “amnesty” should be tendered to anyone who violates the 
law, regardless of circumstances, and hold that DACA recipients not only should not be 
eligible for permits, but should in fact be deported from the United States.207 On the other 
end of the spectrum, an argument exists that children cannot to be made responsible for 
the immigration law violations of their parents. Many thus support making the presence 
of DACA individuals in the nation legal or even placing them on a path to citizenship. 
While it is impossible to fix with precision the exact contours of public opinion on this 
question, consistent majorities respond in favor of some version of legalization for 
individuals in the DACA program.208 
207 At a speech by Sen. Kamala Harris (D-CA) in favor of citizenship for so-called Dreamers (generally the 
same individuals eligible for DACA), a group of individuals protested this proposal. Opposing Sen. 
Harris’s message “was … a scattering of red ‘Make America Great Again’ hats and people holding signs 
that ‘Deport dreamers and their parents,’ ‘Build the wall, keep them out’ and ‘Defund sanctuary cities.’” 
(Wisckol 2017). 
208 Sanders (I-VT), relatively accurately summed up matters on the Senate floor: “On February 5, in a 
Monmouth poll, when asked about Dreamers’ status, nearly three out of four Americans support allowing 
these young people to automatically become U.S. citizens as long as they don’t have a criminal record. In 
other words, the votes that are going to be cast hopefully today, maybe tomorrow, are not profiles in 
courage. They are not Members of the Senate coming up and saying: Against all the odds, I believe I am 
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Contrary to expectations, views expressed by members of Congress run the full 
gamut of popularly expressed views, with virtually any shade of opinion from deportation 
to citizenship expressed. Sens. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Richard Durbin (D-NY) are 
in favor of a path to citizenship for Dreamers. Representative Ed Royce (R-CA) 
represents a moderate view as he is in favor of legal status for DACA recipients but is 
opposed to a path to citizenship (Wisckol 2017). Sen. Chuck Grassley’s (R-IA) released a 
more law-and-order oriented statement on the day DACA’s suspension was announced. 
He called DACA “executive overreach” and stated that any solution must uphold “the 
rule of law” and “encourage lawful immigration” Further, he said that any compromise 
on this issue must address “the status of those who have been unlawfully brought into this 
country” (Grassley 2017). At the extreme end of viewpoints, Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) 
opposes any form of legalization as a violation of the rule of law and thus voted against 
opening debate on DACA on the Senate floor (154 Cong. Rec. S868, 2018).209 
MCs even have public negotiating positions regarding their preferences and what 
they will “trade” to see these views enacted in statute. Sen. Jeff Flake (R-AZ) supports a 
path to citizenship, but will accept a three-year continuation of DACA in exchange for 
fully funding the Trump administrations border security proposal (Flake 2018). Sen. 
Kamala Harris (D-CA) supports funding for border security as part of a DACA bill, but 
                                                 
going to vote for what is right. This is what the overwhelming majority of the American people want” (164 
Cong. Rec. S942, 2018). 
209 Cruz described the proposals under debate in February as amnesty, even the Republican plan based on 
President Trump’s “4 pillars.” “If this body gets 60 votes for one of these amnesty proposals,” Sen. Cruz 
said, “then it is incumbent on the House to stop it, much like with the Gang of 8” (164 Cong. Rec. S1145, 
2018) 
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refused to appropriate any money for a border wall because she believes “the 
appropriation of $25 billion for a border wall is a waste of taxpayer money. A wall will 
not secure our border and [she] remain[s] concerned those billions of dollars may also be 
used to implement this Administration’s anti-immigrant agenda – one that targets 
California and its residents” (Harris 2018). Sen. Grassley opposed earlier proposals to 
address DACA without a border wall or changes to legal immigration as “a massive 
amnesty to millions of people who’re in the country unlawfully” (Grassley 2018). MCs 
thus express and stand behind views far more diverse than the talking points of two 
warring camps. 
Co-sponsorship of bills in the House of Representatives provides further evidence 
that congressionally expressed views are roughly proportional to those possessed in the 
society at large. The USA Act of 2018, which combines conditional permanent legal 
status for Dreamers with border security funding and an increasing in general funding for 
immigration processing and enforcement, was introduced by Rep. Will Hurd (R-TX). 
This bill was cosponsored by 55 other representatives including 27 other Republicans and 
28 Democrats.210 In addition to these 28 Republicans, a further 92 Republicans co-
sponsored the Securing America’s Future Act of 2018, which is more conservative, but 
still grants legal status (but not a path to citizenship) to DACA recipients.211 Assuming 
that the Democrats who did not cosponsor Hurd’s bill have views to the left of his bill 
210 “H.R.4796 – USA Act of 2018.” Congress.gov.  Accessed March 23, 2018. 
<https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4796> 
211 “H.R.47960 – Securing America's Future Act of 2018.” Congress.gov.  Accessed March 23, 2018. 
<https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4760> 
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(i.e. they prefer a more direct path to citizenship, or do not want to appropriate more 
money for border security), a wide majority of 313 MCs in the House have expressed 
support for some version of DACA, very much in line with wide popular majorities in 
favor of this same position. 
Given this fact, how is it possible that as of May 2018 the Congress has yet to act 
favorably on any DACA related bill? The answer is disappointingly clear: the process for 
integrating the preferences of the House and Senate into the form of generally acceptable 
bills has broken down. Rather than develop a bill, which will then be reported to a 
relevant committee for mark-up and then a vote on the floor, policy formulation in the 
115th Congress has been captured by a centralized and oddly ad hoc process in turn 
cartelized by party-leaders. Unorthodox lawmaking has become the norm, with negative 
consequences for representativeness in the policy process. 
While the committee process does not automatically lead to an efficient 
integration of diverse views (see Chapter Three), avoiding committees in the manner 
practiced in the 115th Congress can prime bills for representative failure. Consider the 
process for dealing with DACA in the Senate. Rather than develop a bill, which would 
then be sent to the Judiciary committee for mark-up, Senate majority leadership 
(including the chairman of the Judiciary committee, Grassley, and Majority Whip, John 
Cornyn [R-TX]) formed an ad-hoc working group to frame a DACA bill. This working 
group consisted of the two leaders and five other individuals, Sens. Tills (R-NC), Perdue 
(R-GA), Lankford (R-OK), Cotton (R-AR), and Ernst (R-IA) (164 Cong. Rec. S856, 
2018). Whereas the Senate as a whole contained views roughly consonant with the 
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population at large, this “committee” failed to contain any moderate Republican voice on 
DACA, to say nothing of moderate or liberal Democratic views. When the proposal 
framed by this group came to the floor senators spoke of the great compromises made 
within the working group to find a common ground.212 In terms of the group itself, this 
was undoubtedly true, as Senators Cotton and Perdue were on the record opposing all 
efforts at “amnesty” before the unveiling of this bill and had earlier in the Congress 
proposed a bill to halve legal immigration (Brownstein 2018). Yet, in all fairness to the 
claims of compromise within this group, it is no great sign of representation that all 
views from far-right to center-right were consulted in the formation of a bill. Predictably, 
this bill failed to find support from the Senate at large, since it failed to even include a 
consideration of the chamber median on this issue – a moderate Republican – and it went 
down in failure with fewer than 40 votes in its favor (164 Cong. Rec. S1148, 2018). 
Demonstrating that this process is not an outlier, a similar process played out 
regarding the drafting of the bill to replace the ACA (Obamacare) in the Senate. Rather 
than utilizing the committee process, Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) opted to 
convene an ad hoc working group to frame a proposal to repeal and replace the ACA. 
The thirteen-member working group thereby formed famously failed to contain a single 
female senator and drew media attention for this reason (Pear 2017). While the working 
212 Majority Leader McConnel (R-KY) claimed that, “This legislation is a fair compromise that addresses 
the stated priorities of all sides” (164 Cong. Rec. S856, 2018). Sen Tillis (R-NC) described the process as 
fair and broad: “Now, this week, we have an opportunity to debate one that I think works. No. 1, there is 
broad consensus. Even among people who have never supported a path to citizenship before, there is broad 
consensus that this is a workable, viable, compassionate framework. So, 1.8 million DACA-eligible 
persons qualify for a path to citizenship [in this proposal]” (164 Cong. Rec. S863, 2018). 
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group’s failure to descriptively represent the Congress was noticeable, recall that the 
framework of representation in this work focuses mainly on substantive representation of 
interests and views. Much less remarked upon is the fact that this working group 
misrepresented both views and interests that would be relevant to proposing a policy to 
replace the ACA. 
Demonstrating the mal-representation of the ACA repeal process requires 
reasoning about several key national divides. Operating geographically, one might split 
the nation into the coasts and the interior, with 20 states bordering the Atlantic or Pacific 
Ocean, and 30 in the interior. It is well-known that the nation’s coastal states differ from 
the rest of the nation; indeed, they differ to the extent that, in the 2016 election, Hillary 
Clinton prevailed in 14 of the 20 coastal states, whereas President Trump won 24 of the 
30 interior states. In sum, coastal states are generally peopled by individuals considerably 
more liberal than those who live in states which do not border the Atlantic or Pacific. 
Operating in terms of policy relevant to the ACA, the states might also be cleaved with 
respect to whether they decided to expand Medicaid as provided for under that statute. 32 
states adopted the Medicaid expansion and 18 declined to do so. Senators obviously had 
different interests at stake depending on whether they were from a state which covered 
hundreds of thousands of residents with heath care access provided by new federal 
money. 
In terms of these views and interests, senators ought not to be automatons. The 
design of Congress does not require that MCs deterministically present views favorable 
to conservative ideology if they are from a state in the nation’s interior, or advocate for 
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the continuation of the Medicaid expansion if they represent a state which has done so. 
MCs are not instructed delegates, pledged to an unalterable program held by their 
constituents. But the electoral connection nevertheless does operate to nudge MCs to pay 
attention to the views and interests of their constituents. The electoral connection can be 
in some sense defeated, however, by improperly constituted internal structures, such as 
the working group working to repeal the ACA. Whereas 40 of the nation’s senators hail 
from the nation’s more liberal coastal states, only one Senator from the working group 
came from such a state. While 32 states had expanded Medicaid, only five of the thirteen 
members came from those states. And while the Senate was majority Republican, in 2017 
it included 48 Senators who were Democrats or caucused with Democrats. The working 
group had none; it was an exclusively Republican affair. It was not surprising when a bill 
proposed by this group, the BCRA, ignominiously failed to receive majority backing 
when it came to a vote on the Senate floor, despite the great pressure exerted on 
Republicans to vote for any bill that successfully fulfilled their campaign promise to 
repeal and replaced the ACA (163 Cong. Rec, S4183, 2017). In the end, the problem with 
Congress is not precisely that it “tends to flatten the nation's diversity into two polarized, 
warring camps,” (Wallach 2018), but instead that essential parts of the nation’s diversity 
are simply ignored at the initiation stage of legislation. 
THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION UNYOKED: UNRESPONSIVENESS 
The problems in the legislative process unfortunately do not end in the state of 
initiation, they continue throughout the legislative cycle. After an especially salient bill 
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becomes public, it is natural that constituents will begin offering their opinions on the 
proposed enactment, whether by calling or emailing their representative, attending a 
town-hall, or being queried for their view by public polling outfits. In the present, the 
sheer quantity of information regarding the preferences of the public is potentially 
overwhelming. Recalling that one of the preeminent attributes of congressional health is a 
thorough-going attempt to make laws that are acceptable, in principle, to a popular 
majority, it is important for the institution to structure ways for information regarding the 
potential popularity of bills to brought into the lawmaking process. The 115th Congress 
fails to exhibit much attention, however, to this task, as its majority party often assumes 
that popularity of its bills flow automatically from election results, and as institutional 
capacity for transmitting preferences from the society at large into the institution, such as 
town halls, correspondence, and calls, is degraded by both norms and a lack of resources 
devoted to this task 
In the 115th Congress, MCs of the majority party often exhibit behavior 
suggesting that responding substantively to expressed citizen concern is irrelevant to the 
task of drafting and passing a bill. Polling data on the Republican effort to repeal and 
replace the ACA (Obamacare) confirmed time and time again that constituents who were 
aware of the bill did not take a great liking to it. In general, the average poll showed that 
disapproval outweighed approval by more than twenty percentage points (Bacon 2017). 
Nevertheless, Republican boosters of the bill continued to insist that they had promised to 
repeal the ACA and thus would do so. Republican leaders, such as Majority Party Whip 
Cornyn stated that the bill which they had drafted, “is not perfect, but it is better than the 
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status quo, and we intend to do our duty” (163 Cong. Rec. S4415). While perhaps fitting 
in a Gilbert and Sullivan number, statements such as these were fundamentally 
unresponsive to what was occurring in their constituencies. On one hand, Republicans 
were certainly correct to note widespread antipathy to the ACA and government 
interference in health care provision. Yet, the problem was that constituents objected to 
the specific means chosen by congressional Republicans to fulfill their promise to repeal 
(or fix) the ACA. Indeed, their bill was so unpopular, by one reasonable estimate “there 
are only about 80 congressional districts — out of 435 — where support for the bill 
exceeds opposition” (Silver 2017).213 Simply put, there is little normative support for the 
passage of a bill, like the AHCA (the House’s repeal and replace plan), which is 
supported by fewer than 100 of the nation’s 435 geographically demarcated districts. 
And while perhaps Republicans felt justified in being warry of polling after the 
reputed failures of those instruments to predict Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 
elections, significant information existed outside of public opinion polling to suggest that 
the AHCA was not approved, in principle, by a popular majority. In some sense, the signs 
of dissent emerged immediately and reasonably: The election of 2016 was very tightly 
contested; congressional Republicans won a plurality but not a majority of votes cast 
across the nation for Representatives. The scope of opposition surprised many MCs, 
                                                 
213 A further estimate suggested that the bill was so unpopular that in only three constituencies did it have 
majority support. Silver developed this estimate by taking advantage of a March YouGov poll which broke 
down support or opposition to the bill by presidential vote choice in the last election. Silver then “allocated 
the Trump, Clinton and other voters in each district based on their overall levels of support or opposition to 
the bill in the YouGov poll.” (2017). 
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however, as protests emerged immediately and vociferously to the proposals emerging 
out of the 115th Congress. At one event Rep. Stefanik (R-NY) heard from constituents 
regarding the AHCA; “No one other than Stefanik had anything good to say about the 
bill” (Hirsch 2017). By February of 2017 (one month into the first session of the 115th 
Congress), “many Republicans [chose] not to hold events at all, wary of protests that 
might greet them” (Gabriel et al 2017). Given the responsibility of Congress, and 
especially the People’s House, to bring popular opinion to bear, this was already a 
dubious step. The reasoning publicly expressed for these decisions, made a bad situation 
worse. “Republicans have accused the protesters who have roiled town hall-style 
meetings of not representing a true grass-roots outpouring but instead being an AstroTurf 
movement paid by shadowy groups” (Gabriel et al 2017).214 While some Republicans 
such as Sen. Grassley pushed back against this narrative, insisting that the protestors were 
genuine constituents, the actions of majority party MCs are clear: Republican members of 
Congress held 133 town halls from February through April, only to hold 2 in all of July – 
the pivotal month were the Senate almost passed a repeal of the ACA (Stein 2017). One 
key role of a legislature, especially one with geographic representation with defined 
representatives, it to provide an ear to popular grievance. In the 115th Congress, however, 
MCs inserted earplugs to drown out unfavorable response to the bills which they had 
“crafted.”215 
                                                 
214 Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-UT) accused the Democrats of “bullying” in a “concerted effort” to create chaos 
at Republican town halls (Nelson 2017). 
215 The subsequent section reveals that not very much “crafting” goes into developing policy proposals at 
present. 
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The actions of MCs are perhaps more culpable given the large citizen interest in 
the goings-on of Congress. In the contemporary era a great deal of discussion and worry 
concerns the quantity and quality of citizen’s understanding of and interaction with the 
political process. Citizens are widely accused of being disconnected, ignorant and 
uninterested in holding their leaders to account. Yet, in an important respect, 
contemporary citizens are remarkably engaged in trying to contact their representatives, 
as an overwhelming flood of letters, emails, and calls deluges the capitol. “Constituent 
correspondence to the Senate,” for instance, “increased by 548 percent between 2002 and 
2010” (Finley 2017). This trend continued into the 115th Congress. “The office of Sen. 
Bob Casey, a Democrat from the large battleground state of Pennsylvania, has received 
more than 50,000 letters and emails opposing DeVos’ confirmation as education 
secretary” (Hefling 2017). Not simply a feature of the first moments of session, 
engagement has continued throughout the session. “Between 2016 and 2017, calls, 
emails, and letters to representative Moulton’s office alone grew from 500 a month to 
3,000 a month—and that’s in an almost entirely Democratic district with a Democratic 
congressman” (Lapowsky 2018). Such a concerted effort to contact their representatives 
raises two questions: (1) are MCs listening? And (2) are they responding? 
Congressional norms and limited resources devoted to this task impede the 
process of listening and make responding very difficult. In terms of norms, MCs publicly 
express little interest in hearing from those who disagree with them. In fairness to MCs, 
such lack of interest is a more or less universal human behavior; in fairness to 
constituents, representatives have voluntarily agreed to be lawmakers, taking on all duties 
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which are entailed in being an MC. Rep. Gohmert (R-TX), for instance, justified his 
opposition to meeting with constituents by sketching a picture of town hall participants as 
violent revolutionaries: “Unfortunately, at this time there are groups from the more 
violent strains of the leftist ideology, some even being paid, who are preying on public 
town halls to wreak havoc and threaten public safety” (Gohmert 2017). Even reasonable 
norms, like a preference for hearing from one’s own constituents rather than Americans 
at large, are exploited and expanded beyond due bounds. After being deluged with calls 
suggesting that Sec. DeVos was unqualified, Sen. Scott (R-SC) said in a statement that 
while he “wants to hear from every one of his constituents…out-of-state callers are doing 
a disservice to our folks who are trying to reach the office” (Hefling 2017). As a Senator, 
one is not merely an ambassador from a state, the decisions made in that body affect all 
citizens. Sec. DeVos was, when confirmed, placed at the head of the Department of 
Education across the nation, not just in South Carolina. Public facing expressions are 
perhaps not even biggest problem; work with congressional staffers suggest that 
“Constituent input is used most universally to back up existing policy agendas…. And 
constituent correspondence is consistently delegated to the most junior staffers, whose 
turnover, experience, and capacity inhibit innovation” (“From Voicemails” 2017, 9). 
MCs do not seem to be listening especially closely. 
MCs are moreover unable to respond to the sheer amount of correspondence they 
receive based on self-imposed funding caps. The lack of congressional resources devoted 
to responding to constituents is part of an overall decline in the staffing of Congress. As 
an example of this wholesale decline in congressional capacity, consider one 
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representative committee of Congress. “In 1975, the Commerce Committee had 112 
staffers, which increased to 162 by 1985. By 2015, staffing on the committee had fallen 
to eighty-three” (Drutman 2017).216 These cuts at the committee level have been carried 
out in parity with congressional staff for individual MCs. “Budgets for House members' 
personal offices had been cut by 21 percent since 2011” (Lapowsky 2018). A substantive 
lack of staffing means that a third of those who email Congress receive no response. 
“Nearly half of those who did receive a response found it lacking, usually because they 
believed it failed to actually address their issue. The reason for those dismal results is 
simple: Members of Congress are only allowed to hire eighteen staffers each. That means 
that as the volume of email grows, those dozen-and-a-half staffers are stuck with more 
work, and Congress can't hire more people to help” (Finley 2017). Funding is scarce, but 
within the available amount of resources, MCs have made their priorities painfully clear. 
In an age of large deficits, the popular pressure to cut the budget of Congress is 
real, but one of the most essential attributes of Congress concerns that body’s openness to 
influence from its constituents. Recall that it was considered a landmark in the history of 
democratization for constituents in the First Congress to be able to sit in the gallery and 
watch the House of Representatives debate petitions which they had themselves 
submitted. It seems perverse to think of the current Congress, an institution embedded 
                                                 
216 “House staffing levels underwent an even sharper decline after Newt Gingrich became speaker in the 
1990s and slashed committee budgets. Neither chamber has recovered. Nonpartisan sources of expertise in 
Congress have also declined. The Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Research 
Service, which provide nonpartisan policy and program analysis to lawmakers, now employ 20 percent 
fewer staffers than they did in 1979” (Drutman 2017). 
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within a more democratic polity, seem nearly closed off from the public at large. And 
rather than being a problem of corruption or special interest influence, the issue seems to 
be will and desire, which is potentially as much or more troubling than the former. 
DELIBERATION: MISSING ON THE FLOOR
The deliberative deficit of the contemporary Congress is greatly remarked upon 
by congressional observers and experts, but the scale of current difficulties must 
nevertheless be emphasized. The end of the regular order has led to a dearth of committee 
hearings and mark-up sessions on bills and reduced the quality of the few hearings that 
were conducted (Lewallen et al 2015). As mentioned above, the Congress has reduced its 
own resources for committee staffing and the like, which can help MCs to make more 
informed determinations regarding the merits of the thousands of bills that are introduced 
in a given legislative session (Wallach 2018).217 In this section, however, I would like to 
focus especially on floor debate. In 2017 and 2018, congressional deliberation was 
hampered by norms regarding debate on the floor, as well as procedures that eliminated 
the possibility for meaningful deliberation. The deliberative muscles of the Senate have 
atrophied to the point that when Majority Leader McConnell structured an “open floor 
debate” on DACA, the floor was not open, and there was no substantive debate. Just as in 
the antebellum Congress, senators failed to make substantive contact with one another’s 
arguments, preferring to provide expressive speech for their constituents back home. 
217 “Even as the executive branch's responsibilities have ballooned, legislators have thinned the ranks of 
their own staffs and diminished their salaries” (Wallach 2018). 
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The special rules used to organize “debate” in the 115th Congress do not in fact 
encourage meaningful deliberation regarding the merits of proposed legislation. Let one 
turn, for instance, to the attempt to repeal the ACA. By July of 2017, several efforts to 
repeal the ACA had bogged down. On July 27th a new proposal was being floated by 
Republican legislative leaders called a “skinny repeal,” which would repeal the insurance 
mandate in the ACA, defund Planned Parenthood, and encourage states to get exemptions 
from various other mandates regarding the scope of insurance which could be sold in 
exchanges under that law. When it was made public for the first time, around 10:00 PM 
on the evening of July 27th, the Senate gave unanimous consent to for a two-hour debate 
over a motion to recommit the “skinny repeal,” with time equally divided between 
Democrats and Republicans. In the first place, two-hours was given to discuss a 
fundamental change in the American health care system, with no pressing deadline. The 
Senate debated the emergency bank bill in 1933 for longer than this; the House of 
Representatives would have considered such a time limit “martial law” in 1933. While 
clearly partisan as well as procedural concerns abounded, Senate Democrats expressed 
astonishment at this process. Sen. Murphy (D-CT) said that, “this process is an 
embarrassment. This is nuclear-grade bonkers what is happening here tonight. We are 
about to reorder one-fifth of the American healthcare system, and we are going to have 2 
hours to review a bill which, at first blush, stands essentially as healthcare system arson” 
(163 Cong. Rec. S4401, 2017). Under no pressing emergency, there is little reason for the 
Senate to operate under such stark control. 
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Compounding this limited time was the manner chosen by the parties’ designees 
for dividing it. Rather than having Democrats and Republicans alternate, the Democrats 
presented their broadsides against the bill in an hour of continuous declamation, with no 
substantive response by Republicans. When the Republican time arrived, bill manager 
Sen. Enzi (R-WY), undertook to filibuster his own bill, discussing health co-ops and 
other features of health-care policy unrelated to the bill at hand. A surreal exchange 
occurred when the Democrats attempted to force a substantive exchange regarding the 
bill: 
Mr. ENZI. Well, where are the suggestions [you Democrats have] for 
making it as near perfect as possible? We put up a lot of—— 
Ms. HEITKAMP addressed the Chair. 
Mr. ENZI. I am not asking that as a rhetorical question. Think about it for 
a little while, come up with constructive suggestions. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming has the floor. 
Ms. HEITKAMP. Would the Senator yield for a question? 
Mr. ENZI. No, I will not yield for a question. (163 Cong Rec. S4408, 
2017). 
Sen. Enzi asked for Democrats to propose substantive improvement to his bill, insisted it 
was not a rhetorical gesture, and then refused to yield to a Democrat when they asked to 
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respond.218 Such an exchange, or rather the deliberate attempt to avoid a genuine 
exchange on the floor of the Senate, reveals a settled norm against providing substantive 
arguments in favor of or opposed to a given bill or amendment on the Senate floor, when 
someone might be on hand to give counter-arguments. The floor is, in reality, not 
designated for lawmaking deliberation or negotiation. Only under the sway of such a 
norm is the suggestion of Sen. Cornyn, that the Democrats did not participate, legible 
(163 Cong. Rec. S4415). Democrats had talked on the floor for an hour; where they had 
absented themselves from (or been excluded, depending on who tells the story) was the 
informal negotiation actually taking place regarding the bill off the floor. 
The pattern of floor usage prioritizing “expressive speech” continued during the 
“open debate” on DACA held in February of 2018. While Sen. Grassley proclaimed that 
“Leader McConnell has honored his commitment and allowed us to have an open, fair 
immigration debate this week” (S895), reality did not bear out this assertion. Curiously 
enough, the first aspect missing from debate was deliberation of any kind. Even though 
this was supposed to be a special week, the floor looked just like any other in the 
contemporary Congress, with senators presenting prepared speeches to an empty room. 
Worse, when it came time to give her speech the next senator in line would often fail to 
even address the existence of the previously given speech. An example of from the 
                                                 
218 Other oddities occurred off the Senate floor. Accurately recounting what he had seen on television, Sen. 
Kaine (D-VA), reported on what “Senator GRAHAM [had said] just a few hours ago. He described the bill 
that is now on the floor, the skinny repeal, the skinny bill, as a policy is a disaster as a replacement for 
ObamaCare. It is a fraud. Is ‘‘fraudulent disaster’’ the best that the United States Senate can do now?” (163 
Cong. Rec. S4407, 2017). Sen. Graham would go on to vote in favor of the skinny repeal. 
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Congressional Record during this “open debate,” is given below (see Figure 6-1). In the 
illustration that follows, one can see that Sen. Cornyn gains the floor from Sen. Durbin 
and begins talking on an entirely different subject than immigration. Juxtaposing this type 
of “debate” with an example from an earlier Congress makes for a downright alarming 
comparison. Figure 6-2 represents a page chosen from the Congressional Record during 
Senate debate regarding the banking emergency of 1933. The first thing which leaps off 
the page is the number of interlocutors present on the page (five), and the tendency of the 
speakers to directly answer one another’s arguments. Keeping in mind that this earlier 
debate was carried out under immense time and presidential pressure “to get things 
done,” it is yet more remarkable that Senators are responding to one another, and 
genuinely attempting to figure out if the proposal from the White House will be able to 











Figure 6-1: Page of the Congressional Record from February 12, 2018 
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Figure 6-2: Page of the Congressional Record from March 9, 1933 
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It was not just the structure of sequential set-piece addresses that imperiled 
debate: the speeches expressed on both sides substantively failed to argue regarding the 
merits of the proposal from Sen. Grassley’s working group. Democrats who spoke on the 
question of DACA generally limited their remarks to stories of individual DREAMERS 
and their contention that it was unreasonable and unjust to deport individuals who were 
teachers, or soldiers, or doctors, or the like. Republicans generally spoke to their belief 
that the proposal from the Grassley proposal was the only bill that had a chance to be 
voted upon by the House, or signed by the President.219 Even the exception to this general 
rule, goes on to prove the rule. 
While there were almost no substantive interactions between senators there was 
one exchange over the concept of “chain migration.” Chain migration is a term of current 
political contestation; Republicans hold that this is a metaphor to describe the way that 
one legal permanent resident or citizen can eventually sponsor many members of his or 
her extended family to immigrate to the United States; Democrats hold that the term is 
offensive, particularly to members of minority groups whose ancestors literally were 
brought to this country in chains (164 Cong. Rec. S934-7, 2018). Sens. Menendez (D-NJ) 
and Tillis (R-NC) sparred over the appropriateness of this term, or one should say more 
accurately that Sen. Tillis responded negatively to a speech given by Sen. Menendez. 
219 Grassley (R-IA) stated that “at the end of the day, in spite of everything else, the simple fact remains 
that this amendment is the only plan that the President supports. This plan is the only Senate plan that has 
any possibility of passing the House of Representatives and becoming law. So I have asked my colleagues 
who oppose this proposal: Are you interested in actually getting something done, in actually providing a 
path to citizenship for these DACA kids, or are you interested in a political issue for the 2018 elections? If 
you are actually interested in getting something done, in getting a bill signed into law, and fixing the 
DACA issue, the choice is obvious: You will vote to support this plan” (164 Cong. Rec. S861, 2018). 
 300 
After hearing Menendez, Tillis opined that, “We just heard a discussion. I tell you, 
sometimes I think I teleport from this Chamber to the Kennedy Center because there are 
more theatrics going on here than you can find down there on any given day” (164 Cong. 
Rec. S936, 2018). Sen. Tillis insisted that the term chain migration was appropriate and 
that this process must be limited to for the sake of “our economic growth [and] for our 
economic security” (S937). Sen. Menendez not being in the room, or anyone else other 
than the presiding office and clerks, the exchange stopped at this point.  
Instead of being elaborated or extended, a potential for real debate was lost. Had 
anyone been around, senators could have discussed family-reunification (“chain 
migration”) as a policy of immigration, and whether this topic really needed to be folded 
into a debate regarding DACA. Instead, Sen. Tillis himself descended to the theatrics that 
he was decrying only moments before, questioning the motives of his opponents: “I 
guarantee you, anybody who sits here and says that the President’s proposal is unfair and 
insincere and hardline is playing politics. It makes me wonder if some of them would just 
as soon have this be the ‘if you elect me next year, I promise I will fix this problem’ 
campaign speech versus take this off the table, provide them certainty, and do something 
different for a change” (S938). Tillis’s guarantee fairs especially poorly in retrospect, as 
he is here describing a bill that would only go on to get 39 votes out of 99 in the Senate. 
The second feature missing from the “open debate” was an open process 
regarding amendments. In the aforementioned debate regarding the banking emergency 
in the 73rd Congress, several senators developed amendments in the midst of debate and 
successfully got a hearing of those amendments. In the process regarding DACA, there 
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was no attempt to develop a bill and then to modify it by successive amendments to a 
shape that would pass the Senate. This lack of openness likely contributes to the lack of 
genuine debate, as there is no reason to substantively reason with your opponent, 
especially one whom you dislike, if there is no way to provide signals of good faith 
argumentation. In an open process another senator could offer that an amendment to their 
proposition will induce them to support a proposal that they would otherwise oppose. 
Without this expedient deliberation suffers. Indeed, the process was remarkably closed. 
Rather than debate one bill, the Senate process revolved around four separate proposals 
(one which did not address DACA at all) all of which were preliminarily made subject to 
cloture, necessitating 60 votes for passage. While Democrats such as Sen. Murphy (D-
CT) explained that they wanted a deal, “Negotiation still has to be part of the legislative 
process, and I am glad there are Members of the Republican and Democratic caucuses 
who have been trying to do that. We will see where that goes” (S949). All negotiations 
regarding DACA, however, happened off the floor, where several proposals were created, 
only to see each ultimately fail to receive sixty votes. 
To confirm that this qualitative account is driven by a genuine difference between 
the deliberation of the present Congress and previous ones, one can subject the debate 
regarding the ACA “skinny repeal” and DACA to the same quantitative analysis carried 
out in earlier chapters. Recall that the procedure is to examine each debate, counting the 
number of speakers, the number of speeches (continuous addresses at least one column of 
the Record, being about 750 words), and the number of substantive replies that are 
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delivered between MCs. Under this scheme of analysis, it is apparent that the Senate 
exhibited high quantities of expressive speech and very little deliberative debate. 
Table 6-1: Senate Debate on ACA, July 27, 2017 and DACA February 12 – 15, 2018 
Summary Statistic No. of Speakers No. of Speeches Substantive Interactions 
Median 15 12 1 
Average 16.4 12.8 1.8 
ACA “Skinny” 
Repeal 
24 14 0 
DACA “Open 
Floor Debate” 
14.5 12.5 2.3 
Total N/A220 64 9 
Source: 163 Cong. Rec. S4350-4415, 2017; 164 Cong. Rec. S855-1148, 2018. 
The key to determining if Senators are talking to one another, or to some audience 
outside Congress, is to compare the number of speakers on the floor with the number of 
speeches. Seeing this number is generally the same for the 115th Congress – i.e. that each 
person talking is giving a speech – confirms the qualitative interpretation offered above; 
Senators used their time on the floor as an opportunity to make a speech, not to debate the 
merits of a bill with another individual. In some sense, the degree of substantive 
interaction is actually over-estimated by the method of counting employed here. In fact, 
                                                 
220 A sum of all speakers would lead to significant double-counting. Therefore, this count is not summed. 
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the majority (five) of substantive interactions in this data set occurred on the last moment 
of DACA floor debate where proponents of a moderate plan argued about what day one 
of its provisions ought to go into effect. This “debate” obviously did not touch on the 
fundamental matters regarding the bill. 
In the end, deliberation is perhaps even in worse shape than suggested in some 
modern accounts (Loomis 2011, Taylor 2012, Wallner 2012). While caution must be 
exercised in evaluating the Congress based on a sample of its total deliberation, one 
might consider the very real possibility that this sample represented the Senate at its most 
deliberative moments; after all, that is what Senators said they were doing during the 
week of February 12 – 15 in particular. Given the great consensus across experts and 
even opposite partisans in Congress regarding the lack of deliberation, it is possible that 
deliberation over typical, rather than salient, topics is even worse than that presented 
here. 
CONCLUSION: THE CONGRESS ON THE BRINK 
Up to this point in the chapter, Congress has been evaluated rather poorly along 
dimensions of representativeness, responsiveness, and deliberativeness; only a limited 
and mostly individualized respect for traditional norms of the lawmaking process have 
prevented outright failure in the Congress. The clearest example of such observable 
behavior by Members of the 115th Congress was the speech given by Sen. McCain (R-
AZ) on July 25th, 2017, and the votes taken by Sens. Collins (R-ME), McCain, and 
Murkowski (R-AK) on July 27th, 2017. Returning from medical treatment for cancer, 
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McCain delivered a long speech on the floor of the Senate which heavily criticized the 
Congress for its violation of norms and traditions that helped that body function in the 
past. Suggesting that the process that the Senate was using to attempt to repeal the ACA 
was dysfunctional, McCain said, “Let’s return to regular order…. Both sides [have] 
mandate[ed] legislation from the top down, without any support from the other side, with 
all the parliamentary maneuvers it requires. We are getting nothing done, my friends. We 
are getting nothing done” (163 Cong. Rec. S4169, 2017). Lacking any incentive to 
persuade or bargain with the other side, he suggested that “Our deliberations … haven’t 
been overburdened by greatness lately. Right now, they aren’t producing much for the 
American people” (S4168). Emphasizing the role of the Congress in providing for the 
common good of all Americans, McCain wound up to his peroration: 
 This place is important. The work we do is important. Our strange rules 
and seemingly eccentric practices that slow our proceedings and insist on 
our cooperation are important. Our Founders envisioned the Senate as the 
more deliberative, careful body that operates at a greater distance than the 
other body from the public passions of the hour (163 Cong. Rec. S4169, 
2017).221
Upon concluding his address, the Senator from Arizona was treated to a standing ovation 
by his colleagues on both sides of the aisle. 
221 Senator John S. McCain elaborated on this point when he noted that, “Our responsibilities [as senators] 
are important—vitally important—to the continued success of our Republic. Our arcane rules and customs 
are deliberatively intended to require broad cooperation to function well at all” (163 Cong. Rec. S4168, 
2017). 
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Stepping back from the adulation, one can see that McCain’s address presented a 
logically sequenced argument. He provided an account of the importance of “regular 
order,” tied the set of norms and procedures that make up the “regular order” to the 
ability of the Senate to deliberate, and then connected this feature of the Congress to its 
role in the constitutional system that it anchors. McCain, although not a political scientist 
or theorist, thus traced out in practical terms one important element of the role of 
Congress, in a way not dissimilar from that articulated in this study. Since a conception 
of congressional health or functionality still exists in the dysfunctional contemporary 
Congress, and can prove a spur to pivotal action to reject products of highly-suboptimal 
processes, the present Congress cannot be said to be a failed institution; it remains 
perched on a precipice. 
 One must note with some hope that the jury-rigged Senate bill, fashioned by a 
process which had so perturbed McCain, was voted down, removing the chance that the 
115th Congress would pass a policy favored by little more than a third of the citizenry. 
Moreover, it was not as if it was voted down by some agency outside the senior Senator 
from Arizona’s power. In his speech of July 25th, he stated, regarding the Senate’s efforts 
at repeal: 
I will not vote for this bill as it is today…. I know many of you will have 
to see the bill changed substantially for you to support it. We have tried to 
do this by coming up with a proposal behind closed doors in consultation 
with the administration, then springing it on skeptical Members, trying to 
convince them it is better than nothing—that it is better than nothing—
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asking us to swallow our doubts and force it past a unified opposition. I 
don’t think that is going to work in the end and probably shouldn’t 
(S4169). 
Then, Sens. McCain, Murkowski and Collins all voted against the bill on the 27th, ending 
the process of comprehensively repealing and replacing the ACA. The three senators, by 
acting on their stated opposition to the process, provided behavioral reinforcement for the 
stated, expressive norm regarding the place of a senator. The actions of the three 
Republican senators provoked a restrained response from the Democratic Minority 
Leader. Rather than gloating (publicly at least) regarding the salvation of “Obamacare,” 
Sen. Chuck Schumer delivered a short statement reaffirming the sentiments of Sen. 
McCain: 
This august body has been around for over 220 years. It has rules. It has 
traditions we are very proud of. In recent years—both parties to blame—
many of those traditions have been eroded. What happens when you erode 
the traditions—the bipartisanship, the ability to work through the regular 
order—is very simply that the product that emerges is not very good. 
There is a reason this body has been the greatest deliberative body in the 
world, and it is because it had those traditions. Now we don’t have them 
(Congressional Record S4414). 
Senators on both sides of the aisle are both cognizant of the fact that Congress (and the 
Senate in particular) lacks the requisite processes to make good law. 
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Yet, one must face the fact that not passing an unpopular bill scored by 
Congress’s own deliberative institutions, such as the CBO, as disastrous, does not make 
that institution healthy. The norms, rules and procedures of Congress must help promote 
the general welfare for to be healthy; while muddling through it has its virtues, abstaining 
from harming the general welfare is not good enough.222 Indeed, despite the widely 
expressed contention of those such as Sen. McCain, there is little work ongoing in 
Congress which heeds his call for greater or more substantive bipartisan deliberation. 
Later in the same year as the ACA, Congress passed a substantial change in the tax policy 
of the United States with a very similar amount of (which is to say little) substantive 
deliberation, hearings and a closed amendment process. In 2018, there has been no action 
on DACA or gun policy, the latter of which has grown remarkably in salience after a 
mass shooting in February at a Florida high school. 
One reason for the lack of movement on the reform front is the sketchy grasp 
expressed by MCs of the comprehensiveness of the dysfunction of their institution. 
McCain, Schumer and others seem to suppose that if the Congress can go “back” to its 
traditions, the Congress will function well. But, as shown in this study, functional 
Congresses often need to innovate to respond to exigent circumstances. In the Early 
Republic and in the New Deal, Congress found that it needed to reject traditions to 
maintain representativeness in changed contexts, to respond to emergent crises, or to 
                                                 
222 Sen. Shelly Moore Capito said, regarding the Senate’s attempt to repeal the ACA, “I did not come to 
Washington to hurt people. For months, I have expressed reservations about the direction of the bill to 
repeal and replace Obamacare” (Abramson 2017, emphasis added). This sentiment generally goes without 
saying, but such is not the case in the 115th Congress. 
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deliberate wisely in a complex world. The regular order did not serve the 73rd Congress, 
but that did not stop the legislators from attempting to be more responsive to their 
constituents, or deliberative under tight time pressures. In some sense, the comprehensive 
and systematic approach to evaluating the institution of Congress undertaken in this work 
must be adopted by reformer within or without Congress if congressional functionality is 
to be restored. 
Finally, something must be said about institutional perspective and its importance 
for the prospects of the renovation of Congress. Comparing the New Deal Congress to 
the Congress of today reveals important changes in member motivation that must be 
considered in any attempt to address the doleful state of the fundamental lawmaking 
institution in our polity. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a president who won 
his election in a landslide among the worst peacetime turbulence in American history. 
President Donald John Trump was elected in a narrow victory during a time of slow but 
steady economic growth. His reputed populism, however, is unusual, in that many of his 
proposals to Congress are unpopular.223 Notwithstanding these radically different 
contexts, and all the intuitions that would follow for the rate of presidential support in the 
Senate (i.e. all differences suggest that President Roosevelt would have comparatively 
higher support) Trump is supported at the same or a higher level by the Senators of his 
                                                 
223 One of President Trump’s most recent proposals is to appropriate funds for allowing, training and 
licensing teachers to carry concealed weapons in the classroom. Among a set of gun related policies that 




party than FDR was during the First Hundred days (see Appendix Table A-1).224 
Whether or not a motive to support the Congress as an independent actor can be 
reestablished is very likely to be a pertinent factor in the potential future course of 
Congress; whether it is to recover, or to plunge further into ignominy on the pattern of the 
Antebellum Congress. Yet, the cases in this work do not show a steady march of decay or 
decline; while Congress is profoundly dysfunctional at present, equipping ourselves with 
appropriate historical knowledge regarding Congress can give rise to hope. Especially 
given the consequences of congressional failure, the future of Congress is not a mere 
academic concern; the study of congressional health, which this work seeks to inaugurate, 
will hopefully be one tool which can be called on to arrest its decline and support the 
placing of its edifice upon a surer foundation.  
  
                                                 
224 To come to this conclusion, I compared a list of pivotal votes prepared by Herring 1934 in the 73rd 
Congress, and created a similar list of votes in the contemporary Senate. Simply dividing the number of 
votes in favor of the president’s position by the number of voting members of his party yields a presidential 
support score for each vote, which ranges from 0 to 1. President Trump receives an average support score 
of 0.88 and a median of 0.95 from Republicans; President Roosevelt received an average level of support of 
0.87 and a median of 0.93 from Democrats. 
 310 
Appendix 
Figure A-1: List of 34 Critical Votes from the 73rd Congress (Senate) 
 
The thirty-four test votes include: 
• passage of the Emergency Banking Act; 
• three amendments (limiting impact) to the Economy bill; 
• passage of the Economy Bill; 
• passage of the Beer Bill and the conference report on Beer;  
• passage of the Federal Emergency Relief Bill; 
• eight amendments to the Farm Bill including those related to cost-of-production 
and inflation; 
• passage of the Farm Bill; 
• passage of the bill establishing the Tennessee Valley Authority;  
• Repeal of the Gold clause;  
• an amendment limiting the thrust of the Black Bill; 
• six amendments to the National Industrial Recovery Act including those related to 
the licensing section, sales tax, Title I and labor; 
• passage of the NIRA and the conference report on NIRA; 
• five votes related to the Independent Offices Bill, including suspension of the 
rules, a motion to recommit, and passage of the Cutting-Steiwer amendment;  
• and passage of the conference report on the Independent Offices Bill. 
Source: Imler 1975, 355. 
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Table A-1: Presidential Support for FDR and Donald J. Trump in United States Senate 






Reform Dodd-Frank – S 2155 3/14/2018 100% 35% 
Trump 4 Pillars Immigration Plan – HR 2579 2/15/2018 72% 6% 
Continuing Res. (Govt. Shutdown) – HR 195 1/19/2018 90% 10% 
Continuing Resolution (December) – HR 1370 12/21/2017 96% 38% 
Trump Tax Bill – HR 1 12/20/2017 100% 0% 
Debt Limit / Hurricane Relief – HR 601 9/7/2017 63% 98% 
ACA Repeal (Skinny Repeal) – HR 1628 7/28/2017 94% 0% 
FY 2017 Appropriations Bill – HR 244 5/4/2017 62% 98% 
Eliminate Filibuster for SCOTUS Noms. 4/6/2017 100% 0% 
Repeal SS Admin. Rule on Gun Bkgrnd. 
Checks 
2/15/2017 100% 10% 
AVERAGE FOR TRUMP 88% 30% 
Emergency Banking Act – HR 1491 3/9/1933 98% 81% 
Economy Bill (Spending Cut) – HR 2820 3/15/1933 91% 50% 
Legalization of Beer (Conference) – HR 3341 3/20/1933 65% 37% 
Direct Unemploy. Aid (Conference) – HR 
4606 
3/30/1933 95% 44% 
30 Hour Work Week – S 158 4/6/1933 98% 35% 
Tennessee Valley Authority – HR 5081 5/3/1933 94% 45% 
Farm Aid (Conference) – HR 3835 5/10/1933 78% 43% 
NIRA (Conference) – HR 5755 6/13/1933 73% 18% 
AVERAGE FOR FDR 87% 44% 
Source: Congress.gov for 115th Congress, Herring 1934 for 73rd Congress. 
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